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ABSTRACT: This volume offers a first step toward the unification of many 
disparate threads in Canada’s history of the Second World War and new 
perspectives on Canada’s political and operational wars. What emerges is 
both unsurprising, and surprisingly new. Canada at war was a young nation 
increasingly, and sometimes cheekily, pursuing its national interests—at the 
level of policy. Although historians have overlooked Canada’s assertive role, 
through its joint defence measures and alliances Canada largely defined 
itself as a country, and combined close defence relationships with sover-
eignty. Operationally, in training, and in civil affairs Canada’s inexperience 
resulted in a steep learning curve. Nonetheless, battlefield experience pro-
vided important lessons that, in most key areas, were willingly learned.
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Introduction
Christine E. Leppard and Abraham M. Roof
Junior partners in a coalition war must balance their commitment and contribution to an alliance with their need to pursue their own national interests. These aims become problematic when, as often happens, par-
ticular aims of the junior partner do not perfectly align with those of the 
greater allied cause. This outcome was especially so for the newly independ-
ent Dominion of Canada upon the outbreak of war in 1939. Having had control 
over its foreign policies only since the signing of the Statute of Westminster 
in 1931, the war with Germany was the country’s first opportunity to de-
fine its independence in real terms; to determine its own national goals and 
fight for them. For Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King, this aim 
meant asserting Canada’s independence from its bigger allies, Britain and 
the United States, while keeping the country united behind the war effort.  
 Over the next six years of war, Canada raised its largest army ever, made 
critical contributions to the strategic bombing campaign, and protected 
Britain’s lifeline by guarding the safe and timely arrival of convoys travelling 
across the North Atlantic, all the while gearing its economy to wage total 
war. And yet, the country remained a junior partner in the Grand Alliance, 
tied historically and psychologically to Britain, but growing ever closer pol-
itically, economically and culturally to the United States. Military strategy 
was left to the Combined Chiefs of Staff—out of Canadian hands—while 
Canadian forces had to learn modern warfare, and then how to fight it, along-
side American, British and Empire troops. 
 With little to no role in strategy, Canada’s war experiences were divided 
between higher policy and the actions of men on the ground, leaving a vac-
uum in the traditional ‘middle’. Perhaps in response to this divided nature 
of Canada’s war experience, historians rarely have offered a unified study of 
Canada’s Second World War. Instead the historiography has been divided 
along two separate paths—rarely the two have met. Down one path, histor-
ians have studied Canada’s transformation from colony to nation (or colony 
to nation to colony) during the war. In 1939, Canada entered the war a sover-
eign country, but with no experience or institutional knowledge of what that 
meant in practice. Throughout the war, the government determined a set 
of national interests, and derived a distinct foreign policy to pursue those 
goals. And yet, Britain’s vulnerability led Canada to become closer than ever 
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before to the United States, a trend that continued throughout the Cold War. 
Down the second path, historians have focused on the operational and tac-
tical levels, where Canada’s army, navy and air force had to equip, train for 
and then fight modern warfare. On all fronts, the quality of the Canadians’ 
performance was condemned until the 1990s, when Canadian military his-
torians largely moved away from political-diplomatic questions in order to 
broaden and deepen their understanding of Canadian performance on the 
battlefront. 
 This book aims to bridge the divide by offering new perspectives on 
Canada’s political and operational wars in a single volume. It originated at a 
conference on the Second World War hosted by the University of Calgary in 
Lake Louise, Alberta, in September 2009. The first section examines Canada 
as alliance partner. In chapter one Galen Perras assesses the historiography 
of the topic. There has been an unfortunate and persistent tendency by 
Canadian historians, he argues, to accept Colonel C.P. Stacey’s official histor-
ies as canon, thereby overlooking areas in need of research or re-assessment. 
Perras notes many questions of coalition war that require detailed study, 
including Canada’s economic alliances; outlook towards the Pacific Theatre; 
bi-lateral relations with allies; and the Hong Kong debacle of 1941. Even the 
well-trodden topics of British-Canadian and American-Canadian relations 
are still wide open, especially the influence which key foreign officials had 
in Ottawa. Perras reminds us that the passage of time has removed official 
barriers to almost all key record groups and manuscript collections, leaving 
little excuse for a new generation of historians not to challenge the accepted 
historiography.
 A concept central to the study of Canada’s bi-lateral relationship with 
the U.S. is “defence against help”. As a country far outmuscled by its south-
ern neighbour, Canada has done just enough to defend its borders so that 
the U.S. never had to step in, breaching Canada’s geographical and political 
sovereignty as it did so. In chapter two, Richard Goette argues that this para-
digm does not apply to the active participation of Canadian officers on the 
Permanent Joint Board of Defence (PJBD) in 1941. Command was the acid 
test of sovereignty; the efforts of Canadian officers to find a balance between 
combined command and control arrangements with the Americans, while 
still ensuring that Canadian forces remained under Canadian command, 
were vital to safeguarding sovereignty. 
During the 1941 PJBD discussions, Canada rejected the American desire 
for unity of command under an American officer, and instead enforced ABC-
22, under which each nation retained strategic direction and command of its 
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own forces, while working for mutual cooperation. The results were mixed. 
On the quiet theatre of the West Coast, cooperation remained fluid, but when 
trying to coordinate the critical convoy air support out of North America 
relations were tense. Ultimately, however, Canada insisted that the strategic 
threat did not warrant unity of command, and championed mutual cooper-
ation. This functional approach protected Canadian sovereignty, and set a 
precedent for Canada-U.S. continental defence during the Cold War. Goette 
argues that Canada was not simply defending itself against help, but actively 
used its operational control over Canadian forces to bolster North American 
defence and Canadian sovereignty.
A similar agency can be found in Canada’s economic relationship 
with Britain and the U.S. In a re-examination of the Hyde Park agreement, 
Abraham Roof argues that following the Lend-Lease Act of February 1941, 
Canada crafted a policy to protect its national interests and largely at the 
expense of a nearly bankrupt Great Britain. Contrary to the traditional 
thesis that British weakness forced Canada into the arms of the U.S., Roof 
demonstrates that Mackenzie King, Minister of Munitions and Supply C.D. 
Howe and Deputy Minister of Finance Clifford Clark effectively achieved 
the best deal for Canada from Lend Lease. In February 1941, Dominions 
Secretary Lord Cranborne threatened to seize British orders in Canada and 
switch them to the U.S. if Canada did not join Lend Lease. In the following 
weeks, Mackenzie King and Clark devised a plan by which British orders 
to Canada using American components would be charged to Britain’s Lend 
Lease bill. They then devised a reciprocal trade programme for the U.S. 
and convinced the Americans of the plan’s viability, had Roosevelt sign 
the agreement at Hyde Park, all the while keeping the British largely in the 
dark. Britain’s pecuniary crisis may have forced Canada to cooperate more 
closely than ever before with the U.S., but Canada did so on its own, well 
calculated, terms.
The Canadian media positively embraced the country’s changing rela-
tionship with the United States. In his analysis of the media representation of 
the First Special Service Force (FSSF), Jim Wood in chapter four argues that 
the Canadian and American media idealized the force as distinctly ‘North 
American’, and therefore symbolising the shared values of the continent at 
arms. Even when the administrative difficulties inherent in a bi-national 
formation led to the Force’s disbandment, it remained a symbol of Canadian-
American good relations. Wood concludes that it was thanks to wartime 
media coverage of the FSSF that the legend of a uniquely North American 
military formation is remembered today. 
new perspectives on canada in the second world war
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In the final chapter of Section I, Alex Herd demonstrates that, in a 
manner similar to the defence and economic spheres, Canada in the Cold 
War became closer doctrinally to the U.S. as a matter of policy, planning, 
and education. After the war, the Canadian Army Staff College sought to 
train officers for amphibious warfare. Operation Gulliver, from 7-21 March 
1947, a staff exercise devoted to this end, was scripted to reflect the American 
attack on Cherbourg in 1944. Ultimately, the operation was about learning 
how a British-style organization like the Canadian Army could undertake an 
American military operation. During the Cold War, the Canadian army was 
not simply pulled into the American orbit. The Army Staff College sought 
methods by which Canada could adapt its existing structure to work symbi-
otically with American military doctrine. 
Altogether, the chapters of the first section point toward a Canada more 
calculated than conventionally thought in its diplomatic, economic and 
military relationships with Britain and the U.S., and to a Canadian media 
and public which were amenable to the country’s new friendship with their 
neighbours to the South. This is a new view of Canada’s wartime alliances, 
one where Canada was active and assertive in pursuit of its own interests, 
and Canadians liked the results. 
Section II moves from politics and economics to operations and tactics. 
Here, too, the results point to a more confident Canada than has been previ-
ously understood. Moving away from a traditional review of performance, 
this section considers how Canadians learned to fight on the modern battle-
field. In chapters six and seven, Will Pratt and Christine Leppard investigate 
the tactical changes made by Canadians in order to fit their armoured doc-
trine to the rugged Italian terrain. 
Pratt argues, contrary to popular belief, that armoured doctrine in Italy 
was dynamic. Armour increasingly was used at points where the German 
enemy least expected it. The Sherman tank, with good mobility over rough 
ground, was a technology ideally suited to this doctrine. Moreover, argues 
Pratt, historians’ fascination with the technology of the tank has at times ob-
fuscated a nuanced picture of the Italian Campaign. The experiences of tank 
crews show that there was much more to armoured warfare than muzzle 
velocity and horsepower. Reliance on the logistic capacity of military mules 
in the mountainous terrain of Italy counters the tropes of the Second World 
War being a case of mechanized warfare par excellence.
One Canadian tactical innovation during the war was the use of task 
forces, small battle groups designed to allow the Canadians to attack at tank 
speed, with enough infantry and supporting artillery to handle any battlefield 
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contingency. Leppard argues that task forces, developed in Sicily in response 
to the Italian terrain and German defences, were used successfully against 
German fighting retreats to the Liri Valley. They stemmed from a Canadian 
learning curve. Yet in the breakout from the Hitler Line in May, 1944, the task 
forces organised by Bert Hoffmeister proved too weak to advance speedily in 
the chaotic environment of the German retreat. When infantry were pinned 
down by small arms fire, the tanks kept attacking, resulting in disparate, and 
mediocre, local attacks. The Canadian reaction, argues Leppard, highlighted 
the maturity of their learning curve, as Canadian officers recognized that 
these task forces had been too weak to accomplish their objectives, and there-
after did not use them in the breakout from German strongpoints.
The final three chapters of the book address not only what tactics the 
Canadians were learning, but also how they were learning to wage war. 
In chapter eight, Craig Leslie Mantle deconstructs the ideal Canadian offi-
cer. The Canadian Army, he argues, expected junior officers to secure the 
trust and compliance of its men by, first, effecting a paternalistic approach 
where the interests of their men were put first. Secondly, officers were to 
demonstrate an expertise appropriate to their rank and trade; and, thirdly, 
to conduct themselves with the highest morals. In addition, officers were 
tasked with the seemingly contradictory mission of both maintaining stiff 
discipline among their subordinates, as well as high morale. Together, these 
standards were the archetype to which all officers were expected to aspire. 
Training officers to lead was accompanied by the difficult task of training 
soldiers to fight. As Russ Benneweis demonstrates in chapter nine, achieving 
a high standard of training was out of reach for the South Saskatchewan 
Regiment. Wading into a heated debate in the historiography over whether 
the Canadians were well trained for Normandy, Benneweis’ case study into 
one regiment’s experience, determines that the quality of their training was 
left wanting. Too much attention was paid to parade drill, and not enough on 
infantry/armoured cooperation.  
In the final chapter of the volume, David Borys examines Canadian Civil 
Affairs in North-West Europe—the first in-depth study of this topic. Borys 
illuminates a problem acute within Civil Affairs (CA), but also generally af-
fecting the Canadians, and that is how they had to learn and adapt on the 
battlefield. Although Canadians had been trained in Civil Affairs before the 
invasion of Normandy, the difficulty of population control, re-establishing 
effective government, and addressing the basic necessities of civilians, tested 
the mettle of the Canadian CA officers, and meant that learning had a high 
cost from Caen to the Channel Ports. Together, these chapters emphasize that 
new perspectives on canada in the second world war
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Canadians trained towards an ideal type, be it in junior officers, battalion 
training or civil affairs, but faced the reality that the best training for war, 
was war.
This volume has offered a first step toward the unification of many dis-
parate threads in Canada’s history of the Second World War. What emerges is 
both unsurprising, and surprisingly new. Canada at war was a young nation 
increasingly, and sometimes cheekily, pursuing its national interests—at the 
level of policy. Although historians have overlooked Canada’s assertive role, 
through its joint defence measures and alliances Canada largely defined it-
self as a country, and combined close defence relationships with sovereignty. 
Operationally, in training, and in civil affairs Canada’s inexperience resulted 
in a steep learning curve. Sometimes, as with training, it was not steep 
enough. Nonetheless, battlefield experience provided important lessons that, 
in most key areas, were willingly learned. We hope that the emerging gen-
eration of Canadian military historians will further integrate the experiences 
of Canada in the Second World War. 
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Is There More to Be Said? Examining 
the History of Canada’s Alliances in the 
Second World War
Galen Roger Perras
The following tale illustrates a problem that has afflicted the study of Canada’s role in the Second World War. In May 1990, I gave a paper, “Canada as a Military Partner: Alliance Politics and the Campaign 
to Recapture the Island of Kiska,” at the Canadian Historical Association’s 
annual meeting in Victoria, BC. This paper, derived from my MA thesis,1 
emphasized the civil-military machinations that ensued when an overeager 
Canadian Army, desperate for battlefield success after catastrophes at Hong 
Kong in December 1941 and Dieppe in August 1942, plunged headlong into 
an American-led operation to expel Japanese forces from the Aleutian Islands 
in 1943. Though Canada sent 5,000 home defence conscripts to Kiska, in itself 
a risky political choice, that project nearly foundered when Canada’s notori-
ously cautious Prime Minister, William Lyon Mackenzie King, pondered 
scuttling it in late May 1943. Only the direct intervention of N.A. Robertson, 
the Under Secretary of State for External Affairs – Robertson believed that 
sending Canadian troops to the Aleutians would counter-balance the large 
and politically dangerous American presence in northwest Canada in such 
projects as the Alaska Highway and Northwest Staging Route – convinced 
King to permit the expedition to go forward. Still, the military had to accept 
potentially troubling political limitations on the use of the Canadian troops.
 The CHA’s publication, The Journal of the Canadian Historical Association, 
had the right of first denial for publication. After some delay, I received two 
referee reports. The first judged that a revised version could be published by 
the JCHA. But the second report, just one paragraph long, maintained that 
C.P. Stacey, the Canadian Army’s official historian, had said all that needed 
to be said about the Army’s role in the Second World War! I found this as-
sessment disconcerting. Stacey’s account of Canada’s Aleutian role, found in 
Volume 1 of the Canadian Army’s official history, is less than 15 pages long. 
Further, as Stacey’s account emerged in 1955, he lacked access to then un-
available materials, including King’s voluminous diary and personal papers. 
Thus, Stacey’s description did not discuss the civil-military contretemps that 
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almost derailed participation at Kiska, my paper’s very focus. After making 
minor changes, I sent the manuscript to The Journal of Military History for con-
sideration. This second group of referees praised the paper, with one calling 
it a necessary and welcome revision of Stacey’s conclusions. JMH published 
my paper in 1992.2
 Likely every historian interested in Canada’s role in the Second World 
War can relate a similar story. As Tim Cook’s fine study about the writing of 
Canadian military official history has noted, Stacey’s balanced scholarship 
earned him a remarkable reputation in various constituencies, be they mil-
itary, political and the general public.3 And while all of us who study Canada’s 
military and external relations policies prior to 1950 must acknowledge how 
much we owe to Stacey’s seminal studies, his most influential works, Arms. 
Men and Governments: The War Policies of Canada 1939-1945, and the two volume 
set, Canada and the Age of Conflict, came out in 1970 and 1984 respectively.4 But 
as J.L. Granatstein, whose has written extensively on Canada and the Second 
World, noted in his address to the conference that sparked this volume, it is 
time to rethink and revise that role. Referring to his own seminal 1975 study 
of how King’s government prosecuted the war,5 Granatstein averred that the 
advent of key new sources and historical methodologies since the 1970s have 
dictated that key aspects of the Canadian experiences in the Second World 
War, domestic and foreign, must be rethought.6
 Commendable efforts have already begun. My colleagues in the 
Department of History at the University of Ottawa, Jeff Keshen and Serge 
Durflinger, have completed superb accounts of Canada’s home front experi-
ence.7 Further, after embarrassing delays, the official histories of the Royal 
Canadian Air Force (RCAF) and the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) for the 
Second World War period have appeared, though the RCN series is ongoing.8 
But this short paper, while endorsing Granatstein’s challenge that so very 
much about Canada’s part in the Second World War remains to be done and/
or redone, will focus more narrowly on aspects of Canada’s external relation-
ships during the war. Not intending to be exhaustive, instead, I will highlight 
issues needing proper illumination. 
 For a country that has always gone to war in alliances with other and 
usually stronger powers, it seems odd to suggest that the history of Canada’s 
relationships with its allies in the Second World War remains inadequate. 
Stacey provided a sound base upon which we can build with Arms, Men and 
Governments and Canada and the Age of Conflict. Still, these works are dated, 
and the first is an official history, replete with all the advantages and dis-
advantages that official history engenders. Further, Stacey, no fan of Prime 
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Minister King as his separate 1976 study of King’s diary made clear,9 can be 
accused of not giving King much credit when it comes to the management 
of external affairs. King only relinquished that job after the war’s end when 
Louis St-Laurent became the first non-Prime Minister to hold the position of 
Secretary of State for External Relations (SSEA). Moreover, the third volume 
of H. Blair Neatby’s biography of King, which ended in 1939, looked only at 
the war’s earliest days.10 We thus badly require a new look at King’s wartime 
foreign policy. 
 In 1938, King famously told a visiting British diplomat “that his [King’s] 
experience of political life had taught him that any success he had been at-
tained had been due far more to avoiding action rather than taking action.”11 
Certainly many who worked for the Prime Minister during the war probably 
would have agreed with King’s self-assessment. In January 1942, Escott Reid 
of the Department of External Affairs (DEA), among other things, recom-
mended separating the posts of Prime Minister and SSEA in order to better 
advance Canadian foreign policy interests.12 Unsurprisingly, King did not 
act on that proposal. Thus, in early 1942, another DEA official, Hume Wrong, 
no fan of King, formulated the Functional Principle which provided Canada 
with a defendable rationale for taking on a greater role in the war’s direction. 
As both Granatstein and A.J. Miller have pointed out in two short pieces,13 
Functionalism, although sometimes a useful means to advance Canadian in-
terests in a multi-national coalition dominated by a handful of great powers, 
could not overcome hard power disparities. As General Maurice Pope aptly 
put it, Canada’s lack of “big battalions” and its limited military experience 
likely would not “have made us competent to give it [advice] effectively.”14 
We badly need to reconcile such conflicting notions about Canada’s ability to 
promote its interests. John Allan English’s excellent 1996 chapter on Canada’s 
wartime foreign policy offers a blueprint for a much larger work on the 
subject.15 John Hilliker’s official history of the DEA from 1909-1946 is useful 
too for explaining how the DEA functioned during the war.16 Biographies 
of Norman Robertson and his fellow DEA officer, Lester Pearson, by J.L. 
Granatstein and John English respectively, and John MacFarlane’s fine ac-
count of Ernest Lapointe’s influence on Canadian foreign policy17 have wid-
ened our understanding of wartime policy making. But a recent edited study 
of Reid’s diplomatic career, while useful for the pre- and postwar period, 
oddly said nothing about Reid’s wartime years.18
 We already have very good accounts of Canada’s economic policies. Two 
books by J.L. Granatstein and Doug Owram about governance roles played 
by officials and intellectuals in the 1930s and 1940s have provided a frame-
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work for other studies to come.19 Archivist/historian Paul Marsden has writ-
ten a good short account of Canadian financial planning for war in 1939.20 So 
too has Hector MacKenzie, a historian at the Department of Foreign Affairs 
and International Trade (DFAIT), with his focus on the substantial financial 
aid that Canada extended to Britain during and after the war.21 Francine 
McKenzie has added much to the historiography with a detailed and bal-
anced monograph looking at the politics of imperial preference from 1939-
1948. We also have a classic insider account of the Department of Finance’s 
international operations from Robert B. Bryce, one of Canada’s leading public 
servants for forty years.22 Still, a detailed study of Canadian-American eco-
nomic relations in the war is lacking, no small job given the sheer scale of 
that vast interlocking effort after the 1941 Hyde Park Agreement, a pact that 
remains largely unexplained barring a short chapter in a 1975 book produced 
by Granatstein and R.D. Cuffe.23 
 More needs to be done about direct bilateral relations between Canada 
and its various allies. Canada-Soviet ties would be a good place to start. 
Stacey’s Arms, Men and Governments and volume two of Canada and the Age 
of Conflict mention the Soviet Union only a handful of times. This is an odd 
omission given the vital role Soviet forces played in defeating Nazi Germany, 
the opening of formal diplomatic relations between Moscow and Ottawa in 
1942, and the fact that the Soviet Union was a major recipient of Canadian 
Mutual Aid. In 1998, J.L. Black, using extensive Russian-language sources, 
gave us a finely detailed study of how Soviet officials perceived Canada from 
1917 to 1991 through an often distorted ideological lens. Soviet claims about 
Quebec fascism and a belief that postwar revolution in Canada was possible 
are especially interesting.24 Some survey articles by Norman Hillmer and J.L. 
Granatstein about Canada-Soviet relations in the 1930s and the war, in a 1992 
edited volume, have provided firm bedrock upon which further research into 
the subject should proceed, as has an edited 1981 monograph from Aloysius 
Balawyder.25 But both collections draw their primary materials solely from 
Canadian sources, an unavoidable problem as they were researched during 
the Cold War. With better access now to formerly closed Soviet archives, we 
can hope that an historian will soon give us a truly bilateral view of the be-
ginning of the Canada-Soviet relationship.
 We also lack a big study on Canada’s wartime connections to China, an-
other major recipient of Mutual Aid and, like the Soviet Union, a country that 
Canada did not establish formal relations with until after the war had begun 
(by contrast, Canada had sent a diplomatic representative to Japan in 1929). 
Political scientist Kim Richard Nossal completed a fine but unpublished PhD 
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thesis in 1977 about General Victor Odlum, Canada’s Ambassador to China 
from 1943 until 1946. Instead, we must rely on Nossal’s short 1977 essay about 
Odlum’s quixotic diplomatic career in China (Odlum, relieved of divisional 
command in 1940, peppered Prime Minister King with increasingly plain-
tive requests to be returned to active military duty, requests King happily 
declined).26 Works by Alvyn Austin, A. Hamish Ion, and Paul Mitchell about 
Canadian missionaries in China and the Japanese empire have offered some 
limited clues about the Canada-China relationship. But perhaps an historian, 
with facility in Chinese, will soon give us the big and comprehensive study 
we so badly require.27 We can hope. 
 We possess a good selection of mostly short studies about Canada’s 
wartime ties to Australia. There are good reasons for this happy situation. 
First, despite the Australian predilection for elongated vowels and rhyming 
slang, our two nations share a common language. Second, our historical 
imperial ties have made two countries obvious case studies choices on a 
variety of thematic fronts. DFAIT’s Greg Donaghy has produced an excellent 
short survey of Canada-Australian relations since 1890s. Greg’s former boss 
at DFAIT’s Historical section, John Hilliker, has discussed the bilateral rela-
tionship in the Second World War in the Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth 
History.28 If these two fine accounts can be faulted, while admitting ties were 
not close, they have downplayed the harder edges of that relationship in 
the 1930s and the war years. R.G. Haycock’s 1984 article in War & Society 
has painted a darker picture regarding Victor Odlum’s near disastrous 
tenure as Canadian High Commissioner to Australia in 1942, brought on 
by Odlum’s unauthorized offer of Canadian military aid to Australia, aid 
that never materialized though it took King months to actually to say no.29 
My work has echoed Haycock’s analysis. Indeed, I have traced some of the 
enmity to a prewar attempt, spurned initially by Australia, by Canada to 
establish direct diplomatic relations. Australia rejected this initiative for 
two reasons: it refused to “reward” Canada for its anti-imperial stance; and 
its leaders believed they could rely solely on British diplomacy.30 But the 
formal establishment of relations in the winter of 1939-40 and cooperation 
against German aggression could not obscure the fact that Canada and 
Australia had vastly different views of the global strategic situation. Japan’s 
attack on Western interests in the Asia-Pacific region in December 1941 
and the startling Japanese victories that followed over the next six months 
engendered real concern among Australians for their nation’s future, con-
cerns that Canadians, beyond Odlum, cared little about. As I noted in a 
2003 chapter, real bitterness ensued when Canada declined to send help to 
the history of canada’s alliances in the second world war
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Australia in 1942, bitterness that grew when Canada also showed no interest 
in Australian initiatives to create a formal imperial security system for the 
Pacific in 1944-45.31
 What is left to do then in Canadian-Australian relations? Quite a bit, 
actually, as John Blaxland, an Australian Army officer, has shown us in his 
2006 book, Strategic Cousins: Australian and Canadian Expeditionary Forces and 
the British and American Empires. Relying deliberately on secondary materials, 
Blaxland has made obvious the great need to put Canadian and Australian 
security policies in a wider strategic and temporal context.32 In short, we 
badly need a successor to Richard Preston’s seminal monograph, Canada and 
‘Imperial Defense’: A Study of the Origins of the British Commonwealth Defense 
Organization, 1867-1919, that would carry forth a broader Commonwealth (not 
just Canadian) focus into and beyond the Second World War.33 Such a study 
could examine Canadian Mutual Aid to Australia, the United Kingdom and 
other Dominions, the nature of imperial military intelligence cooperation (or 
lack thereof), and differing views by Commonwealth members about global 
& regional strategic situations stretching back to the First World War. Kurt 
Jensen’s recent study of Canadian foreign intelligence from 1939-1951 is a 
good start, but its focus, subjectively and in terms of primary sources used, is 
narrowly Canadian.34 
 I further suggest that Canadian views of the strategic situation in the 
Pacific needs greater elucidation. Both Gregory Johnson and I have made a 
start with our respective doctoral dissertations about the creation of a “North 
Pacific Triangle” in the 1930s and Canadian-American cooperation in the 
Aleutian campaign.35 Each of us is currently revising these studies for future 
publication. In the meantime, good short studies do exist. Greg and I have co-
authored a chapter about Canadian perceptions of the Japanese threat prior 
to 1931 in an edited collection about Canada-Japan relations. That volume 
also contained papers by John Meehan about Canada-Japan relations from 
1929-1941 (summarizing his monograph on that subject), as well as a very 
good survey of Canada’s military contribution to the war against Japan from 
William Rawling.36 Canada’s decision to participate in a US-led invasion of 
Japan scheduled for 1945-1946 also merits more work. My short 1997 paper 
explaining why Canada opted to integrate its Army Pacific Forces into a US, 
rather than a UK, command system, is only a beginning. Part of this story 
has been told in a 2009 book by American historian Nicholas Sarantakes, 
in Allies Against the Rising Sun: The United States, the British Nations, and the 
Defeat of Imperial Japan.37 But more remains to be said, especially failed British 
attempts to convince the Dominions to take up much of the imperial cause 
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against Japan on 1944-1945 so that Britain could demobilize and rebuild its 
battered economy. 
 Another subject crying out for a good monograph is the tragic and 
poorly understood loss of 2,000 Canadian troops at Hong Kong in December 
1941. At a February 1992 meeting of the Canadian Committee of the History 
of the Second World War, in a paper discussing how the multi-national his-
toriography of the battle of Hong Kong had unfolded, I had emphasized two 
things: first, despite its flaws, which the author admitted in his memoirs,38 
Stacey’s account of Hong Kong in his 1955 Army official history remained 
the best account; and second, there was room for one more monograph 
on the subject that would supplant hopefully the dominant place in the 
Canadian public imagination held by Carl Vincent’s flawed and anti-British 
1981 monograph on Hong Kong.39 What I had not counted on then was the 
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation’s decision to air a three-part television 
documentary looking at aspects of the Canadian military experience in the 
Second World War in 1992. Though its’ most controversial part concerned 
intimations of war crimes committed by Allied crews for the bombing of 
German cities, The Valour and the Horror also depicted Hong Kong’s loss 
when Japan seized that crown colony in December 1941. Taking its cue from 
Vincent’s claims, the show charged that British perfidy – an unwillingness to 
send British troops to a post that had no chance of surviving an attack – and 
Canadian governmental and military incompetence – sending obviously 
ill-trained troops after practically no debate – led to the disastrous loss of 
2,000 Canadian troops when Hong Kong fell. One result was an ugly public 
debate led by members of Canada’s Senate that engendered hard feelings on 
all sides.
 Most importantly, the fracas created some good history. A 1994 mono-
graph edited by two senior Canadian military historians studied the various 
angles of The Valour and the Horror Controversy, including a fine piece by John 
Ferris that dissected the allegations of British perfidy. I authored a journal 
article in 1995 that did much the same.40 Two books, one co-authored by 
Canadian and Japanese historians in 1990, another by Canadian medical 
historian Charles Roland in 2001, though Hong Kong was not their focus, 
helped to establish a much needed wider context that refuted both Vincent 
and The Valour and the Horror.41 If this is so, why do we need another book 
about Hong Kong? Well, Brereton Greenhous’s 1997 monograph on the 
topic, sponsored by the Canadian War Museum, reads like Vincent Part II.42 
Selective in its use of evidence – like Vincent’s book, few British primary 
sources were consulted – and dismissive of contradictory analyses – none 
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of the critical secondary sources mentioned above are cited – Greenhous’s 
book sadly added little to the debate. We need a thorough weighty tome, 
free of crude nationalist bias and a lingering post-colonial cringe that offers 
a sophisticated exploration of how 2,000 Canadian troops stepped into Hell 
in December 1941. This study will have to take into account fears of further 
appeasement of Japan and a broader attempt by Britain and the United States 
in 1941 to deter Japan through embargoes, sanctions, and the reinforcement 
of Allied assets in the Asia-Pacific theatre. 
 The Hong Kong issue illustrates a true puzzle; an odd absence of good 
historical accounts about the complex Canada-Britain relationship in the war 
other than the Stacey and Granatstein volumes noted above. But time’s pas-
sage has meant that key manuscript collections that were closed when those 
books came out, including the vital Winston Churchill papers and various 
British official record groups, are now open. We lack a dedicated monograph 
that looks at the contentious birth and workings of the massive British 
Commonwealth Air Training Plan (BCATP) that was centered in, and largely 
paid for by, Canada. F.J. Hatch’s short official account from 1983 has not filled 
that gap, not least for its near complete reliance on Canadian sources and 
its tendency to play down the acrimonious debates among Canadian and 
British officials about who would pay for the plan.43
 More explanation of how Canada and Britain sought to mesh their 
respective war efforts at the highest political levels is necessary too. Clyde 
Sanger has written a breezy journalistic account of Malcolm MacDonald’s role 
as British High Commissioner in Ottawa for much of the war. But it is a thinly 
documented story based mostly on secondary sources and MacDonald’s per-
sonal papers.44 The story of Canada’s High Commissioner to Britain, Vincent 
Massey, is better documented thanks to Massey’s self-important memoir and 
a good biography by Claude Bissell.45 Two recent accounts – Roy MacLaren’s 
history of the post of Canadian High Commissioner in Britain and Lorna 
Lloyd’s broader study of the office of the High Commissioner generally in the 
Commonwealth – have added to our understanding.46 Unfortunately, both 
dedicate only a chapter or so to the Second World War. Oddly, British his-
torian Andrew Stewart’s new book, which has asserted, correctly I believe, 
that the Second World War demonstrated how growing Dominion autonomy 
both contributed to Allied victory and fractured imperial ties, is based on 
only a cursory examination of Canadian and/or other Dominion primary 
sources.47
 If we are still waiting for the authoritative account of Canada-UK war-
time relations, we can hope that it might cover other key subjects requiring 
15
galen roger perras
more elucidation. We need to know more about British reactions to Canada’s 
growing ties with the United States, beginning with the Ogdensburg Pact of 
August 1940 and its creation of the Permanent Joint Board of Defence (PJBD). 
Both Dominions Secretary Lord Cranborne and Prime Minister Winston 
Churchill disliked the deal. Churchill, in fact, in August 1940, icily informed 
King – King was defending the deal on the grounds that it allowed Canada to 
send more aid to Britain – that if Germany could not best his nation, “all these 
transactions will be judged in a mood different to that while the issue still 
stands in the balance.”48 We need a better understanding of British concerns 
about how Canadian-American cooperation during the war could contribute 
to postwar problems over military bases, aviation agreements and trade, 
etc. We know the broad outlines thanks to Malcolm MacDonald’s famous 
intervention in 1942-1943 with King about American military activities in 
northwest Canada, but the internal debate among British officials and policy 
makers both during and after the conflict’s end remains opaque. 
 Canada’s multi-faceted relationship with the United States also is 
strangely unexplored. As far as I know, only two monographs are wholly 
dedicated to the origins and subsequent workings of the Canada-US secur-
ity relationship that emerged with the establishment of the PJBD in 1940. 
The first is Colonel Stanley W. Dziuban’s Military Relations Between the United 
States and Canada 1939-1945. The other is my own study, Franklin Roosevelt and 
the Origins of the Canadian-American Security Alliance, 1933-1945.49 Dziuban’s 
volume, part of the famed and lengthy US Army Green Book official his-
tory series, remains the only major study that has attempted to deal with the 
sweeping scope of Canada-US military cooperation. While generally sound 
in its analysis, the book, based primarily on American sources, came out 
in 1959 and is very weak in Canadian primary sources. My book, in turn, 
is much stronger for the period from 1934-1940 than what comes after, in 
part because its focus was Roosevelt’s keen interest in hemispheric secur-
ity, an interest that waned considerably, for obvious reasons, when Japan 
attacked Pearl Harbor in December 1941. Other shorter pieces have looked 
at the PJBD, notably essays by Granatstein, David Beatty, and a chapter in 
another Green Book volume.50 All roughly have agreed about the rationale 
behind Roosevelt’s advocacy for the PJBD, save for American historian Fred 
Pollock who has claimed that FDR plumped for the deal with Canada only 
to ensure that the Royal Navy, if Britain fell, would land in American hands 
rather than being handed over to Germany. Once Britain survived 1940 
and that dire option was no longer likely, FDR quickly lost interest in his 
continental security creation.51 What is absent, however, is an up to date ac-
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count of how the PJBD went about its business. We have only David Beatty’s 
dated 1969 thesis from Michigan State University which lacked access to 
so many key document collections that are freely available now.52 Another 
defence-related body that must be studied is the Canadian Joint Staff Mission 
(CJSM). Formed in 1942 despite American and British objections, the CJSM, 
designed to interact with the many agencies connected to the newly formed 
Anglo-American Combined Chiefs and to perhaps gain Canada a seat on the 
Combined Chiefs, was a logical result of Wrong’s functionalism. Canada did 
not break the Anglo-American Combined Chiefs monopoly (no country did), 
and its attempts to get seats on many of the reporting bodies also enjoyed 
rather little success. But we need a better understanding of how the CJSM, 
led ably by General Pope until 1944 (Pope gained the trust of British and 
American functionaries), functioned, how it related to the British Joint Staff 
Mission (which had opposed the CJSM’s creation) and how it dealt with num-
erous American planning bodies. Ultimately, we must determine if there had 
been a real chance, perhaps squandered as Reid and Wrong have claimed to 
widen Canadian influence in Allied strategy-making and planning bodies in 
1942-1943.
 Indeed, so very little is known about how Canada’s war effort was 
viewed by US policy makers, politicians, the media, and the American 
public while the conflict was ongoing. In 2009 journalist Chantal Allan’s 
book, Bomb Canada and Other Unkind Remarks in the American Media, out-
lined how American newspapers and then television have portrayed and 
judged Canada, Canadians, and Canadian policies since the nineteenth 
century. Though the book makes for interesting reading, it says nothing 
about either of the World Wars, an odd omission indeed.53 In March 1942, 
the US Coordinator of Information (the precursor to the Office of Strategic 
Services, or OSS) warned that growing Canadian discontent since December 
1941 and an American propensity to overlook or to criticize the Dominion’s 
war effort threatened to make bilateral relations “less cordial than they have 
been.”54 The OSS studied Canada and Canadian attitudes throughout the 
war, reports that remain obscure. Canadian military manpower policy was 
a subject of some concern in the United States, especially when a Canadian 
Army proposal to shrink its home defence elements to allow for the buttress-
ing of its overseas forces in late 1943 engendered a brief but hostile reaction 
in American newspapers and in Congress, the Canadian announcement 
having come just as Congress was engaged in a bitter debate about the need 
to draft married men and 18 year olds. There are numerous references in 
the official records of the Department of External Affairs regarding allega-
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tions that King was responsible for a lackluster effort to properly publicize 
Canada’s vast wartime effort in the United States, but this subject too has not 
been dealt with well. 
 A great PhD thesis could be done about J.P. Moffat’s tenure as the US 
Minister in Canada from 1940-43. Moffat, who left an extensive set of records 
at Harvard University, not to mention the massive State Department collec-
tions at the National Archives and Records Administration in Washington 
DC, was personally chosen by FDR to take up that job in the Spring of 1940 
as Germany’s military was slashing its way through Allied forces in Western 
Europe. That was an interesting choice for Moffat, described by the American 
press as “one of our crack diplomats,”55 was a notorious Anglophobe who 
opposed American entry into the war in 1940. Nor do we know much about 
how the US military, after doing so much in northwest Canada during the 
war with the Alaska Highway, the Northwest Staging Route, and the Canol 
Pipeline, viewed Canadian-American security cooperation in the postwar 
period. By 1943, Escott Reid feared that the US was building a Maginot Line in 
the Canadian North to deal with an impending postwar Soviet threat.56 Were 
US officials thinking about this contingency too prior to the war’s end, or did 
such fears more fully develop later once the Cold War confrontation with the 
Soviets had grown far more frigid? Someone needs to make this clear.
 The time is all too ripe for the many studies that I have recommended 
above. The passage of time has removed almost all of the official archival 
impediments that had blocked access to key record groups and manuscript 
collections in the past (unless one wishes to study connections between the 
British Royal Family and Nazi Germany – access to those papers will be re-
stricted for many more decades). So unless the historical profession succumbs 
completely to the absurd post-modernist complaint about the “tyranny of 
archives” ruining academic inquiry, we should hope to see soon some good 
answers to the questions posed herein.
Notes
1 Galen Roger Perras, An Aleutian Inter-
lude: Canadian Participation in the Recap-
ture of the Island of Kiska, MA thesis in 
War Studies, Royal Military College of 
Canada, 1986.
2 Galen Roger Perras, “Canada As A 
Military Partner. Alliance Politics and 
the Campaign to Recapture the Island 
of Kiska, The Journal of Military History, 
vol. 56, July 1992, 423-54.
3 Tim Cook, Clio’s Warriors: Canadian 
Historians and the Writing of the World 
Wars (Vancouver: University of British 
Columbia Press, 2006).
4 C.P. Stacey, Arms, Men and Govern-
ments: The War Policies of Canada 
1939-1945 (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer 
1970: and Idem., Canada and the Age of 
Conflict. Volume 1: 1867-1921 and Volume 
2: 1921-1948 (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1984).
18
the history of canada’s alliances in the second world war
5 J.L. Granatstein, Canada’s War: The Poli-
tics of the Mackenzie King Government, 
1939-1945 (Toronto: Oxford University 
Press, 1975).
6 J.L. Granatstein, “What is to be Done? 
The History of Canada in the Second 
World War,” at the conference, “Sev-
enty Years On: New Perspectives on 
the Second World War,” hosted by the 
University of Calgary History Depart-
ment, the Centre for Military and Stra-
tegic Studies, and the History Gradu-
ate Students’ Union, Calgary and Lake 
Louise, AB, August 31-September 2, 
2009.
7 Jeffrey A. Keshen, Saints, Sinners, and 
Soldiers: Canada’s Second World War 
(Vancouver: University of British Co-
lumbia Press, 2006); and Serge Marc 
Durflinger, Fighting at Home: The Sec-
ond World War in Verdun, Quebec (Van-
couver: University of British Columbia 
Press, 2006).
8 W.A.B. Douglas, The Creation of a Na-
tional Air Force: The Official History of 
the Royal Canadian Air Force. Volume II 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1986); Brereton Greenhous, Stephen 
J. Harris, William C. Johnston, and 
William G.P. Rawling, The Crucible of 
War 1939-1945: The Official History of 
the Royal Canadian Air Force. Volume III 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1994); W.A.B. Douglas, Roger Sarty, 
Michael Whitby et al., No Higher Pur-
pose: The Official Operational History of 
the Royal Canadian Navy in the Second 
World War, 1939-1943. Volume II, Part 
1 (St. Catharines: Vanwell, 2002); and 
Idem., A Blue Water Navy: The Official 
Operational History of the Royal Ca-
nadian Navy in the Second World War, 
1943-1945. Volume II, Part 2 (St. Catha-
rines: Vanwell, 2007). Some of the 
early problems that affected the late 
issuance of RCN and RCAF histories 
are discussed in Cook, Clio’s Warriors.
9 C.P. Stacey, A Very Double Life: The Pri-
vate World of Mackenzie King (Toronto: 
Macmillan, 1976).
10 H. Blair Neatby, William Lyon Macken-
zie King: Volume Three 1932-1939. The 
Prism of Unity (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1976).
11 F.L.C. Floud to Harry Batterbee, 24 
May 1938, Dominions Office Records, 
DO35/586, file GS88/55, The National 
Archives of the United Kingdom 
(TNA).
12 Escott Reid, “The United States and 
Canada: Domination, Cooperation, 
Absorption,” 12 January 1942, Escott 
Reid Papers, vol. 13, file US and Can-
ada, Library and Archives of Canada 
(LAC).
13 J.L. Granatstein, “Hume Wrong’s Road 
to the Functional Principle,” in Keith 
Neilson and Roy E. Prete, ed., Coalition 
Warfare: An Uneasy Accord (Waterloo: 
Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 
1983), 55-57; and A.J. Miller, “The 
Functional Principle in Canada’s Ex-
ternal Relations,” International Journal, 
vol. 35, Spring 1980, 309-328.
14 Maurice A. Pope, Soldiers and Politi-
cians: The Memoirs of Lt.-Gen. Maurice 
A. Pope (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1962), 175.
15 John Allan English, “Not An Equilat-
eral Triangle: Canada’s Strategic Re-
lationship with the United States and 
Britain, 1939-1945,” in B.J.C. McKercher 
and Lawrence Aronsen, ed., The North 
Atlantic Triangle in a Changing World: 
Anglo-American-Canadian Relations, 
1902-1956 (Toronto: University of To-
ronto Press, 1996), 147-183.
16 John Hilliker, Canada’s Department 
of External Affairs. Volume I: The Early 
Years, 1909-1946 (Montreal and Kings-
ton: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 
1990).
17 J.L. Granatstein, A Man of Influence: 
Norman A. Robertson and Canadian 
Statecraft, 1929-1968 (Ottawa: Deneau, 
1981); John English, Shadow of Heaven: 
The Life of Lester Pearson. Volume One: 
1897-1948 (Toronto: Lester & Orpen 
Dennys, 1989); and John MacFarlane, 
Ernest Lapointe and Quebec’s Influence 
19
galen roger perras
on Canadian Foreign Policy (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1999).
18 Greg Donaghy and Stéphane Roussel, 
ed., Escott Reid: Diplomat and Scholar 
(Montreal and Kingston: McGill-
Queen’s University Press, 2006).
19 J.L. Granatstein, The Ottawa Men: The 
Civil Service Mandarins, 1935-1957 (To-
ronto: Oxford University Press, 1982: 
and Doug Owram, The Government 
Generation: Canadian Intellectuals and 
the State, 1900-1945 (Toronto: Univer-
sity of Toronto Press, 1986).
20 Paul Marsden, “The Cost of No Com-
mitments: Canadian Economic Plan-
ning for War,” in Norman Hillmer et 
al., ed., A Country of Limitations: Canada 
and the World in 1939 (Ottawa: Cana-
dian Committee for the History of the 
Second World War, 1996), 199-216.
21 Hector M. MacKenzie, “Sinews of War 
and Peace: The Politics of Economic 
Aid to Britain, 1939-1945,” International 
Journal, Vol. (Autumn 1999), pp. ; and 
Idem., “The Path to Temptation: The 
Negotiation of Canada’s Reconstruc-
tion Loan to Britain in 1946,” Historical 
Papers. Vol. 17, No. 1, 1982, 196-220.
22 Francine McKenzie, Redefining the 
Bonds of Commonwealth, 1939-1948: 
The Politics of Preference (Houndmills: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2002); and Robert 
B. Bryce, edited by Matthew J. Bellamy, 
Canada and the Cost of World War II: 
The International Operations of Canada’s 
Department of Finance 1939-1947 (Mon-
treal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s Uni-
versity Press, 2005).
23 R.D. Cuffe and J.L. Granatstein, Ca-
nadian-American Relations in Wartime: 
From the Great War to the Cold War (To-
ronto: Hakkert, 1975), 69-92.
24 J.L. Black, Canada in the Soviet Mirror: 
Ideology and Perception in Soviet Foreign 
Affairs, 1917-1991 (Ottawa: Carleton 
University Press, 1998).
25 David Davies, ed., Canada and the Soviet 
Experiment: Essays on Canadian Encoun-
ters with Russia and the Soviet Union, 
1900-1991 (Toronto and Waterloo: Uni-
versity of Toronto and the University 
of Waterloo, 1992); and Aloysius Bala-
wayder, ed., Canada-Soviet Relations 
1938-1980 (Oakville: Mosaic Press, 
1981).
26 Kim Richard Nossal, Strange Bedfel-
lows: Canada and China in War and 
Revolution, 1942-1947, PhD thesis, 
University of Toronto, 1977; and Idem., 
“Chung king Prism: Cognitive Process 
and Intelligence Prism,” International 
Journal, vol. 32 (Summer 1977), 559-576.
27 Alvyn J. Austin, Saving China: Cana-
dian Missionaries in the Middle Kingdom, 
1888-1959 (Toronto: University of To-
ronto Press, 1986: A Hamish Ion, The 
Cross and in the Dark Valley: The Canadi-
an Protestant Missionary Movement in the 
Japanese Empire, 1931-1945 (Waterloo: 
Wilfrid Laurier University, 1999); and 
Peter M. Mitchell, “The Missionary 
Connection,” in Paul M. Evans and B. 
Michael Frolic, ed., Reluctant Adversar-
ies: Canada and the People’s Republic of 
China, 1949-1970 (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 1991), 17-40.
28 Greg Donaghy, Parallel Paths: Canadian-
Australian Relations since the 1890s (Ot-
tawa: Department of Foreign Affairs 
and International Trade, 1995); and 
J.F. Hilliker, “Distant Ally: Canadian 
Relations with Australia During the 
Second World War,” Journal of Imperial 
and Commonwealth History, Vol. 13 (Oc-
tober 1984), 46-67.
29 R.G. Haycock, “The ‘Myth’ of Imperial 
Defence: Australian-Canadian Bilat-
eral Military Cooperation, 1942,” War 
& Society, vol. 21 (May 1984), 65-84.
30 Galen Roger Perras, “Parties Long 
Estranged: The Initiation of Austra-
lian Canadian Relations, 1935-1940,” 
in Linda Cardinal and David Heaton, 
ed., Shaping Relations: Constitutional-
ism and Society in Australia and Canada 
(Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 
2002), 135-165.
31 Galen Roger Perras, “‘She should have 
thought of herself first’: Canada and 
20
the history of canada’s alliances in the second world war
Military Aid to Australia, 1939-45,” 
in Margaret MacMillan and Francine 
McKenzie, ed., Parties Long Estranged: 
Canada and Australia in the Twentieth 
Century (Vancouver: University of 
British Columbia,2003), 124-150.
32 John C. Blaxland, Strategic Cousins: 
Australian and Canadian Expeditionary 
Forces and the British and American Em-
pires (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-
Queen’s University Press, 2006).
33 Richard A. Preston, Canada and “Impe-
rial Defense”: A Study of the Origins of the 
British Commonwealth Defense Organiza-
tion, 1867-1919 (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1967).
34 Kurt F. Jensen, Cautious Beginnings: Ca-
nadian Foreign Intelligence 1939-51 (Van-
couver: University of British Columbia 
Press, 2008).
35 Gregory Allan Johnson, North Pacific 
Triangle? The Impact of the Far East on 
Canada and Its Relations with the United 
States and Britain, 1937-1948, PhD the-
sis, York University 1989; and Galen 
Roger Perras, Stepping Stones on a Road 
to Nowhere? The United States, Canada, 
and the Aleutian Islands Campaign, 1942-
1943, PhD thesis, University of Water-
loo, 1995.
36 Greg Donaghy and Patricia E. Roy, 
ed., Contradictory Impulses: Canada and 
Japan in the Twentieth Century (Vancou-
ver: University of British Columbia 
Press, 2008). See also John D. Meehan, 
The Dominion and the Rising Sun: Canada 
Encounters Japan, 1929-41 (Vancouver: 
University of British Columbia, 2004).
37 Galen Roger Perras, “Once Bitten, 
Twice Shy: The Origins of the Canadi-
an Army Force,” in Greg Donaghy, ed., 
Uncertain Horizons: Canadians and Their 
World in 1945 (Ottawa: Canadian Com-
mittee for the History of the Second 
World War, 1997), 77-99; and Nicholas 
Evan Sarantakes, Allies Against the Ris-
ing Sun: The United States, the British 
Nations, and the Defeat of Imperial Japan 
(Lawrence: University Press of Kan-
sas, 2009).
38 Stacey described Hong Kong as “the 
most difficult historical problem I 
ever confronted” thanks to a lack of 
documentation and Canadian and 
British political sensitivities; C.P. Sta-
cey, A Date With History: Memoirs of a 
Canadian Historian (Ottawa: 1982), 238-
240.
39 Galen Roger Perras, “‘Defeat Cries 
Aloud For Explanation”: An Examina-
tion of the Historical Literature on the 
Battle of Hong Kong,” at the confer-
ence, “Canada and the Second World 
War in the Pacific”, sponsored by the 
Canadian Committee for the History 
of the Second World War, Victoria, BC, 
27-29 February 1992; and Carl Vincent, 
No Reason Why: The Canadian Hong 
Kong Tragedy – An Examination (Stitts-
ville: Canada’s Wings, 1981). 
40 John Ferris, “Savage Christmas: The 
Canadians at Hong Kong,” in David J. 
Bercuson and S.F. Wise, ed., The Valour 
and the Horror Revisited (Montreal and 
Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University 
Press, 1994; and Galen Roger Perras, 
“‘Our position in the Far East would 
be stronger without this unsatisfac-
tory commitment’: Britain and the Re-
inforcement of Hong Kong, 1941,” The 
Canadian Journal of History, vol. XXX, 
August 1995, 231-259.
41 Patricia Roy, J.L. Granatstein, Masako 
Iino, and Hiroko Takamura, Mutual 
Hostages: Canadians and Japanese dur-
ing the Second World War (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1990); and 
Charles G. Roland, Long Day’s Journey 
into Night: Prisoners of War in Hong 
Kong and Japan, 1941-1945 (Waterloo: 
Wilfrid University Press, 2001).
42 Brereton Greenhous, “C” Force to Hong 
Kong: A Canadian Catastrophe 1941-1945 
(Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1997).
43 F.J. Hatch, Arsenal of Democracy: Canada 
and the British Commonwealth Air Train-
ing Plan 1939-1945 (Ottawa: Depart-
ment of National Defence, 1983).
44 Clyde Sanger, Malcolm MacDonald: 
Bringing An End to Empire (Montreal 
21
galen roger perras
and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s Univer-
sity Press, 1995).
45 Vincent Massey, What’s Past is Prologue: 
The Memoirs of Vincent Massey (To-
ronto: Macmillan, 1963); and Claude 
Bissell, The Imperial Canadian: Vincent 
Massey in Office (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1986).
46 Roy MacLaren, Commissions High: 
Canada in London, 1870-1971 (Montreal 
and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s Uni-
versity Press, 2006); and Lorna Lloyd, 
Diplomacy with a Difference: The Com-
monwealth Office of High Commissioner, 
1880-2006 (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 
2007).
47 Andrew Stewart, Empire Lost: Britain, 
the Dominions and the Second World War 
(London: Continuum, 2008).
48 Winston Churchill to W.L.M. King, 
no. 96, 22 August 1940, W.L.M. King 
Papers, Memoranda and Notes, reel 
H1158, p. C282290, LAC.
49 Colonel Stanley W. Dziuban, Military 
Relations Between the United States and 
Canada 1939-1945 (Washington DC: 
Department of the Army, 1959); and 
Galen Roger Perras, Franklin Roosevelt 
and the Origins of the Canadian-American 
Security Alliance, 1933-1945: Necessary 
But Not Necessary Enough (Westport: 
Praeger, 1999).
50 David Beatty, “The ‘Canadian Corol-
lary’ to the Monroe Doctrine and the 
Ogdensburg Agreement of 1940,” The 
McNaughton Papers, vol. 5, 1994, 30-45; 
J.L. Granatstein, “The Conservative 
Party and the Ogdensburg Agree-
ment,” International Journal, Vol. 22, 
Winter 1966-67, 73-76; Idem., “Macken-
zie King and Canada at Ogdensburg, 
August 1940,” in Joel J. Sokolsky and 
Joseph T. Jockel, ed., Fifty Years of Can-
ada-United States Defense Cooperation: 
The Road From Ogdensburg (Lewiston: 
Edwin Mellen Press, 1992), 9-29; and 
Stetson Conn and Byron Fairchild, 
The Framework of Hemisphere Defense 
(Washington DC: Department of the 
Army, 1960), chapter XIV.
51 Fred E. Pollock, “Roosevelt, the Og-
densburg Agreement, and the British 
Fleet: All Done With Mirrors,” Diplo-
matic History, vol. 5, Summer 1981, 203-
219.
52 David Beatty, The United States Perma-
nent Joint Board on Defense, PhD thesis, 
Michigan State University, 1969.
53 Chantal Allan, Bomb Canada and Other 
Unkind Remarks in the American Media 
(Edmonton: Athabasca University 
Press, 2009).
54 British Empire Section of the Coor-
dinator of Information, “Changing 
Canadian-American Relations,” 5 
March 1942, State Department Re-
cords, Decimal File 1940-44, RG59, 
file 711.42/241, National Archives and 
Records Administration (NARA).
55 M.M. Mahoney to the SSEA, no. 1078, 
1 June 1940, W.L.M. King Papers, Cor-
respondence, vol. 292, reel C4571, LAC.
56 Reid, “Some problems in the rela-
tions between Canada and the United 
States,” 16 April 1943, Reid Papers, vol. 
6, file 10, LAC. 
23© Centre for Military and Strategic Studies http://cmss.ucalgary.ca/
Calgary Papers in Military and Strategic Studies, Occasional Paper No. 6, 2012
New Perspectives on Canada in the Second World War Pages 23–43
The Acid Test of Sovereignty: Canada, 
the United States, and the Command 
of Control of Combined Forces for 
Continental Defence, 1940-1945
Richard Goette
Introduction
In 1941, Andrew McNaughton, Canada’s top general and future Minister of National Defence, noted that “the acid test of sovereignty is the con-trol of the armed forces.”1 After a careful examination of the Canadian-
American command and control relationship for continental defence during 
the Second World War, this paper elaborates on McNaughton’s statement. 
It demonstrates that the key issue was not control but command – that com-
mand over one’s armed forces in one’s territory was the central quality of a 
sovereign state and the “acid test of sovereignty.” This argument is in fact 
representative of a maxim that remains a fundamental facet of Canadian 
armed forces command and control culture and tradition: always to retain 
command when co-operating with other nations’ armed forces in contin-
ental defence, thereby ensuring Canadian sovereignty.2 Indeed, as this 
chapter will demonstrate, throughout the Second World War Canadian mil-
itary authorities worked hard to retain national command and operational 
command of Canadian forces when operating with American forces in the 
defence of North America, and this proved to be an effective means to safe-
guard Canadian sovereignty.
Conceptual Approaches to Sovereignty
This paper challenges a number of existing concepts of sovereignty. 
Rather than focusing on the “political” approach to sovereignty cham-
pioned by Canadian Government civil servants and especially those of 
the Department of External Affairs, this paper focuses on the “functional”, 
or military service, interpretation of sovereignty. The External Affairs 
perspective places emphasis on the “political” aspects of the Canada-U.S. 
continental defence relationship, with particular focus on diplomatic pro-
cedure and the desire for greater government consultation at the political 
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(strategic) level. The functional perspective, on the other hand, focuses on 
the purely military or “functional” aspects of the Canada-U.S. continental 
defence relationship, and in particular the efforts of officers from the two 
nations to ensure effective coordination of forces at the operational level in 
order to efficiently accomplish the military task of defending North America 
from attack. Here, the issue of command and control took centre stage, as 
Canadian officers had to try to find a balance between effective combined 
command and control arrangements with the Americans, while at the same 
time ensuring that Canadian forces remained under Canadian command so 
as to safeguard sovereignty.3
 In undertaking a functional approach, Canadian officers were also able 
to avoid a “defence against help” situation with the United States. Articulated 
first by Norwegian academic Nils Ørvik in 1973 as a security “strategy for 
small states,” “defence against help” dictated that a country had to establish 
and maintain military credibility if it was to avoid unwanted “help” from its 
larger neighbours.4 In a Canadian context, the concept stresses the require-
ment of Canada to maintain a credible level of defensive capabilities for fear 
of the United States losing confidence in Canada’s ability to defend itself. 
This scenario could prompt an American usurpation of Canadian sover-
eignty by taking independent unilateral action in Canadian territory, waters, 
or airspace in order to protect U.S. security and defence interests.5 Therefore, 
according to the concept of “defence against help,” not only were Canada’s 
enemies a threat to Canadian security and sovereignty, but so too was its 
closest ally, the United States. 
 However, the Canadian military had, since 1940, positively asserted 
Canadian sovereignty with its attitude towards the continental defence 
relationship with the United States. Instead of maintaining a belligerent 
approach to American defence concerns, the Canadian military advocated 
taking an active role in the overall Canada-U.S. continental defence relation-
ship by coordinating with its southern neighbour to organize effective and 
efficient bilateral command and control arrangements. Rather than “defence 
against help” this was indicative of a more positive “piece of the action” 
approach to the Canada-U.S. continental defence command and control re-
lationship, a concept best articulated by P. Whitney Lackenbauer in “From 
‘Defence Against Help’ to ‘A Piece of the Action’: The Canadian Sovereignty 
and Security Paradox Revisited” (2000). Lackenbauer posits that Canada’s 
conscious decision to secure a proverbial “piece of the action” by actively 
participating in continental defence efforts with the United States enabled 
the country to protect its sovereignty from American intervention.6 
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 This paper adopts Lackenbauer’s “piece of the action” argument. It does 
so by stressing that, despite the overwhelming power of the United States, 
by taking an active role in arranging an effective continental defence com-
mand and control relationship with the United States, while at the same time 
ensuring that Canadian forces did not come under American command, 
Canada was able to avoid a “defence against help” situation with the United 
States, maintain Canadian sovereignty, and provide effective defence for the 
continent. 
National Command: A Service Prerogative
Before delving into the historical account of Canada-U.S. combined com-
mand and control relations during the Second World War, it is first necessary 
to discuss the principles of national command and operational command. 
One of the main characteristics of the Canada-U.S. Second World War 
continental defence relationship was the exclusion of administration and 
discipline over Canadian forces in bilateral command and control arrange-
ments.7 Responsibility for such matters was not inherent in operational-level 
command and control authority but instead remained a national prerogative 
as part of the “national command” that Canada’s civilian government main-
tained over Canadian forces through the service chiefs of staff—a practice 
that has continued to this day. During the Second World War, the national 
authority was the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee, consisting of the 
service chiefs of the army, navy and air force. All aspects of national com-
mand, which included authority over the assignment and original compos-
ition of forces, logistics, and administration and discipline, were therefore 
service prerogatives. These powers could not be assigned to an operational 
commander from a foreign nation, meaning that the retention of national 
command in combined command and control arrangements was an effect-
ive guarantee of Canadian sovereignty.8 There was, therefore, an important 
distinction between command and control authority exercised at the oper-
ational level by Canadian or foreign commanders, and at the strategic level 
by national headquarters in Ottawa.
 The key concern was operational command of Canadian forces, and 
here again Canadian officers were successful during the Second World 
War at ensuring that operational command of Canada’s forces remained in 
Canadian hands. Operational command, as the term denotes, is focused on 
actual operations; that is, the task at hand and how to utilize the means al-
located to accomplish it. It did not include authority over administration or 
logistics, and its focus was on the ability of a commander to assign missions 
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and deploy or reassign forces.9 A service chief delegated operational com-
mand to his service’s operational-level commanders. However, he could also 
grant operational command (or operational control) to a commander from 
a different service for joint operations or, if necessary, to a foreign officer in 
command of bilateral or multilateral forces.10 During the Second World War, 
Canadian officers were careful to avoid having Canadian forces come under 
U.S. strategic direction or unity of command, both of which embodied the 
same command and control authority as the modern principle of operational 
command.
The Beginning of the Canada-U.S. Continental Defence 
Relationship and the 1940 “Black Plan”
After the shocking defeat of France in 1940, the United States became 
alarmed by the growing German threat to North America and sought to 
make arrangements with Canada to coordinate continental defence. This 
endeavour led Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King and President 
Franklin Roosevelt to conclude the Ogdensburg Agreement and establish the 
Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD) in August 1940. One of the initial 
tasks assigned to the PJBD was to produce the first ever bilateral plans for 
the defence of North America, and the command and control of combined 
Canadian-American forces quickly became a central issue. 
Canada was reluctant to surrender part of its sovereignty and command 
and control of its forces to American commanders. However, the United 
States, as U.S. Army official historian Stanley W. Dziuban has explained, 
stood staunchly by its “unwillingness to leave in the hands of another power 
the defense of continuous border areas whose adequate defense was vital 
to the security of the United States.”11 While Canada championed its joint 
committee cooperation system of command and control, the U.S. desired to 
implement its unity of command system.12 These unique joint command and 
control cultures often conflicted, but in the end a compromise between the 
two systems was struck. Through this compromise, Canada was able suc-
cessfully to resist American pressure to place Canadian forces under U.S. 
command, thereby retaining national command and operational command 
and ensuring Canada’s sovereignty.
During the initial PJBD defence discussions in the summer of 1940, 
American officers felt that they held a definite advantage in securing favour-
able command and control arrangements. They observed that Canadian 
defence measures in North America were alarmingly weak because of the 
comparatively small size of Canada’s military, and the fact that the bulk of 
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its forces were deployed overseas to protect Britain. Because this strategic 
situation would make Canada reliant on the U.S. for continental defence, the 
American military expected to dominate the defence relationship.13 
The PJBD soon began working on a joint defence plan, which it released 
on 10 October 1940. It was officially called the Joint Canadian-United States 
Basic Defense Plan–1940, but it was commonly known as the “Black Plan” be-
cause it “postulated a German victory over Britain, the disappearance of the 
Royal Navy as an effective fighting force, and a concerted Axis effort against 
North America.”14 The plan provided for defence responsibilities in territor-
ial waters and land areas on the lines of national sovereignty: Canada would 
protect Canadian territory and the United States would protect American 
territory. Responsibility for the defence of Newfoundland, however, was un-
clear, especially after the U.S.-British Destroyers-for-Bases Deal in September 
1940 meant that Canadian and American forces would now be stationed 
there to defend the British colony.15 The PJBD sought to address this issue 
when they met to discuss specific command and control arrangements for 
the Black Plan during the following winter.
Because the Black Plan envisaged the defeat of Britain – which would in-
clude the large number of Canadian forces overseas defending the island na-
tion – and a major assault on North America, Canadian planners understood 
that their only hope of survival hinged on assistance from the United States. 
Therefore, in this unfavourable scenario, Canada was willing to grant the 
United States greater command and control authority over Canadian forces. 
Based on recommendations from the Canadian Section PJBD and the Chiefs 
of Staff Committee, the government agreed with the American proposal that 
the U.S. Army Chief of Staff could exercise “strategic direction” (the term 
“strategical direction” was also used) over Canadian land and air forces. At 
the operational level, this meant the exercise of operational command by 
the United States over all military forces in Canada and Newfoundland.16 
However, this command and control authority was subject to Canadian 
consent and consultation, as there was a specific provision in the Black Plan 
that gave the individual Canadian service chiefs or a Canadian operational 
commander “the right to appeal to the Canadian government if, in his opin-
ion, Canadian national interests are imperilled by the strategic directives 
received from the United States.”17 
To summarize, in the event of an Axis assault on North America, 
Canada recognized that the United States would be the preeminent power 
and should have strategic direction over forces defending the continent in 
the Black Plan. Nonetheless, by making this strategic direction authority sub-
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ject to Canadian consultation and having a provision for the right to refer to 
higher authority, the Canadian government also ensured that it would have 
a say in the deployment and movement of its forces.
Mutual Cooperation or Unity of Command: ABC-22
Nonetheless, by early 1941 it was becoming more probable that Britain was 
going to survive and continue the fight against the Axis. With the English 
Channel, not the Western Atlantic, as the first line of defence, Canadian PJBD 
members announced to their American counterparts that the Black Plan was 
out of date and that a new plan for 1941 “should be drawn up at once.”18 The 
Americans agreed, and work began on the new plan, which later became 
known as Plan 2 or ABC-22 (both terms will be used). Unlike the Black Plan 
(which subsequently became known as Plan 1), Plan 2 envisaged the sur-
vival of Britain and the entry of the United States into the war alongside the 
British Commonwealth, a scenario which was becoming much more likely 
by the spring of 1941.19 Canadian planners felt that, in this more strategically 
favourable climate, Canada had more leverage in its command and control 
discussions with the Americans. In particular, the Canadian PJBD members 
believed that they did not have to accept American strategic direction. This 
stance led to several disagreements with American planners. 
In the resulting discussions, U.S. planners advocated for the same 
American strategic direction over all Canadian and U.S. forces as in the Black 
Plan. The Canadians, conversely, argued that the improved strategic situation 
did not warrant it, and instead insisted that the Canada-U.S. command and 
control relationship should be based on the principle of cooperation.20 The 
American members, although admitting that cooperation was “possible,” 
maintained that this command and control principle “is definitely wrong, 
inconsistent with Plan No. 1 and invites confliction [sic], delay and uncer-
tainty.”21 It was, therefore, not surprising that the two sides were unable to 
find a middle ground and an impasse resulted. For the moment, they essen-
tially agreed to disagree on the issue of command and control, deciding that 
it would be best to seek further advice from their respective Chiefs of Staff 
and governments.22 Nonetheless, because the American planners admitted 
that cooperation was at least a possibility, Canadian PJBD service members 
were encouraged to push harder to make it the basis of the command and 
control arrangements for ABC-22.
In opposing American strategic direction in Plan 2, the Canadian PJBD 
members had the full support of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, who were 
“most strongly against the acceptance by Canada of any proposal giving the 
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United States unqualified strategic control of Canadian Armed Forces” for 
ABC-22.23 Their main concern was that American strategic direction would 
potentially allow the United States to re-distribute Canadian forces to other 
areas of North America, which was a national command responsibility. In 
particular, the Chiefs feared that this authority could possibly lead American 
commanders to remove forces from Canadian territory without Canadian 
consent, in order to provide added protection to their own vital points. This 
would have been a significant blow to Canadian sovereignty.24 
The Chiefs of Staff Committee instead endorsed a suggestion by the 
Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) member of the PJBD, Captain H.E. Reid. 
“Rastus” Reid, who would later become the RCN’s Chief of the Naval Staff, 
recommended that the U.S. retain strategic direction over its forces in its own 
territory and Canada retain strategic direction over its forces in Canada and 
Newfoundland. When Canadian-American forces operated together, the 
command and control relationship between the two nations’ forces should 
be “the same mutual co-operation which has been so evident between the 
U.K. and Canadian forces now operating in the Atlantic area.”25 The Cabinet 
War Committee concurred, and officially sanctioned the Canadian PJBD 
Section’s efforts to resist U.S. strategic direction and come to a more agreeable 
command and control solution.26
The resulting 19th Meeting of the PJBD in Washington in late May was 
the most strained in the history of the Canadian-American body. It took 
place in the Federal Reserve Board building beginning at 9am and lasted 
well into the night. It was a hot day, but the air conditioning system was 
shut off after 6pm. The Canadians suspected that this had been done on 
purpose in order to “sweat out” an agreement on command and control 
more favourable to the United States. The American planners stressed that 
U.S. strategic direction, or as they now also termed it “unity of command” 
(they used both terms interchangeably), was “essential in war” and there-
fore necessary for ABC-22. To back up this position, they cited the precedent 
of Marshal Ferdinand Foch’s exercise of unity of command over all Allied 
armies on the Western Front in 1918 and how the U.S military felt that it was 
a crucial factor in Allied victory in the First World War. Brigadier Maurice 
Pope, the Canadian Army’s Assistant Chief of the General Staff (ACGS) and 
that service’s member of the PJBD, disagreed with this line of reasoning. He 
argued that the 350 divisions on the Western Front and the strategic setting 
in 1918 were “totally different to a situation when there was a war in the 
Western Hemisphere and our joint coastlines exposed only to occasional hit 
and run raids.”27 Put simply , the strategic situation upon which ABC-22 was 
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based – British survival and no major Axis assault on North America – was 
not serious enough to warrant U.S. strategic direction or unity of command 
over Canadian forces. Pope’s stance had the desired effect, and the proposal 
for U.S. unity of command was withdrawn.28 Instead, the two sides came to 
a compromise.
On 28 July 1941, the Board released its final draft of ABC-22.29 The com-
mand and control provisions in the new bilateral North American defence 
plan were a significant victory for Canadian planners. ABC-22 outlined that 
each nation would retain strategic direction and command of its own forces. 
The combined Canadian-U.S. military effort was to be based on the command 
and control principle of “mutual cooperation” and the forces of each nation 
were required, “to their utmost capacity, support the appropriate forces of 
the other nation.” In addition, to appease the Americans, ABC-22 also in-
cluded a provision for the exercise of unity of command over Canadian and 
American forces in an emergency situation, to be implemented in the follow-
ing circumstances:
a) When agreed upon by the Chiefs of Staff concerned; or
b) When the commanders of the Canadian and United States 
forces concerned agree that the situation requires the exercise 
of unity of command, and further agree as to the Service 
that shall exercise such command. All such mutual agree-
ments shall be subject to confirmation by the Chiefs of Staff 
concerned, but this provision shall not prevent the immediate 
establishment of unity of command in cases of an emergency.30
The final definition of unity of command in ABC-22 was as follows:
Unity of command, when established, vests in one commander 
the 
• responsibility and authority to co-ordinate the operations of 
the participating forces of both nations by the setting up of 
task forces, the assignment of 
• tasks, the designation of objectives, and the exercise of such 
co-ordinating 
• control as the commander deems necessary to ensure the suc-
cess of the operations. 
Unity of command does not authorize a commander exercising it 
control the administration and discipline of the forces of the na-
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tion of which he is not an officer, nor to issue any instructions to 
such forces beyond those necessary for effective co-ordination.31
This definition of unity of command was similar to the modern definition of 
“operational command.”32 For ABC-22, this meant that unity of command in 
a theatre entailed vesting operational command of both joint and combined 
forces in one single operational commander. 
Furthermore, by specifying that unity of command did not include au-
thority over administration and discipline, ABC-22 also ensured that these 
responsibilities remained a service prerogative under the national command 
exercised by the respective country’s chiefs of staff. The command and 
control provisions in the new plan were, therefore, a compromise between 
the Canadian joint committee cooperation system and the American unity 
of command system. It ensured that national command would be retained 
by each nation’s chiefs of staff. Although the plan contained provisions for 
unity of command in an emergency, or when agreed to by the Canadian and 
American chiefs of staff, cooperation was the main principle upon which the 
command and control relationship between Canadian and American oper-
ational commanders would be based in the event of U.S. entry into the war.
The American planners were never fully satisfied with the command 
and control arrangements in ABC-22. The U.S. Army War Plans Division 
in particular felt that that “mutual cooperation is an ineffective method of 
coordination of military forces” and that the plan was therefore “considered 
defective in its provisions relative to command arrangements.”33 However, 
although senior U.S. Army PJBD member Lieutenant-General Stanley 
Embick agreed with his War Plans Division colleagues, given the difficul-
ties already experienced in negotiating the command and control arrange-
ments for Plan 2, he concluded that the arrangements in ABC-22 “probably 
represent the best compromise possible under present conditions.”34 The 
United States Secretary of the Navy approved ABC-22 on 16 August and the 
Secretary of War did the same two days later. President Roosevelt’s approval 
came on the 29th of that month.35 The Canadian Chiefs of Staff submitted 
their endorsement of ABC-22 to the government on 30 September, and the 
Canadian Government gave its official approval to the plan on 15 October.36 
In the end, ABC-22 was appended to existing American and Canadian de-
fence plans and distributed to the relevant operational commanders. It was 
only to be put into effect upon the entry of the United States into the War.37 
This, of course, proved to be a short time indeed, as Japanese carrier aircraft 
launched a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941. 
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At the Operational Level
The arrival of U.S. troops and aircraft in Newfoundland in early 1941 marked 
the first time that Canadian and American commanders were tasked to co-
ordinate their forces at the operational level in a combined effort to defend 
the continent from attack. Several significant differences of opinion arose be-
tween the Canadian and American militaries regarding what the command 
and control relationship between their forces should be. Different perceptions 
in Canada and the United States of how the defence of Newfoundland fit into 
the overall defence scheme for North America was a crucial factor in the on-
going debate on command and control. The Americans saw Newfoundland 
as a separate entity outside of the continental United States, and, as the larger 
partner in the new Canada-U.S. alliance, they naturally desired that one 
of their commanders be allowed to exercise unity of command there. The 
Canadians, on the other hand, viewed Newfoundland as an integral part 
of the overall defence of eastern Canada. Feeling that their special interests 
in the British colony were paramount – and the fact that they had deployed 
to the colony first at the behest of both the Newfoundland and British gov-
ernments – the Canadian military leadership felt that responsibility for the 
defence of Newfoundland and the command and control system that should 
be implemented for this purpose should be Canada’s prerogative and should 
thus be based on mutual cooperation.38
 The situation at the operational level in Newfoundland was clarified 
somewhat with the approval of ABC-22 by the Canadian and U.S. govern-
ments in the autumn of 1941. Nevertheless, ambiguities and disagreements 
regarding the command and control issue persisted in Newfoundland 
throughout the last months of 1941. This situation was due largely to the fact 
that ABC-22 was not in effect because the United States was not yet officially 
in the war, and also because of the arrival of a new U.S. Army officer in St. 
John’s.
 Due to the growing number of U.S. forces in Newfoundland and the 
increased USAAF operations in the defence of maritime trade by the autumn 
of 1941, the U.S. Army decided that it was time to appoint a general-ranking 
officer to the colony. In October 1941, Major-General Gerald C. Brant arrived 
in St. John’s to take over responsibility for U.S. Army forces in the colony as 
the new Commanding General, Newfoundland Base Command.39 Brant was 
brash and aggressive, and his personality did not make him amenable to 
accepting mutual cooperation as a basis for command and control of com-
bined forces in Newfoundland. A former classmate of U.S. Army Chief of 
Staff General Douglas MacArthur, Major-General Brant was, in the words 
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of Canadian official historian W.A.B. Douglas, “a soldier moulded in the 
tradition of the old army.”40 Moreover, Brant was a staunch advocate of unity 
of command.41 Immediately upon arriving in Newfoundland, he began con-
stantly to exert pressure on the Canadians to establish unity of command 
– exercised by himself – in the colony, and this attitude only served to alien-
ate him from the Canadian operational-level commanders.42 Brant’s efforts 
towards achieving unity of command, and Canada’s successful resistance to 
them, became a recurring theme for the next several months.
 The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 brought the 
issue of command and control of combined Canadian-American continental 
defence forces to the forefront. Previously, with Canada fully engaged in 
the war and the U.S. officially neutral, it was unclear what the actual com-
mand and control relationship between the two countries’ military forces 
was. However, now with the U.S. as belligerents and ABC-22 officially placed 
into effect there was no question at all: mutual cooperation would be the 
means by which Canadian and American commanders would coordinate 
their forces. Nevertheless, disagreements between the two nations persisted 
about whether this practice should be continued or the provision in ABC-22 
for unity of command should be implemented.
 These differences of opinion largely centred on conflicting interpreta-
tions of the seriousness of the actual threat that their combined forces faced. 
The Americans were devastated by the scale and surprise of the Japanese at-
tack, and they were anxious to take all of the defensive precautions they could 
now that they were belligerents in the war, including implementing unity of 
command on both coasts.43 The Canadian military leadership, however, felt 
that the strategic threat was still negligible. They predicted, correctly, that in 
the Pacific the Japanese would focus their offensive to the southeast, not the 
northeast towards the North American Pacific coast, and that Germany, still 
heavily engaged in the Soviet Union, would not risk an attack on the east 
coast. Under these circumstances, the Chiefs of Staff Committee concluded 
that a command and control relationship between Canadian and American 
forces in Newfoundland and on the Pacific coast based on mutual cooper-
ation, as provided for in ABC-22, was satisfactory and that unity of command 
under an American officer on either coast was not necessary.44 
 For the Pacific coast, it took a direct approach with American military 
leadership in Washington to secure reassurance that the current forms and 
scales of attack did not require unity of command. After the Pearl Harbor 
attack, the United States Section of the PJBD immediately pressed Canada 
to place all of its military forces in British Columbia under U.S. unity of 
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command. American PJBD Chairman Fiorello LaGuardia outlined the U.S. 
position in a 2 January letter to Canadian Chairman O.M. Biggar. He argued 
that British Columbia “geographically was an enclave” within the newly-
formed U.S. Western Theatre of Operations, which stretched from Southern 
California up to and including Alaska. Stressing that the Puget Sound-
southern British Columbia area in particular was of crucial strategic import-
ance and therefore “cannot be most effectively defended under the control 
of several commanders,” LaGuardia formally requested that the Canadian 
and U.S. governments implement the provision for unity of command in 
ABC-22 by placing Canadian army and air forces in British Columbia under 
the “Supreme Command” of the U.S. Army commander, Lieutenant-General 
John L. Dewitt.45 LaGuardia ended his letter to Biggar by stressing that unity 
of command under Dewitt was “a wise precautionary measure, in advance of 
the occurrence of an actual attack.”46
 As Galen Perras has noted, LaGuardia’s request “met a Canadian stone 
wall.”47 After meeting on 3 January, the Canadian PJBD Section came to the 
unanimous conclusion that “no case whatever had been made for the insti-
tution of a U.S. unity of command over Canadian Army and Air Forces.”48 
Once again, the U.S. request for unity of command was representative of 
a fundamental Canada-U.S. disagreement on anticipated enemy intentions. 
The Americans, “as usual,” did not include any updated forms or scales of at-
tack to justify their position. The strategic threat to the west coast was in fact 
“precisely the situation that was contemplated last Spring when ABC-22 was 
drafted.”49 Since the Canadians had then held out for mutual cooperation, 
there was thus no new reason why they should not again resist this new 
attempt by the Americans to establish unity of command.50
 At the time, the Canadian Chiefs of Staff were in Washington for discus-
sions with the Americans and the British. They decided to take advantage 
of their presence in the U.S. capitol to resolve the command and control 
issue by speaking directly to their American counterparts, USN Chief of 
Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Harold Stark and U.S. Army Chief of Staff 
General George Marshall.51 Although unknown to the Canadian Chiefs 
of Staff at the time, Admiral Stark had in fact been advocating to General 
Marshall that mutual cooperation, not unity of command, should be the pri-
mary command and control principle upon which American defensive joint 
operations should be based. Specifically, although Stark felt that unity of 
command may be necessary for mixed task forces for offensive operations, he 
believed that mutual cooperation was better suited for defensive ones.52 This 
opinion proved to be beneficial to the Canadian stance on bilateral Canada-
35
richard goette
U.S. command and control. In Washington, the Canadian Chiefs asked Stark 
and Marshall the specific reasons why, in their view, a change in the Canada-
U.S. command and control relationship was necessary. The response was 
very revealing. The U.S. Chiefs of Staff agreed that the threat was no more 
than sporadic hit-and-run raids and “stated unequivocally that they did not 
subscribe to the necessity of Unified Command either in Newfoundland or 
on the West Coast.”53 
 This official U.S. military opinion not only satisfied the Canadian Chiefs 
of Staff Committee, but also convinced them of the effectiveness of a dir-
ect approach to the U.S. Chiefs of Staff. Accordingly, the Canadian military 
leadership announced that any further deliberation and decisions regarding 
the Canada-U.S. command and control relationship would no longer come 
under the purview of the PJBD, but instead would be “entirely a matter of 
the Chiefs of Staff Committee.”54 Only if the U.S. Chiefs of Staff directly ap-
proached the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee about implementing the 
unity of command provision in ABC-22 – which appeared unlikely – would 
the Canadian military leadership consider the matter again. Therefore, al-
though members of the U.S. Section PJBD tried at various times during the 
winter and spring of 1942 to convince their Canadian counterparts of the 
need for unity of command on the west coast, because no proof was given 
that mutual cooperation had broken down and no formal request came from 
the U.S. Chiefs of Staff (by March 1942 the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or JCS), the 
Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee refused to contemplate these requests.55
 On the east coast, the relationships between the Canadian and American 
operational-level commanders also proved crucial. In particular, the rela-
tionship between Major-General Brant and the Canadian commanders in 
Newfoundland continued to be a rocky one. Brant had a particularly difficult 
relationship with the RCAF commander in Newfoundland, Air Commodore 
C.M. “Black Mike” McEwen. Although Brant was a USAAF officer, he was 
not an advocate for an independent air force in the United States; unlike most 
airmen at the time, he felt that the air services should remain under the U.S. 
Army.56 This factor, added to Brant’s brash and aggressive personality, meant 
that the commander of the U.S. Army Newfoundland Base Command was 
not enamoured with the upstart young Canadian airman.57
 The friction between Brant and McEwen spilled over during a meeting 
in St. John’s in June 1942. When the Newfoundland Base Commander re-
fused to adhere to RCAF air traffic control and identification regulations and 
then proceeded to mock the Canadian air service, McEwen and the Canadian 
Army commander in Newfoundland, Major-General L.R. Page, issued him 
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a thinly-veiled threat to shoot down any USAAF aircraft that did not adhere 
to the regulations. Brant retorted that he was willing to take that risk and 
stormed out of the meeting.58 Unfortunately, this clash of personalities had a 
direct result on the command and control situation in Newfoundland; as the 
RCN commander in Newfoundland, Rear-Admiral L.W. Murray, noted at the 
time, “the system known as cooperation, which we favour, is very difficult 
to achieve with an officer of this type commanding one of the five services 
involved.”59 
 Brant was reprimanded by his superior for the incident and later 
apologized to the Canadians for his behaviour. The Canadian Chiefs of 
Staff Committee accepted the apology and considered the matter closed.60 
Thereafter, relations between the Newfoundland Base Commander and the 
Canadians were “extremely good” and mutual cooperation proved effective 
for continental defence coordination. Brant did not bring forth the unity of 
command issue again; however, he never did feel comfortable with mutual 
cooperation, feeling that it was defective. Moreover, he expressed privately 
his opinion that the Canadian forces in Newfoundland were “negligible” 
and that in the event of an enemy attack the main defensive effort would be 
handled by the U.S. Army with himself in command.61 Fortunately, there 
was no enemy attack on Newfoundland during the war to test whether or 
not Brant would adhere to official policy or his own personal views on the 
exercise of unity of command. As a result, mutual cooperation as provided 
for in ABC-22 remained the command and control principle in effect between 
Canadian and American continental defence forces throughout the remain-
der of the Second World War.
Conclusion
During the Second World War, Canada’s ability to retain both national com-
mand and operational command of its forces in its combined command 
and control relationship with the United States was indeed the “acid test of 
sovereignty.” The Americans had hoped to utilize their own joint system 
of unity of command for combined Canada-U.S. continental defence com-
mand and control, but Canadian officers worked hard in negotiations with 
their allies for bilateral defence plans and in-theatre at the operational level 
to ensure that Canadian forces would not come under American command. 
Instead, they stressed that the strategic situation did not warrant unity of 
command, and remained steadfast throughout the war in their preference 
for mutual cooperation. As a consequence of this functional perspective that 
the Canadian military planners maintained regarding the military situation 
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as it applied to the Canada-U.S. continental defence command and control 
relationship, Canada was able to avoid a “defence against help” situation 
with the United States. Moreover, the retention by Canada of command 
of its forces for continental defence proved to be an effective safeguard of 
Canadian sovereignty throughout the Second World War.
In the end, there were – fortunately – no enemy attacks on North America 
during the war (except the Aleutians – see note # 49) to determine whether 
or not mutual cooperation was an effective means of command and control 
to coordinate combined Canada-U.S. defensive operations. Nonetheless, 
mutual cooperation was put to the test in the Northwest Atlantic, where the 
two countries’ air forces worked together to coordinate their operations to 
defend Allied shipping from U-boat attacks. It failed this test and necessi-
tated the implementation of the British system of operational control for com-
bined Canada-U.S. maritime air power operations, a command and control 
principle that also ensured Canadian national command and operational 
command. This experience set important precedents for future Canada-U.S. 
continental defence command and control arrangements during the Cold 
War, but that is a story for another time.
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North American Exceptionalism in 
Wartime: Media Representation of the 
First Special Service Force
James Wood
From the Ogdensburg Agreement of 1940 to the present day, Canadian military forces have often acted in direct concert with their American allies. The First Special Service Force was a unique development in 
the history of this US-Canadian partnership. Composed of soldiers drawn 
from the armies of both Canada and the United States, the Force was the 
first and only example of a completely integrated North American military 
formation. While originally conceived as a long-range sabotage outfit, in the 
autumn of 1942 the First Special Service Force (FSSF) was reorganized as an 
élite light infantry brigade for employment in the Mediterranean Theatre. 
In 1943-1944, it fought a series of difficult campaigns in Italy and Southern 
France, where it came to be distinguished by its outstanding combat record 
and its unique, bi-national composition. To this day, the First Special Service 
Force represents the closest that Canadian soldiers have come to a complete, 
working integration with the armed forces of the United States. This paper 
will discuss media representation of the First Special Service Force (FSSF) 
at war, addressing US and Canadian coverage of its activation, employment 
and ultimate disbandment. 
Throughout its brief existence from 1942 to 1944, the unit was character-
ized by effectiveness at the front, based on exceptional training and good rela-
tions between Canadian and American officers and their men. In the process, 
it became a symbol of Allied unity and the commitment of the two nations 
to winning the war. Once the veil of secrecy that initially cloaked the FSSF 
was lifted, media coverage of the Force by both Canadian and American war 
correspondents portrayed the unit as a quintessentially “North American” 
military formation, a symbol of the common values of its citizen soldiers and 
the nations they represented. Of course, the very fact that what had begun as 
a “top secret” unit received this kind of media attention is itself significant. 
The bi-national composition of the FSSF became a source of pride for the 
peoples of Canada and the United States and this became the focus of media 
coverage of the unit. At the same time, however, the hidden administrative 
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liabilities of an international formation were beginning to wear down the 
Force’s effectiveness, leading to its disbandment at the end of 1944. 
Activation and Training at Helena
Following the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, the United States 
joined the Allies in the war against the Axis powers. In the spring of 1942, 
despite the dismal situation of occupied Europe, there was nevertheless a 
certain degree of euphoria in Ottawa owing to the American entry into the 
war. On July 12th 1942, Canadian Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie 
King – a prime minister whose concern with fostering better relations with 
the Americans is almost legendary – authorized the movement of nearly 700 
Canadian officers and men to the United States for training as part of a joint 
US-Canadian military formation. Training began at a newly expanded US 
National Guard camp at Fort William Henry Harrison in Helena, Montana.
 Originally created by British and American planners for the purpose of 
sabotaging industrial targets in German-occupied Europe, the Force repre-
sented a tenuous, experimental attempt by Canada and the United States to 
ignore national distinctions and create a truly international North American 
military formation. Within the Force, Canadian and American soldiers wore 
the same uniforms, carried the same weapons, and answered to the same 
superiors, regardless of nationality. As was later pointed out by Montreal 
Star correspondent Sholto Watt, within the Force an American private could 
answer to a Canadian sergeant, who in turn reported to an American lieu-
tenant, and so on.1 All the way up the chain of command, Canadians and 
Americans were completely integrated, and this was later seen as something 
remarkable by media correspondents from both countries who never failed 
to comment on this unique characteristic of the Force. All told, this combined 
North American formation was founded upon an ongoing effort to ignore 
national distinctions in the interests of a common cause. 
 Given the secretive nature of the Force’s initial tasking, the first “media” 
coverage of the unit was a product of the unit’s own press arm. On 20 July 
1942, the First Special Service Force Photo Unit was created, composed of pho-
tographers from the US Signal Corps who were attached to the FSSF Service 
Battalion. Their comprehensive 16 mm Force training films were shown to 
groups of up to 500 at a time in a theatre specially constructed at Fort William 
Henry Harrison for training purposes. The filming of jump landings, use 
of explosives, scaling mountains, snowshoe and ski training, and hand-to-
hand combat all served to increase the instructional efficiency of the unit, 
particularly for parachute landings. Injuries, including broken legs, knees, 
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and sprains, were reduced from a weekly high of 25 percent to 1 percent after 
slow-motion analysis of the film images and intensive classroom instruction. 
Training the FSSF was a high priority in 1942: film, cameras and projectors, 
the photo building and theatre, darkroom equipment, and trips to a Chicago 
lab for special processing -- all were considered to be of absolute necessity for 
the Force, and in general no expense was spared for this purpose. Although 
utmost secrecy was maintained throughout this early period, the result was 
an extensive record of the unit’s activation in photographs and in film that 
still exists to this day.2 
Diplomatic Cracks 
Maintaining secrecy was strategically necessary given the unit’s intended 
purpose as a long-range sabotage outfit. When it came to the release of in-
formation through the media, however, the Canadian government had a 
more pressing concern: presenting the Force as a combined effort by Canada 
and the United States, rather than an American unit that happened to have 
a few Canadian soldiers serving in its ranks. The first of these two images 
was the precise sort that PM Mackenzie King wanted to foster in 1942, as it 
would serve to highlight Canada’s new partnership with the United States. 
The latter image of Canadian soldiers being turned over to the US Army, 
however, would quite obviously present a political liability for King if it were 
to become widely publicized. While the US Personnel Branch of General 
Staff supported a proposal of the new Force commander, Colonel Robert 
T. Frederick, that administration of pay, records, and discipline would be 
simplified if Canadian FSSF personnel were to take the oath of service and 
obedience to the US Army, Canadian officials quickly responded by noting 
the political difficulties such a move would entail.3 Instead, the Canadians 
kept their men on Canadian pay-books and continued to protect the top se-
cret status of the FSSF. For security, Canadian military command decided in 
July 1942 to disguise any discussions regarding the Force by describing the 
unit as a new parachute battalion.4 
With such an emphasis on secrecy, one can only imagine the shock ex-
perienced by Canadian government and military officials when they read 
a US War Department press release announcing the creation of the First 
Special Service Force as a new formation of the US Army. Announced on 6 
August 1942 – the very same day that Canadian troops were arriving at Fort 
William Henry Harrison for training – the War Department’s press release 
was initially viewed in Ottawa as a breach of operational security. Upon re-
covering from this surprise, Ottawa issued a statement of its own that closely 
matched the recent press release by the US War Department:
north american exceptionalism in wartime
48
The Minister of National Defence announced today the formation 
of joint Canadian-United States Force to undergo special train-
ing for offensive warfare including parachute training, Marine 
landings, mountain fighting and desert warfare…. The new unit 
to be known as the 1st Special Service Force will be under com-
mand of Colonel Robert T. Frederick, U.S. Army, with Lt.-Col. J.G. 
McQueen of the Calgary Highlanders as second in command.5
 The Canadian press release made a point of countering the American 
announcement in which the Canadian soldiers were said to be arriving 
for training in a new formation of the US Army. It also emphasized that a 
Canadian would be second in command. An encrypted message from the 
Canadian Government then instructed Lester B. Pearson, the Chargé d’Affaires 
in Washington, to inform US authorities that the Canadian government had 
been “very seriously embarrassed by this announcement of establishment 
of [a] Joint Force, particulars of which have been kept as closest military se-
cret.”6 Following Pearson’s formal protest, the US Director of Public Relations 
expressed “the great regret of his department for the premature announce-
ment,” explaining that there had been a mix-up between two administra-
tive divisions of the War Department, each thinking that the other had 
cleared the matter with the Canadian authorities. Future announcements 
would be taken up through the Military Attaché to the Press Attaché of War 
Department to allow simultaneous publication.7
 The Force by this time was receiving some very specialized and expen-
sive training for an exceedingly dangerous mission – Operation PLOUGH 
– the intent of which was designed to parachute the Force into occupied 
Norway for the purpose of destroying hydroelectric dams. Unfortunately, 
when the Royal Air Force proved unwilling to divert British Lancasters 
from the bombing of Germany in order to drop the force on Norway and 
the Norwegian government-in-exile in London objected to the proposed de-
struction of an important element of their country’s national infrastructure, 
the scramble was on to find something to do with this highly specialized and 
extremely expensive special operations unit.
 Even though the FSSF was brigade-size formation, decisions regarding 
its employment were in the hands of the combined chiefs of staff, which 
included Prime Minister Churchill, President Roosevelt, and their military 
chiefs of staff. The United States, for its part, had originally undertaken the 
Norway mission at the suggestion of the British, and since the spring of 
1942 had devoted considerable resources to its development. The Canadian 
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government, meanwhile, had always taken a hands-off approach to strategic 
decisions and actually went so far at this point as to relinquish its right to 
withdraw the Canadians from the FSSF once approval for a general as-
signment had been given. Once a proposed mission had been approved in 
Ottawa, the Canadian Chief of General Staff believed: “We can safely leave 
the operational planning to the United States authorities. They are not 
given to rash military undertakings.”8 With the cancellation of a landing in 
Norway, however, it would be another eight months before a new mission 
could be found for the FSSF. 
 Meanwhile, although the identity and purpose of the new troops sta-
tioned at Fort William Henry Harrison remained secret, the people of Helena 
soon came to know the men from their visits to town. They were often seen 
drinking at establishments such as the Gold Bar, a favourite local “watering 
hole.” Forcemen dated young women of the town and, given the nature of 
parachute training in 1942, they were also frequent patients at the Helena 
hospital. The townspeople often came out to watch parachute jumping prac-
tice and were generally happy for the money that American and Canadian 
servicemen brought to the local economy, not to mention the substantial 
Federal spending on supplies and requirements of the post.9 But the mission 
itself remained secret to outsiders and unknown to Force insiders -- which 
in a military context is an ideal environment for the cultivation of rumours. 
At the Fort there was a constantly-evolving series of tall tales among the 
men regarding the unit’s objectives, with imagined missions ranging from a 
commando raid in Norway to the assassination (or rescue) of Mussolini, an 
airborne campaign in Burma, or a suicide mission to the destroy the oilfields 
of Rumania. 
 What the soldiers of the FSSF did not know was that even the Allied 
high command remained unsure of what to do with them. Frederick later 
recalled that “in one day in Washington within fourteen hours the Force had 
been assigned to 6 different missions.”10  Constant speculation, both at Fort 
William Henry Harrison and in the town of Helena, was matched by the 
Force’s concern to maintain secrecy, as reflected in a post-war interview with 
Captain Finn Roll, one of the original four headquarters staff in Helena:
Rumors were constantly flying around… One good-looking 
doll took me out for a drive in a new Buick. She asked me when 
we were leaving. I said I did not know. I reported this to Col. 
Wickham and suggested the FBI look into her. They did. Reported 
back she was harmless, only wanted to get me in bed. Col. Adams 
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blew his top. As a matter of fact, to my knowledge, no one found 
out our original mission.11
 In a separate interview, Lieutenant-Colonel Kenneth G. Wickham also 
referred to the incident, explaining that the FBI had found the woman not 
only harmless but to have come from a good family. Shortly afterwards, she 
berated Wickham at the exclusive Montana Club regarding the question-
ing. In his recollections Wickham added that the woman later took another 
Canadian officer to her ranch for Christmas.12 Well known as these soldiers 
were to the people of the town, their precise mission remained secret when 
on 6 April 1943 the 2300 men of the First Special Service Force marched in a 
farewell parade through downtown Helena. They had been posted to camp 
Bradford in Norfolk, Virginia for amphibious training while still awaiting 
their first combat mission. 
Anonymous at Kiska
When the First Special Service Force was ultimately sent into combat, it was 
not for a reckless air-drop into enemy territory as originally planned, but 
rather as the spearhead of a combined US-Canadian amphibious landing. In 
August of 1943, US and Canadian forces were chosen by the US Joint Chiefs 
of Staff for the American invasion of Kiska, one of the Aleutian Islands oc-
cupied by Japan earlier in the war. Although the 13th Canadian Infantry 
Brigade, composed of NRMA conscripts, was the first Canadian unit selected 
to join an American task force, by 12 June the US War Department decided 
to include the FSSF as well.13 The Force was to be incorporated into an am-
phibious invasion that seemed an odd choice for a parachute unit’s first as-
signment. Fortunately or not, however, when the FSSF landed on Kiska on 15 
August 1943, it was found that the Japanese garrison -- once estimated to be 
10,000 strong -- had already abandoned the island.14 Fog in the Alaska region 
had been so intense that month that the Japanese were able to evacuate their 
garrison by sea without being observed. The landings were covered in detail 
by both the Canadian and American press, with the forces of each nation 
being mentioned individually as separate units. No mention was made, how-
ever, of the FSSF; the presence of a combined bi-national force was not even 
hinted at in the US or Canadian press.15 
On 22 August 1943, the front page of the New York Times carried Sidney 
Shalett’s just-released article, “U.S. – Canadian Forces Take Kiska,” followed 
by another on the next page: “Joint Statement on Kiska is Issued – Roosevelt 
and Mackenzie King Announce Recapture of Island from Enemy.” The 
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Toronto Globe & Mail of the same day featured the article “Canucks Help 
Retake Kiska,” followed the next day by John Dauphinée’s “Canada, U.S. 
Take Kiska.” Like the American press, the Toronto Globe & Mail covered the 
action as that of two separate national units in a combined assault in which 
Canadians comprised about one-sixth of the invasion force. Press coverage 
focused on a great spirit of cooperation in a joint assault under the leader-
ship of US Vice-Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid. Foreshadowing what would 
later become known about the FSSF, Kiska media coverage explained that all 
equipment carried by Canadian troops during the landings was US Army 
regulation issue.16 With its involvement in the landings unacknowledged 
in the press, the Force prepared to begin its transfer from the fog-shrouded 
Aleutians to cold and muddy Italian front of winter 1943-44. 
Monte La Difensa: Secret Victory
In the fall of 1943, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to send the First Special 
Service Force to Italy to join the US Fifth Army, whose advance was run-
ning parallel to the British Eighth Army moving up the Italian peninsula. 
The Allies were now approaching the main line of the German defences 
barring the approaches to Rome. On the American side of the Apennines, 
the advance had stalled before a belt of German fortifications known as the 
Winter Line. The Force arrived here on 17 November 1943, during a stalemate 
in the US Fifth Army’s drive towards Rome. Having despaired of finding 
a parachute mission for the Force, this highly-trained and very expensive 
force was about to be thrown into the Italian meat-grinder, tasked with 
overcoming entrenched German positions in the mountainous Camino-la 
Difensa-Mignano range.
 On 24 November, the Force received orders to capture the summit of 
Monte la Difensa, a mountain stronghold that had been frustrating the 
American advance for almost a month. On the night of 2-3 December, the 
Second Regiment of the Force conducted a very risky assault up the cliffs 
on the north face of the mountain, which the enemy had left unguarded as 
they believed them to be impassable. This was the highly-specialized type of 
work the Force had been designed to do; the ascent was conducted at night 
while an artillery barrage hammered away at the top of the mountain, not 
with the usual purpose of providing fire support to an assault but rather to 
cover the noise of the Force’s ascent. 
 As the attack began, New York Times correspondent Herbert L. Matthews 
reported the artillery barrage and flights of B-25s and A-36s pounding the 
summit of la Difensa, noting that “We all knew that the Germans had dug 
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themselves into rock masses and were hardly likely to be killed by shells.”17 
Matthews was right. As the shells and bombs crashed into the Camino-
Difensa hill mass, the reinforced 3rd Battalion of the 104th Panzer Grenadier 
Regiment on la Difensa withdrew to their pillboxes and caves to wait out the 
attack.
 Unlike the earlier failed attempts to take Monte la Difensa by its more 
gradual south face, the FSSF made its way up 300-foot cliffs using ropes and 
climbing gear, which allowed them to reach the summit and then attack 
downhill, knocking out German bunkers that were facing in the wrong dir-
ection. Success was achieved this time: in the first two hours of fighting on 3 
December 1943, the Force mounted a successful surprise attack and captured 
a height of land that had been holding out against the British and Americans 
since the first week of November. In addition to 75 enemy dead, 43 Germans 
were taken off the peak as prisoners of war. The next day, Herbert Matthews 
reported for the New York Times: “In one of the most important battles of 
the Italian campaign, Allied troops drove their way up and over the high-
est peaks of the Mount Camino mass…. Monastery Hill, La Maggiore, and 
La Difensa are in our hands.”18 Optimistic as it was, the report missed the 
mark on a number of details, including its assertion that the supporting ar-
tillery barrage the night before had left the Germans “too stunned to offer 
opposition.” The steady line of FSSF and German casualties making their 
way down the mountain served as evidence that the Difensa summit had 
not been taken without a fight. Matthews was also unaware that the British 
56th Division had been able to hold Monte Camino (Monastery Hill) for only 
a brief period before heavy fire from a nearby slope forced them to withdraw 
from the summit. The news reached the FSSF atop Monte la Difensa later 
the same day when a supply train of Third Regiment and Service Battalion 
men arrived, having ascended the cliffs carrying ammunition, water, rations, 
and blankets – supplies essential to holding their position and surviving the 
cold rain, wet snow, and falling temperatures that were already producing 
hypothermia and exhaustion casualties. 
 In what was in reality a terribly violent and confused firefight over the 
next six days, the Force was all but isolated as it held against repeated German 
counterattacks. Monte la Difensa was a key point in the German defences 
– from its summit German artillery observers had been able to direct fire 
down onto Allied armour should it try to push its way up the valley below. 
Supplies were limited, as every meal and every bullet had to be carried to the 
summit on someone’s back – not even mules could make it up la Difensa. It 
was an 8-hour climb to the summit, but the way down could be much longer: 
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many of the wounded, for example, had to be lowered down the cliffs by 
stretcher. Despite all this, the Force held its ground against repeated German 
counterattacks and artillery bombardment while it waited to be relieved by 
conventional infantry units. 
 Throughout the first week of December, American and Canadian news-
papers reported daily on the progress of troops fighting on the slopes of 
Monte la Difensa and Camino. Nevertheless, while the attack itself received 
a great deal of enthusiastic media attention, the role -- or even the existence 
-- of the FSSF was not yet reported by the press of either nation. Thus, at 
la Difensa, the identity of this élite American-Canadian unit was shrouded 
in secrecy. It would remain so throughout the winter, with the papers back 
home reporting the actions, but not the identity, of these soldiers who fought 
as part of the first integrated North American fighting unit.
 By the end of the week, reports of American war correspondents took on 
a more reserved tone. In the New York Times, Milton Bracker reported that the 
fight for the Camino-Difensa hill complex had become a “slow, tortuous en-
velopment of numberless ridges and peaks; …the entire tone of the struggle 
is one of fierce will to resist. Despite severe losses, the German Tenth Army is 
setting a standard of savage defensive fighting that its opponents will never 
forget.”19 The Toronto Globe & Mail, meanwhile, reported the fighting in the 
American Fifth Army sector to be a “savage new offensive for control of the 
Mignano Pass,” with Fifth Army’s mud-splattered Anglo-American infantry-
men opposed by stubborn German defenders.20 Press coverage continued to 
refer only to the US Fifth Army, with presence of Canadian soldiers going 
unmentioned, nor was the FSSF given credit for their spectacular victory on 
Monte la Difensa.21 In later interviews, Warrant Officer Angus Bush recalled 
visits from war correspondents such as Ernie Pyle, Robert Capa, Sholto Watt 
and Don Whitehead, all of whom wanted to talk about the Force and their 
victory but who had to await clearance from the military censors to do so.22 
 Overall, the battle for la Difensa was a six-day effort that cost the force 
some 511 casualties, or roughly a quarter of its total combat strength. The 
unit’s performance in the capture of a formerly impregnable stronghold 
brought it to the notice of Lieutenant-General Mark Clark, Commanding 
General of US Fifth Army. In his commendation to the unit, Clark congratu-
lated the Force for capturing la Difensa, the possession of which was vital 
to further advance in that sector. He noted that in spite of adverse weather 
conditions and heavy enemy rifle, machine-gun, mortar, and artillery fire on 
the precipitous slopes, the Force’s position had been maintained in the face of 
bitter counterattacks and difficulties with communication and supply. Clark 
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saw the Force’s hard-won victory both as a tribute to fine leadership and a 
splendid reward for time spent in arduous training.23 
 Although the identity of the First Special Service Force remained an-
onymous, the result of their first battle did not. On 9 December, the front 
page of the New York Times announced, “By grim process of gouging out 
its way from height to height … Lt. Gen. Mark Clark’s Fifth Army has won 
control of the major dominating heights over twenty-five square miles of the 
Camino-Difensa-Maggiore mountain masses.”24 From this point forward, 
the Force found itself thrown head-long into the sort of infantry engage-
ments where a conventional unit would have served just as well. Following 
its success at Monte la Difensa, the FSSF was assigned the right flank of the 
American advance as it rolled up the German defences to the north. In the 
meantime, on Christmas Day, elements of the Force conducted a downhill 
frontal assault against German strongholds on the western spur of Monte 
Sammucro. Though the attack was successful, the subsequent shelling and 
losses to trench foot and exposure reduced several companies who took part 
in this fighting to between 20 and 30 percent strength. From New Year’s Day 
until January 17th, the Third Regiment of the Force fought a bitter campaign 
to overcome entrenched German positions on Monte Majo. The extreme cold, 
difficult terrain and stubborn German resistance exacted a heavy toll. By the 
time the Force was withdrawn from the front for rest and reorganization, the 
casualties suffered to date had reduced its combat element to approximately 
50% strength.25
The Black Devils of Anzio
In spite of its heavy casualties, the First Special Service Force was ordered 
on 31 January 1944 to board a small fleet of landing craft bound for the port 
of Anzio, where it was to take up defensive positions on the right flank of 
the newly-established Allied beachhead. At Anzio, the existence of the FSSF 
was finally released by military censors. Although he had followed the Force 
through its campaign at la Difensa, Sholto Watt of the Montreal Star had 
always been required to keep these reports secret. That changed in April 
1944, and Watt now made up for lost time in news reports that waxed poetic 
on the international significance of the FSSF. In his article, “Crack Mixed 
Force Is Gradually Becoming American,” released for publication on 9 April 
1944, Watt reported, “No parallel can be found for the U.S.-Canadian mixed 
force which has opened its fighting career in Italy with a series of brilliant 
victories. Canadians remain in their own army for pay and administration, 
Americans in theirs. The force has two armies behind it, two governments, 
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two peoples.”26 After speaking with Forcemen and following them in com-
bat, Watt had come to admire them. He explained that they were justifiably 
proud of their achievements, yet, “They do not brag. They are not ‘tough’; 
they are soft-spoken, with gentle manners – and sometimes the mildest and 
meekest are fiercest in action. They are buoyant after a harsh and costly 
baptism in fire.”27 Robert Burhans, S-2 Intelligence Officer for the FSSF and 
later the author of its highly regarded operational history, acknowledged that 
Watt “knew the Force best of any man outside it.”28 Much as Watt publicized 
the strengths and camaraderie of the FSSF, he also issued realistic reports of 
its weaknesses:
These losses [at Difensa] were particularly devastating to the 
Canadian element, as it had been decided in April 1943 that the 
Canadian army would provide the unit with no reinforcements 
upon departure for overseas. The Force had been designed for a 
single use against the point where it could do the most damage 
to the German war effort – [thus] the Canadian army had not 
undertaken a commitment to maintaining the force on a long-
term basis.29 
 With increased media representation of the Force at Anzio, the “Black 
Devils” legend was born. War correspondents such as Robert Vermillion, 
Ernie Pyle, and Eric Sevareid popularized the exploits of the FSSF. Clinton 
Conger wrote of the Devil’s Brigade as recorded in the diary of a captured 
German prisoner: “The black devils are all around us. [They are on us] every 
time we come into the line, and we never hear them come.”30 With six weekly 
columns reaching 13 million readers in the USA, Ernie Pyle portrayed the 
horrors of constant shelling and explosions along the Anzio front: “On this 
beachhead every inch of our territory is under German artillery fire. There is 
no rear area that is immune, as in most battle zones. They can reach us with 
their 88s, and they use everything from that on up.” 31
 Military newspapers, including Canada’s The Maple Leaf and the 
American Stars and Stripes, now carried regular features on the Black Devils. 
Out of the Italian village of Borgo Sabotino, renamed “Gusville,” First 
Regiment, under Captain Gus Heilman, published their own Gusville Herald 
Tribune. The fame of the Black Devils was not all military – their reputation 
as “scavengers” of food also travelled far and wide. Robert Vermillion of the 
United Press, for example, accompanied the Black Devils as they returned 
from a patrol in no-man’s land with a wounded German soldier, a wheel-
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barrow full of sweet potatoes, bushels of peanuts, two dozen eggs and one 
rabbit. Vermillion further reported that the livestock holdings of Gusville in-
cluded eight cows, fourteen chickens, six pigs, and three horses32 -- all stolen 
from the German occupiers who, presumably, had stolen them from the 
Italians. Some of these agricultural and culinary exploits even became the 
raw material for Bill Mauldin’s “Willie and Joe,” a cartoon series portraying 
the life of two fictional American soldiers in the Anzio beachhead. 
 From Anzio, the American and Canadian reading public came to know 
of the exploits -- military and otherwise -- of the First Special Service Force. 
The ban on publicity had been lifted and the Force became legendary as a 
consequence of this continuing media coverage. Sholto Watt took advantage 
of the relaxed censorship to stress the international significance of the unit: 
“The world has certainly been informed enough of the unguarded frontier, 
the long peace between our two nations. This is another step from the static 
to the active; from ‘We will not interfere with each other’ to ‘We will do big 
things together’.”33 Always realistic, however, Watt envisioned an uncertain 
future for the Force owing to its extremely high casualty rates. In a section 
entitled “No Canadian Replacements,” Watt observed that:
If it continues in the same brilliant way, [the FSSF] may become a 
legend of this war that will exert its influence in peace to no small 
advantage. But – there is a big but – the force at present receives 
little or no Canadian replacements for the Canadian casualties. 
U.S. replacements come in and Canadians are already outnum-
bered in a proportion of seven to three.34
The Race for Rome
As Watt hoped, American and Canadian soldiers of the FSSF continued to 
“do big things together” in the spring of 1944. On the morning of 23 May 
1944, the Force began its breakout from the Anzio beachhead. During the 
opening phases of the attack, the Force made a rapid advance to cut Highway 
7 and the rail line beyond, but was soon forced into a temporary withdrawal 
when a counterattack by German Tigers knocked out much of the unit’s sup-
porting armour and shattered two of First Regiment’s forward companies. 
Reorganizing for the next phase of the attack on 25 May, Third Regiment 
advanced to secure the heights of Monte Arrestino, occupying it that after-
noon in support of US 3rd Division’s push toward Cori. As he accompanied 
them, Sholto Watt could see their renewed energy and sensed that they were 
indeed “special”:
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“The men of the [Force] take a tremendous pride in their inter-
national composition… You couldn’t tell whether you were 
talking to Americans or Canadians in the Force, and indeed the 
Force gives the impression of having formed something new, a 
synthesis of North America, but of North America at its best.”35
 All across the Allied front, the Germans were withdrawing their forces 
toward Rome. Determined to be the liberator of the Eternal City, General 
Mark Clark directed the main body of his forces to advance northward, leav-
ing the monumental task of blocking the German Tenth Army’s withdrawal 
up Highway 6 to what remained of the FSSF, along with elements of the US 
3rd Division and the 1st Armored Division. Determined to take Rome before 
the British Eighth Army -- and before the impending landings at Normandy 
diverted attention from the Italian theatre -- Clark ignored General 
Alexander’s orders to create a roadblock on Highway 6 that would check the 
retreat by the German Tenth Army by blocking the only available route for its 
withdrawal.36 Instead, Clark shifted the axis of the VI Corps advance toward 
Rome, allowing the Germans an opportunity to prevent the encirclement 
and destruction of their forces moving along Highway 6. Consequently, a gap 
was created through which retreating Germans were allowed to escape and 
later rebuild their badly shaken divisions. War correspondent Eric Sevareid 
submitted a script for broadcast questioning the impossible role faced by the 
troops sent to hold back the tide of this German retreat. Military censors 
blocked these reports, however, and Clark was visibly angry with Sevareid 
for criticizing his decision to “rush straight for Rome.”37
 On 28 May, the Force set out from the high ground overlooking the town 
of Artena, advancing into a storm of concentrated artillery, tank, and small 
arms fire in a five-hour effort to sever the enemy’s line of communications 
along Highway 6. Pushing the advance in the direction of Valmontone and 
Colleferro, it was not until 2 June that the latter town was captured in an at-
tack led by Second Regiment. Effective the next day, Task Force Howze – com-
prised of the 81st Reconnaissance Battalion and the 13th Armored Infantry 
– was attached to the First Special Service Force to provide armoured support 
for II Corps’ final advance on Rome. General Clark was nearby and given his 
concern for publicity-hunting there was to be heightened media attention on 
the FSSF. Captain Mark T. Radcliffe of Third Regiment, winner of both Silver 
and Bronze Stars for earlier actions, now received a special assignment from 
Brigadier-General Frederick. Although Burhans later described it as a “recon-
naissance patrol” in the unit’s operational history,38 publicity was undoubt-
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edly its main purpose, as evidenced by the after-action report submitted by 
Radcliffe to Frederick upon its completion.39 Radcliffe was assigned to lead 
a patrol of 60 men in 18 jeeps, accompanied by one movie cameraman, two 
still cameramen, and a news reporter. Their task was to be the first Allied 
soldiers to enter Rome -- marking their route with signposts reading “Follow 
the Blue to Speedy II.” Radcliffe noted their time of entry into the outskirts 
of Rome as 6 am on 4 June. Photographers documented the entire mission, 
confirming the time and position of patrols as they entered the city, includ-
ing a well-known shot of Radcliffe’s men running alongside a burnt-out tank. 
Despite the apparent drama of action under fire, however, careful observers 
would note that the tank was actually a Sherman, the footage having been 
shot well behind the frontlines.40 Moving ahead, Radcliffe’s patrol soon ran 
into unexpected difficulties and narrowly escaped intense machine gun fire 
as well as heavy tank fire, but ultimately found cover behind a 12-foot wall 
until they were later rescued by an anti-tank unit. 
Fighting its way through tough resistance on the outskirts of the city, 
on 4 June the FSSF thus made the first permanent entrance of Allied soldiers 
into Rome, ending a day of intermittent street fighting during which the 
unit captured eight of the city’s bridges over the Tiber. War correspondent 
Eric Sevareid later recalled Frederick as having received orders to speed up 
the advance so that General Clark could be at a photo-shoot by 4 pm. Clark 
got what he was looking for -- a photo taken beside a road sign marked 
“Roma” and with it the glory of being first into Rome (or, as Sevareid 
termed it, “the conqueror within his conquered city).”41 Clark’s victory 
speech to a horde of correspondents paid tribute to Fifth Army – but made 
no mention of the FSSF, or other Allied units that had been essential to the 
breakout from Anzio.42 
With Rome in Allied hands, Frederick now had an opportunity to con-
sider the “lessons learned” on the road from Anzio to Rome. These essentially 
reinforced his belief that it had not been possible to train FSSF replacements 
to the standard of the original personnel. No amount of enthusiasm on the 
part of these volunteers could equal the full year of intense training provided 
to the original Forcemen at Helena, Montana. Second, it was immediately 
apparent that armoured and artillery support had been absolutely crucial to 
the success of recent FSSF operations – just as these supporting arms would 
be for any conventional United States infantry regiment conducting conven-
tional infantry battles. Thus, he recommended that the FSSF be organized 
and equipped as a regular Infantry Regiment, supported by a battalion of 
light Field Artillery.43 A few days later, Frederick left the unit upon his pro-
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motion to Major-General and commander of the First Airborne Task Force 
in the upcoming invasion of Southern France -- a mission in which, owing 
to the mass influx of non-parachute trained replacements into the Force, the 
unit would find itself tasked with an amphibious rather than an airborne 
role. 
Media Attention in Southern France
In July, General Clark endorsed Frederick’s recommendations for reorgan-
izing the FSSF. Recent temporary attachments to the unit of field artillery, 
combat engineers, and medical services were made permanent and the Force 
reorganized as an infantry regimental combat team.44 In mid-August the 
FSSF was shipped to Southern France to take part in an amphibious land-
ing in support of Operation DRAGOON, the opening of a second European 
front. Landing on Île de Port Cros on 15 August 1944, the Force went on to 
complete its mission by taking Île du Levant on 18 August. Throughout these 
operations, there was full media coverage that included tributes to the bi-
national nature of the FSSF. 
 To this point, news reports had told of the exploits of the Devil’s Brigade 
but little was known of their actual identity. Media attention increased, 
however, as publication restrictions continued to be lifted. The Denver Post 
released further details in early August: 
‘Frederick’s Freighters’ sound like a force of supermen. They are 
a self sufficient force, trained to carry their own equipment with 
them. Hence the name….. This article might sound as if they 
were the only real fighters in Italy. That, of course, is not true. 
But for the last seven months, this spearhead outfit, as far as the 
public knows, hasn’t even been in the Tyrrhenian boot. Chalk it 
up to security reasons. But now the truth can be told.45
In news reports of 22 August, coverage of the FSSF landings in Southern 
France also revealed that their training had taken place in Helena, Montana. 
Clinton Conger, writing for the Montana Standard, provided newly-released 
details of the Force in his article, “Veil of Secrecy Is Lifted on Special Service 
Command that WAS Activated, Trained in Montana.” Here Forcemen were 
described as heroes, commandos, and the bravest of the brave. Conger de-
scribed their unique record in the Anzio beachhead as one of dealing out 
misery to German troops, including their use of threatening stickers left 
behind during nighttime raids. These “calling cards” carried a reproduction 
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of the Force emblem, an arrowhead, and the German-language message Das 
Dicke Ende Koomt Nocht – “The Worst is Yet to Come”. Conger reported that 
these stickers were left on German soldiers who had been killed during the 
night, often with the sleek V-42 daggers used by Force personnel. They were 
also left as warnings on destroyed German guns, and on one occasion, on the 
door of a German command post.46 
 A month and a half after the DRAGOON landings, operational coverage 
was becoming more current. In the Toronto Star of 7 October 1944, Conger 
wrote from “somewhere in Southern France”:
Since their dramatic, three-month performance at Anzio beach-
head, everybody knows them. The Allied armies in Italy know 
the men of the force by their special, baggy-panted mountain uni-
forms and shoulder patches. The public back home knew them 
during Anzio as the combined Canadian-U.S. combat group…. 
Finally, they completely released their organizational name and 
history after they landed in France…. To me, during the fortnight 
I spent with the force in southern France, the outstanding thing 
about it is its spirit of offence. These men are trained to fight in 
forests, on mountains or in snow, and always to attack.47
Disbandment and a Legacy
It is ironic that just as this fame was being achieved, negotiations for disband-
ment of the Force were underway. Throughout the autumn of 1944, Colonel 
Edwin A. Walker, Frederick’s replacement as Force Commander, fought a 
rearguard action to save the FSSF as a special unit, but his efforts were ul-
timately doomed to failure. Although Walker repeatedly attempted to retain 
the Canadian element of the Force, both Canadian and American authorities 
now agreed with Frederick’s earlier assessment that the bi-national compos-
ition of the Force introduced unnecessarily complex difficulties for the unit. 
On 7 October 1944, the same day that Conger’s tribute was published in the 
Toronto Star, Lieutenant-General Kenneth Stuart, Canadian Chief of Staff, 
Canadian Military Headquarters, wrote: 
“This unit appears now to be submerged to such an extent with 
the U.S. forces that the value to Canada of its retention is no 
longer apparent….. I recommend that the Canadian element of 
the Special Service Force be disbanded and that the personnel be 
returned to the U.K. for reallocation.”48 
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Concrete administrative and reinforcement difficulties had come to outweigh 
the more ephemeral and sentimental advantages keeping the FSSF active as a 
“North American” military formation. 
 Even in disbandment, diplomatic messages flew back and forth be-
tween Washington and Ottawa to ensure that the disbandment of the unit 
remained secret. The US Chief of General Staff requested the Commander 
of Canadian Army Staff to maintain close contact with Washington “so as 
to ensure that no publicity will be given until we have had the opportunity 
of seeing and agreeing to any Press Release which may be proposed.”49 In 
passing on the top secret message to Major-General P.J. Montague, Chief of 
Staff at Canadian Military Headquarters, Lieutenant General J.C. Murchie 
in turn stressed the importance of “ensuring no publicity whatsoever given 
this disbandment until advised by this HQ.”50 It seems that the Force had 
come full circle – from its top secret origins, it had progressed to the point of 
becoming a source of pride for both Canadians and Americans, but was now 
returning to obscurity in the face of dissolution of this proud regiment. 
 In recognition of “the outstanding service given by this unit in the 
past, and the good showing made on the field of battle,” Montague urged 
that “every consideration should be given the unit when carrying out this 
disbandment.”51 On 5 December 1944, the First Special Service Force came 
to an end after a final parade in Villeneuve-Loubet, France, at which time 
the Canadians were returned to their own army and the American element 
reorganized to form the 474th Infantry Regiment, complete with its own 
anti-tank company, heavy machine guns, mortars, and vehicles – all the 
supporting elements deemed necessary for the type of conventional infan-
try operations the unit was now finding itself assigned to. The Canadians, 
meanwhile, were ordered to fall out and form a separate battalion, at which 
time the command was given for the Americans to close ranks after the 
Canadians stepped out. Instead, the men remaining in the lines held their 
position, leaving the empty Canadian spots in their ranks.52
 Years later, memories of the day would continue to bring great sadness 
to Forcemen who had built a unit not divided as “Yanks or Canucks,” but 
rather one characterized by a unique esprit de corps and an enduring bond 
between the soldiers of two nations. At the height of his media coverage of 
the First Special Service Force, Montreal Star correspondent Sholto Watt had 
trumpeted the political benefits of fielding a renowned international unit: 
As it exists at present the force is capable of effecting political bene-
fits outside the scope of its military role. Wherever it is known it 
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must be an inspiration in international goodwill. It could become 
an object lesson in concrete, human text to the so-long divided 
peoples of Europe. The force is an intensely dramatic embodi-
ment of our common effort in a cause that commands faith from 
all of us.53
Now, as the Force was disbanded, Sholto Watt paid a final tribute to the unit: 
I can testify to their spectacular power and efficiency, their mar-
velous morale and their never-failing spirit of attack. They were 
exactly what one would expect from North America’s best – an 
inspiration to see and a terror to their enemy…. The significance 
of this Force is that it was the first joint force of its kind, drawn 
from two neighbor democracies, and that it was a brilliant suc-
cess throughout.… Their legend will be a feat of arms which 
will remain celebrated in military history…as an international 
brotherhood which deserves enduring honor.54
 During its brief existence, the Force established an enviable combat rec-
ord – and did so despite the difficulties of its high rate of casualties suffered 
during the Italian campaign. On the ground, the FSSF proved repeatedly that 
Canadians and Americans could be molded into an extremely effective fight-
ing unit. Viewed from above, however, the special status and international 
character of the Force introduced unique difficulties that were never fully 
resolved before the unit was disbanded in December of 1944. Following the 
Second World War, the legacy of the FSSF was preserved by Robert Burhans 
in his detailed operational history, The First Special Service Force: A War History 
of the North Americans. It was popularized twenty years later in Adleman 
and Walton’s The Devil’s Brigade and David Wolper’s Hollywood film of the 
same name.55 The legacy has lived on through modern media coverage of 
First Special Service Force reunions, and, to our regret as time goes on, in 
commemorative obituaries. The Black Devil legend will survive as media 
representation adapts to a new generation that seeks to find meaning in the 
legacy of this US-Canadian force. Thanks in part to war correspondents who 
witnessed their determination and skill in action, and the media coverage 
finally permitted during the last months of the FSSF’s existence, it is the 
legend of a uniquely North American military formation that is most remem-
bered today. 
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Cherbourg Peninsula Revisited: A 
Model of U.S. Combined Operations 
for the Canadian Army
Alexander W.G. Herd
During the Second World War, Canada strengthened its political, military, and economic ties to the United States—a process that con-tinued unchecked through the first post-war decade. On the battle-
field, the only Canadian Army unit to serve under direct U.S. military com-
mand was the 1st Canadian Special Service Battalion of the joint 1st Special 
Service Force, the subject of James Wood’s chapter in this volume. However, 
with the war’s end, it was evident that the Canadian Army had begun an in-
stitutional shift closer to its American counterpart and away from its British 
parent. This shift was illustrated in the large planning exercise held at the 
Canadian Army Staff College (CASC) in Kingston, Ontario in March 1947. 
The exercise, Operation GULLIVER1 (7-21 March 1947), was based on the U.S. 
Army VII Corps’ OVERLORD landings and operations to take the port of 
Cherbourg on the Cotentin Peninsula in June - July 1944. British operational 
planning methods were applied in this exercise; however, this exercise was 
less about learning these methods than it was about gaining a working know-
ledge of the recent Anglo-American planning for Operation OVERLORD in 
1944, and how a British-style organization such as the Canadian Army could 
undertake an American military operation. Significant historical revisionism 
was required for the Cotentin operation to be practicable within Canadian 
parameters. Overall, GULLIVER revealed a “Canadian perspective” of a 
Second World War American military experience. 
 At the CASC, student officers learned the professional skills required for 
higher appointments. The CASC was a centre of shared doctrine, predomin-
ately between the Canadian, British, and American armed services. The 1947 
Combined Operations series, one of many series during the year-long staff 
course, best reflected this educational exchange and was organized around 
two major periods – a “British phase” in February and March, in which British 
combined operations experts led the instruction, and an “American phase” 
in April, a separate sub-series on amphibious operations run by U.S. Marine 
Corps officers. Significantly, GULLIVER took place during the British phase.
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 The purpose of Operation GULLIVER was to teach student officers the 
importance of tri-service coordination in modern operations, accomplished 
through detailed joint planning. The exercise was divided into six phases. 
Phase 1 consisted of demonstrations that set the strategic, military, and 
political context of the exercise. These plays showed the conception of a 
combined operation at the Prime Minister/Chiefs of Staff level and included 
the operational briefing of the three Force Commanders—the army officer 
in command of the operation and his naval and air force counterparts. The 
actors were CASC Directing Staff (DS), British instructors, and officers from 
the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) and Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF). The 
critical component was in phase 2, when the Force Commanders worked out 
the “Initial Joint Plan” that incorporated the inter-service aspects of a com-
bined operation. This plan was the basis for student officers’ work in phases 
2 through 5, in which the students, appointed as corps, division, brigade, 
or unit staffs, worked out further outline plans according to the material 
produced at the previous level. Phase 6 concluded the exercise with a discus-
sion of lessons learned and a historical account of the U.S. Army VII Corps’ 
Cotentin operations in 1944. 
 CASC leaders chose the Cotentin operations for GULLIVER primar-
ily because of their access to VII Corps’ Cherbourg plans, air photographs, 
intelligence, and models of the peninsula area.2 There were also practical 
reasons based on the recent wartime experience of First Canadian Army, an 
organization of two corps of five divisions and two armoured brigades. In 
GULLIVER, students planned an assault on France in which a “strong corps,” 
consisting of one assault division, two follow-up divisions, and a build-up 
division, supported by a naval assault force and a Royal Air Force (RAF) 
tactical group, seized a lodgement area.3 For CASC officials, the Cotentin 
Peninsula made “the strategical conception of a lodgment in FRANCE by one 
corps a tactical possibility”; the peninsula offered “good l[an]d[in]g beaches, 
plenty of room for assembly of a large force incl[uding] air [forces], a good all-
weather, deep sea port with a sheltered anchorags [sic], and excellent ground 
for the def[ence] at the peninsula neck.”4 Most importantly, the U.S. Army VII 
Corps’ activities in summer 1944 represented recent, successful combined 
operations conducted by an army organization. However, in view of the 
requirements of an army smaller than its American counterpart, CASC of-
ficials revised history to meet the educational aims of Operation GULLIVER. 
The result was the “Canadian perspective” of the Cotentin operations. 
 A summary of VII Corps’ initial Normandy venture will place the 
‘Canadian perspective’ in context. In October 1943, VII Corps arrived in 
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the United Kingdom as part of the build-up of U.S. combat divisions for the 
attack against German-occupied Western Europe. VII Corps was assigned 
to First U.S. Army under Lieutenant-General Omar N. Bradley. Along with 
Second British Army, First U.S. Army was part of General Sir Bernard L. 
Montgomery’s 21st Army Group, responsible for the ground assault phase 
of Operation OVERLORD.5 In January 1944, it was Montgomery who, in his 
push for a larger cross-channel assault than had been previously planned, 
wanted the early capture of Cherbourg because he did not want the Allied 
forces to rely on artificial ports for their maintenance and re-supply.6 
 American units were given the task of capturing Cherbourg and, in 
February 1944, the Allies solidified their plans to take the Cotentin. Originally, 
the Allies planned to push their Bessin-Caen bridgehead deep to the south 
and southwest and then break out northwest into the peninsula and take 
Cherbourg. The problem was that the Douve River’s marshlands, located 
at the bottom of the peninsula, were subject to inundation and, crossed by 
only three main roads, created an “easily defended moat across about five-
sixths of the peninsula.”7 Therefore, new plans called for an assault on the 
peninsula, simultaneous with the other landings, to establish Allied forces 
north of the Douve River line on the peninsula neck.8 In this plan, VII Corps 
would clear the low-rolling country of the south Cotentin as far west as the 
Douve, then push against the high ground of the north Cotentin, establish-
ing a line around Cherbourg by D plus 2. Allied commanders expected to 
take Cherbourg on D plus 15.9 
 In June 1944, two American airborne divisions assisted VII Corps’ 
landings at UTAH Beach, on the peninsula’s southeastern coast. While the 
101st Airborne Division was dropped west of the beach, the 82nd secured a 
bridgehead west of the Merderet River, a body of water that connected with 
the Douve at the junction of the latter’s western and southern marshlands.10 
Once landed, VII Corps’ operations on the Cotentin Peninsula divided into 
two periods. In the first, 8-18 June 1944, through “hard slugging,” the Corps 
broke out of the German ring established against its D-day bridgehead. In 
the second, 18 June – 1 July 1944, VII Corps achieved a “swift and dramatic” 
victory with the capture of Cherbourg.11 
 The first period began with VII Corps attacking to the north, along the 
east coast, to silence enemy batteries that fired on the landing beaches and 
to widen its base of attack for the drive westward across the peninsula.12 
Between 8 – 14 June, the U.S. Army’s 4th Infantry Division and the 505th 
Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division pursued these object-
ives. They faced the German Seventh Army’s LXXXIV Corps; in the eastern 
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zone, the defenders were three Kampfgruppen formed of units primarily from 
the German Army’s 709th, 243rd, and 91st Divisions. These units were well 
supported by artillery, but suffered from an ammunition shortage and con-
stant Allied air and naval bombardment. The U.S. Army VII Corps accom-
plished its east coast objectives with the help of these air and naval attacks, 
along with the U.S. Army 39th Infantry Regiment’s clearing of the fortified 
beach and coast.13
 As its northern flank was secured, VII Corps began to split enemy forces 
on the peninsula. On 10 June, the 90th Infantry Division attacked west-
ward, towards the north-south axis of the Douve River, in the middle of the 
Cotentin. By 13 June the division had not progressed as quickly as planned.14 
Consequently, VII Corps Commander Major-General J. Lawton Collins al-
tered the attack scheme, with the 9th Infantry and 82nd Airborne Divisions 
undertaking the main thrust west.15 
 Thereafter, Collins’ cutting of the peninsula was facilitated by ever-
weakening German defences and Hitler’s own policy, enunciated at a meet-
ing in France with his field marshals on 17 June, ordering the rigid defence 
of every inch of ground, including the holding of Cherbourg at any cost. As 
a consequence, higher command retracted LXXXIV Corps plans to move the 
German 77th Division, at the time defending Cherbourg, south to stop the 
Americans’ westward push. Ultimately, the 77th Division was sent to the 
town of la Haye du Puits, in the southwest part of the battle area. This move 
was made too late to strengthen the Germans’ right flank.16 Moreover, the 
77th Division paid a heavy toll. On 18 June the U.S. 9th Infantry Division 
destroyed elements of the German formation as they attempted to pass south 
along the peninsula’s west coast.17
 On 19 June 1944 the U.S. Army VII Corps began its attack on Cherbourg. 
VII Corps’ full combat strength was committed to the attack, as the 9th 
Division advanced on the west side of the peninsula, the 4th Infantry 
Division on the east, and the 79th Infantry Division up the middle, with 
other units in support. By the end of 21 June American units had reached 
the Cherbourg Landfront—southern defensive perimeter of the Cherbourg 
Fortress.18 Following U.S. and British air attacks against the Fortress, on 22 
June the three divisions resumed their attack on Cherbourg, facing their stiff-
est resistance yet, as enemy defenders heeded Hitler’s last stand policy. On 23 
June American forces penetrated the outer ring of Cherbourg’s defences; the 
next day these defences began to collapse; on 25 June U.S. units infiltrated the 
city proper; and on 27 June organized resistance within Cherbourg ceased 
as First U.S. Army achieved its primary objective in OVERLORD’s assault 
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phase.19 The capture of Cherbourg was followed by operations to mop up 
enemy points of resistance east and west of the port.20 
 The “Canadian perspective” of these operations was outlined in two 
CASC documents. One document was Operation GULLIVER’s “opening 
narrative,” issued to students at the beginning of the exercise.21 According 
to this story, planning for GULLIVER began in January 1943 as the Allies 
in North Africa closed on Tripoli and the Russian winter offensive slowed 
down.22 CASC officials believed that this timeline allowed students “to work 
with a realistic enemy in a realistic situation,” with the caveat that combined 
operations techniques developed subsequent to 1943 would be employed.23 
The story also stated that, at the Allies’ January 1943 Casablanca Conference, 
British Prime Minister Sir Winston Churchill “committed himself to a spring 
as[sau]lt on the [European] mainland to relieve the pressure on the Russian 
Front and to tie in with the Sicilian as[sau]lt planned for Jul[y].”24 In this 
scenario, the Soviets had pressed Churchill and U.S. President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt to open a western front that spring because, after the battle of 
Stalingrad, they sought to undermine the next German offensive against 
Russia by diverting enemy resources away from the east.25 
 The narrative explained that the assault on Europe’s west coast was not 
to be an all-out landing but the seizing of a lodgement area “within which 
adequate forces could be built-up to start a land offensive.”26 As American 
participation in the initial assault was not possible because of their need for 
assault divisions in the Pacific, the Americans would supply the build-up 
forces to break out across France through their “surfeit” of armoured divisions 
in England, while British armoured formations were busy in North Africa.27 
Therefore, Roosevelt committed significant build-up forces for the lodgement 
area, to arrive either in late August or mid-September 1943.28 In consultation 
with his Chiefs of Staff, Churchill agreed that the Cotentin Peninsula was 
the best operational target for the lodgement area.29 Moreover, because of a 
shortage of American and British assault troops in the UK, the only avail-
able assault-trained forces there were Canadian. Apparently, Churchill was 
very enthusiastic about Canadian participation, being impressed with a 
combined operations exercise by the Canadian Army’s “Third Division” and 
because “there was the old score of DIEPPE to settle.”30 The stage was set for 
an assault by the independent corps-strength force against the Cotentin. 
 In the first part of the “Canadian perspective,” the statement “realistic 
enemy in a realistic situation” most likely referred to the relatively weak state 
of German forces in France and that the German Army’s 243rd and 709th 
Divisions were the primary defenders of the peninsula in 1943.31 After the 
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Allies’ failed Dieppe assault in 1942, Hitler prioritized the construction of 
the Atlantic Wall, a massive, concrete-based defence to ward off further 
Allied landings, or make it impossible for Allied forces to move inland. The 
Atlantic Wall, however, never became the impregnable defence advertised in 
German propaganda. Additionally, in 1943, the combat quality and ability of 
German forces behind the Wall were severely undermined by the military 
situation on both the Russian and Mediterranean fronts. Beginning in late 
1941, while the best German units were sent east to try to stem the losses 
suffered at that front, they were replaced in the west by others of poor combat 
quality, largely composed of inexperienced, disabled, or “foreign” troops. 
Meanwhile, in November 1942, the Allied landings in North Africa led to 
German units being sent south, and as the Allies advanced through Italy 
in 1943, still more German divisions were moved from the west. Finally, by 
the end of 1943, Hitler and his generals had failed to reach an unequivocal 
decision on German defensive tactics in the west because of significant dif-
ferences among them, generally over employing static defence versus more 
traditional German mobile operations and counterattacks.32 
 By the following summer, the situation had changed. Between summer 
1943 and spring 1944, 20 divisions were added to the western front; in May 
1944, the Allies estimated that there were 60 enemy divisions in France and 
the Low Countries.33 That same month, the German Army’s 91st Division 
moved onto the Cotentin to bolster its defences.34 The Allies decided to go 
ahead with OVERLORD because, despite these defensive moves, it was esti-
mated that the Germans’ maximum effort was insufficient to beat back the 
Allies.35 CASC officials therefore believed that it was a realistic exercise if 
GULLIVER’s independent Canadian corps faced the German forces on the 
Cotentin during the first half of 1943. 
 Of course, up-to-date combined operations techniques would help 
student officers’ plan for the corps’ assault and provide them with the ap-
propriate knowledge. This was not only a pragmatic consideration, but also 
a historical one. Tactical amphibious assault methods were refined up to the 
last stages of OVERLORD’s preparation. The British Combined Operations 
Headquarters (COHQ) had experimented with assault tactics since 1940, in 
order to solve the “special technical problems” of a cross-channel attack.36 
Beginning in spring 1942, U.S. and British officers had worked together to 
produce a combined amphibious doctrine “specially adapted to the condi-
tions of the Channel assault.”37 In April 1943, the Assault Training Center 
was established to test new tactical ideas and techniques and integrate 
them into the training of the troops earmarked for the assault. Beginning in 
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September 1943, all U.S. troops set for OVERLORD went through the Center, 
whose staff continued to modify and improve tactical methods up to D-day.38 
Moreover, in early 1944 the Allies created specially organized assault div-
isions by reducing the number of men and vehicles in normal infantry 
divisions, while increasing the infantry’s firepower.39 The purpose was to 
overcome the Germans’ expected measures against a cross-channel attack, 
in which the stubborn defence of the fortified coastal zone was followed by 
German counterattacks to drive the Allies back into the sea.40 Therefore, the 
Allied divisions were designed to smash through the enemy’s coastal de-
fences, carrying the assaulting troops far enough inland to permit follow-up 
forces to consolidate and then exploit the beachheads.41 Hence, GULLIVER’s 
application of combined operations techniques developed and tested by fire 
after summer 1943. 
 As for the GULLIVER narrative’s comments on Casablanca, at the actual 
Casablanca Conference, which began on 12 January 1943, Churchill had not 
sought an Allied assault on Northwest Europe; rather, he wanted to exploit 
the recent victories in North Africa with operations in the Mediterranean 
area. American military officials disagreed. The U.S. section of the Combined 
Chiefs of Staff was divided over when and how to undertake a cross-channel 
assault, but General George C. Marshall, its leader, firmly believed that to 
ultimately defeat Germany, the Allies must push through Northwest Europe, 
not the Mediterranean. The Americans supported the invasion of Sicily that 
summer to help the Russians on the Eastern Front and because they had large 
numbers of U.S. troops available in North Africa for that invasion. However, 
Marshall saw the Mediterranean operations as a temporary expedient, not 
a departure from his commitment to making France the scene of the Allies’ 
main effort.42 The Allies at Casablanca did agree on one item. A cross-chan-
nel invasion appeared unlikely until fall 1943 at the earliest.43 This fact, along 
with the U.S. Chiefs’ desire, expressed at Casablanca, to build up American 
forces in the Pacific,44 was the basis for the GULLIVER narrative’s statement 
that U.S. forces were unable to participate in that operation until late 1943. 
 The other document that expressed the “Canadian perspective” was a 
1946 CASC memorandum that had initially proposed Operation GULLIVER. 
This memorandum included an outline plan of GULLIVER that contained 
the information from which Force Commanders created the Initial Joint Plan. 
The outline consisted of three phases, the details of which followed unit 
movements stencilled in on an accompanying traced map of the Cotentin 
Peninsula.45 In the assault phase, the attacking formations seized a line repre-
sented as “D plus 3,” while the follow-up infantry and armoured divisions 
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assembled in this bridgehead. This outline also allowed for the possible use 
of an airborne division; if employed, these forces were to be dropped into the 
area of the town “LA HAYE DU PUITS.”46
 In the break out phase, the follow-up infantry division broke out of the 
bridgehead, seized “LA HAYE DU PUITS,” and took over the airborne div-
ision’s defensive position to the south of the town. Meanwhile, one brigade 
of the assault division took up a defensive position on the southern edge of 
the bridgehead, while another assault brigade, along with an independent 
armoured brigade, went into corps reserve near the town of “ST SAVEUR” 
in the centre of the corps zone.47 Additionally, a third assault brigade turned 
north and went under the command of the follow-up armoured division, 
which had broken out of the bridgehead to the west and turned north to 
contain the enemy forces around the port of Cherbourg.48 
 In the final phase, consolidation, the build-up division, having landed 
about ten days after D-day, took over the attack on Cherbourg from the 
armoured division and then deployed, in a coastal defence role, over the 
peninsula’s north end. The armoured division moved into corps reserve in 
preparation for the main enemy counterattack expected on “D plus 15,” while 
the original assault division thickened up its defensive positions. The outline 
also included additional information on the Cotentin Peninsula. First, the 
ground on which the corps would operate was the Cotentin Basin, low lying, 
flat country, not heavily wooded but with rivers, streams, and dykes that 
made the area suitable for defence. Secondly, a blue area on the map denoted 
ground capable of inundation; therefore, only a “very l[igh]t force” was ne-
cessary to defend this area.49 Finally, the extensive network of roads that lead 
to the peninsula passed through large urban centres that Allied bombers 
would target—heavy bombers against these centres’ marshalling yards and 
tactical (medium) bombers against their railway stock.50
 In comparison to actual historical events, the outline plan and its map 
are quite rudimentary, but such a comparison also reveals more of the factual 
modifications made to suit GULLIVER’s educational purposes. There were 
some similarities. Like the U.S. Army VII Corps, the outline plan’s assault 
division was accompanied by an airborne unit—in 1944, the initial Cotentin 
attacks were made by the 4th Infantry Division and the 82nd Airborne 
Division. Moreover, the “D plus 3” bridgehead on the map approximated 
VII Corps’ forward positions that these divisions reached by the evening of 9 
June 1944.51 Additionally, the outline plan’s follow-up infantry and armoured 
divisions broadly represented the actions of the U.S. 9th and 90th Infantry 
Divisions in the field. The follow-up armoured division closely simulated 
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the moves by the 90th Division, which had been originally tasked with VII 
Corps’ westward push across the peninsula, before being ordered north to 
protect the flank of this push. Finally, the outline plan’s build-up division 
generally reflected the U.S. 79th Infantry Division. Both historically and in 
the imagined scenario, these formations played a key role in the attack on 
Cherbourg.
 The outline plan’s notes on terrain, the inundation area, and the bomb-
ing of urban areas were also historically accurate. The inundation area 
represented the Prairies Marécageuses de Gorges, the marshlands into and 
through which the Douve and Merderet Rivers flow in the southeast and 
south central parts of the peninsula neck.52 Additionally, Allied air attacks 
were instrumental in facilitating VII Corps’ advance north against enemy 
defences. During the Normandy invasion, German transportation capacity 
was severely limited by effective air attacks against the region’s bridges and 
railway networks.53 
 The differences between the real and imagined operations were, how-
ever, more considerable. The proposed map simplified historical realities, 
such as placing the bridgehead line further inland than what was actually 
achieved by 9 June 1944. The map line was just short of a city in the middle of 
the Cotentin that represented St. Sauveur-le Vicomte, which was not reached 
by units of the 82nd Airborne Division until 16 June 1944.54 The city of la Haye 
du Puits, meanwhile, located to the far southwest of VII Corps’ zone, was 
not a factor during the actual Cotentin invasion. Neither the 82nd Airborne 
Division’s initial actions nor the follow-up by the 9th Infantry Division, which 
reached the peninsula’s west side by 18 June 1944, led VII Corps to the vicinity 
of this urban centre, which was beyond the extent of its Cotentin operations. 
 Different types of combat formations were also used. The proposed 
plan mentioned brigades, more typical of Anglo-Canadian military forces 
than the U.S. Army’s regimental system. Additionally, VII Corps’ attacks 
were primarily conducted by infantry divisions supported by tanks and ar-
tillery. In the outline plan, the corps consisted of infantry and armoured for-
mations, similar to First Canadian Army’s organization during the Second 
World War. Moreover, on the Cotentin, the initial move north was made by 
the 90th Infantry Division; in the CASC scenario this role was tasked to the 
follow-up armoured division. The outline plan’s build-up division led the 
attack on Cherbourg. It is unclear whether this division was infantry or ar-
moured; the key point is that just one division was responsible for the port. 
However, it took three U.S. Army infantry divisions to eventually capture 
Cherbourg in 1944.55 
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 This “Canadian perspective” reflected CASC officials’ realistic appraisal 
of the Canadian Army’s capacity to fight future combined operations, based 
on the army’s recent wartime experience. The planning exercise also taught 
students about Operation OVERLORD. GULLIVER concluded with a discus-
sion of British and American Second World War policies on detailed oper-
ational planning. British policy – as enacted in GULLIVER – decentralized 
detailed planning down to the brigade level at which a firm operational plan 
was made. Therefore, the Force Commanders’ Initial Joint Plan was an oper-
ational instruction for lower formations that was modified as it passed down 
the force hierarchy. American policy established a firm operational plan at 
the Task Force Commander level, unalterable by lower formations.56
 The comparison between British and American policy reiterated the 
historical lesson of Operation GULLIVER. In Operation OVERLORD, the 
British approach to planning had been applied to the Allied preparations. 
On 1 February 1944, the NEPTUNE Initial Joint Plan, which set the basis 
for OVERLORD, was produced by the three force commanders at Supreme 
Allied Headquarters—Montgomery, Admiral Sir Bertram H. Ramsay, and 
Air Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory. This plan was a directive for all 
subordinate formations; it first tasked First U.S. Army and Second British 
Army with submitting their own outline plans. These two armies, along 
with the operation’s chief air and naval commanders, produced their overall 
plans within the next two months. These plans then served as a framework 
for lower formations’ planning. The latter modified the higher level plans, 
generally issuing them as either field or operational orders.57 In GULLIVER, 
student officers practiced what their forbearers had done in a real operational 
context less than three years before. 
 The British-American comparison was also an extension of GULLIVER’s 
primary educational aim, to show the application of British operational plan-
ning principles to an American military operation. This was a pragmatic 
decision given that the Canadian Army was a British-style organization, but 
there were broader implications. The CASC study of an American wartime 
experience was the beginning of the Canadian Army’s increased incorpora-
tion of American military doctrine over the next decade. This process was 
a microcosm of Canadian society in general from the late 1940s to the late 
1950s, in which American politics, economics, and culture helped shape 
Canada’s North American identity. Thus, Operation GULLIVER revealed the 
post-war Canadian Army’s similar move closer to its American counterpart 
and away from its British foundation.
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Mechanization, Mountains and 
Mules: A Reassessment of Canadian 
Participation in the Italian Campaign
William Pratt
An old cartoon from a dusty copy of the Canadian Army’s Second World War service rag, The Maple Leaf, depicts the industrious Trooper Burp astride a cantankerous carriage which has fused ele-
ments of ancient and modern transportation systems. Glaring out of Burp’s 
tank hull are the somewhat insidious faces of the three mules which power 
the contraption. A diminutive underling explains to the watching senior of-
ficer that, “he thinks he’s solved tank warfare in the mountains, sir!”1 Tank 
warfare in the mountains was indeed a problem for the Allies in Italy, yet the 
mountainous spine of the peninsula was not an insurmountable obstacle. 
Through innovation and adaptation, techniques and tactics were reconciled 
to a host of new transportation technology which sought to overcome the 
mud and the mountains. At times cutting-edge technology and improvisa-
tion in the field could solve the problems encountered in the hard struggle up 
the Italian peninsula. Technology, however, was not a cure-all, and the use 
of ancient tools such as the Sicilian mule serves as a corrective to the popular 
conception of the Second World War as the ultimate example of modern, 
mechanized warfare.
 The study of mechanization2 and the Canadian Army in the Italian 
Campaign has been dominated by a historiography emphasizing misguided 
national policy, a brutal strategy of attrition, and an inferior doctrine, pros-
ecuted with the wrong equipment.3 This line of reasoning states that the 5th 
Canadian Armoured Division should never have been sent to the Italian 
peninsula and that when it arrived, it had to match its pathetic Sherman 
tanks against powerful German panzers. To further denounce Canadian ef-
forts, this historical reasoning emphasizes an inflexible doctrine applied to 
terrain deemed anything but “tank-country.” Instead of Winston Churchill’s, 
“soft underbelly of Europe, the Allied armies are said to have fought a brutal 
war up the “crocodile’s back.”4 This narrative of pointless failure is in need 
of adjustment.5 Examination of the British and Canadian discourse sur-
rounding mechanization at the highest political and military levels offers an 
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appreciation of the cultural factors which contributed to an armour-heavy 
balance of Canadian Army formations. By studying the Canadians’ ability 
to adapt to new technology during the campaign, and the manner in which 
equipment was integrated into the Army’s weapons-system, a flexibility is 
observed which counters the theme of stubborn, artillery-based pounding 
that predominates the historiography. The Canadians in Italy were fighting in 
a period of rapid technological advance, and adjusting everything from strat-
egy down to small-unit tactics to wage war in this changing environment. 
 In 1939, Canadian national policy reflected the precarious military bal-
ance of a divided and ill-prepared country with little enthusiasm for entering 
another European war.6 Public aversion to commitment on the European 
continent, or at least the Mackenzie King government’s perception of public 
opinion, justified the promise for no conscription for overseas service and 
kept Canadian military proposals limited to home defence, economic aid, 
and aerial contributions.7 On 6 September 1939, a British telegram to the 
Canadian government enunciated the hopes for a strong Canadian commit-
ment, but recognized that political realities precluded the announcement 
of a robust contribution from the Dominion. The telegram read, “while it 
is hoped that Canada would exert her full national effort as in the last war, 
even to the extent of the eventual despatch of an expeditionary force, it is 
realised that no statement of policy on these lines is likely to be possible at 
the moment.”8 In light of these considerations, British requests were limited 
to: a small unit to serve overseas; technical units for attachment to British 
formations; technical personnel for posting to British units; and naval and 
air forces. The modern and mechanized form of warfare in the Second World 
War, and its reliance on a host of technical specialists, would shape British 
hopes for Canadian Army contributions at the outbreak of the war. By the 
following summer, the knowledge that such technicians largely would be 
drawn from tradesmen working in industry brought the conflict between 
munitions production and the “modern divisional organization” to the fore.9 
With a robust interpretation of the term “unit”, the 1st Canadian Division 
was sent overseas in late 1939, but it was the end of the “phoney” war that 
revved up the Canadian Army’s war efforts.
 On 17 May, with German armoured divisions cutting off Allied forces 
in the Low Countries, the Minister of National Defence, Norman Rogers, re-
ported that Britain (let alone Canada) was unprepared for mechanized war-
fare.10 A historiography heavily influenced by the writings of Sir Basil Liddell 
Hart would strongly agree, since a host of British interwar “apostles of mobil-
ity” were ignored by the military establishment, who failed to procure effect-
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ive armoured fighting vehicles or a doctrine to use them.11 The blitzkrieg stan-
dard of highly mobilized forces with a large proportion of armour seeking to 
break the enemy’s line and wreak havoc on command and communications, 
became the touchstone against which armoured doctrine was measured 
thereafter. By the end of 1940, Canada received the British request for the con-
tribution of a complete armoured division, beyond the Army Tank Brigade 
already called for.12 On 13 August, General Order No. 250 officially brought 
the Canadian Armoured Corps into being, less than a year after the govern-
ment had announced the Canadian Tank Centre was to be mothballed, as 
the army expected not to use tanks in the current war.13 The Canadian public 
also embraced mechanized solutions to Canada’s military unpreparedness. 
Citizens in Ontario organized a “buy-a-tank” campaign, which raised funds 
for the purchase of armoured vehicles for the army.14 British Prime Minister 
Winston Churchill championed mechanization as an answer to a dearth of 
manpower. Churchill stated, “we cannot hope to compete with the enemy in 
numbers of men, and must therefore rely upon an exceptional proportion of 
armoured fighting vehicles.”15 Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King, for 
fear of casualties and conscription, shared these views, and Canada’s army 
leadership reacted to the fall of France in a similar manner. In Army planning 
for 1941, the brass felt, “the power of the modern army resides in its arms and 
equipment - not in the number of men in its ranks.”16 For the Canadian Army, 
the lessons of the war in 1940 meant, “our forces of the future must be based 
on mechanized power, which includes artillery, armoured fighting vehicles, 
and close-support aircraft. Man, on the battlefield, is only needed as eyes 
and brain for the machine-powered weapons...”17 In late 1941, while the war 
raged in the Western Desert, in Ottawa, Churchill made the British hope for 
a Canadian contribution of a second armoured division clear to Mackenzie 
King.18 The ratio of armoured to infantry divisions in the Canadian Army, 
and the eventual dispatch of an armoured division to Italy, had much to do 
with these early requests for armoured formations by the British govern-
ment, as did the discourse of mechanization, which envisioned machines as a 
panacea for the ills of the liberal democracy at war.
 The decision to send any Canadian troops to the Mediterranean theatre 
was a response to pressure for active service from the Canadian public, 
military, and Department of National Defence. Historian Bill McAndrew 
cast this decision as embodying Anglo-American conflict over strategic 
interests, leading to a misunderstanding over the aims of the campaign.19 
McAndrew’s work implies that Canadian national interests were not met in 
a campaign which was initiated by Churchill’s desire for British control in 
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the Mediterranean, and characterized by British imperial sentiment which 
classed the dominions as colonial auxiliaries. McAndrew’s final verdict was:
The effects on Canada and the Canadian Army of sending 
the Canadians to the Mediterranean were less than positive. 
Splitting the army in two foreclosed any possibility of exerting 
the degree of national control of the country’s armed forces that 
their size warranted. Not quite colonials in Italy, neither were 
the Canadians full allies. Having no say in policy, they could 
merely implement the decisions of others. Costs were anything 
but negligible.20
McAndrew suggests the Canadian government would have done better to 
resist public pressures to deploy Canadian forces to the Mediterranean. With 
the benefit of hindsight this argument is logical; yet the contemporary desire 
for battle experience and the positive influence on Canadian morale of the 
active engagement of the Canadians in Italy are important factors to consider.
 By 1943, the government’s opinions towards Mediterranean deployment 
had changed a great deal. Back in 1940, Cabinet War Committee discussion 
noted that Canadian public opinion accepted the defence of the United 
Kingdom, but would be cool to the prospects of sending Canadians to fight 
in the desert war.21 Throughout the next year, however, the Department of 
National Defence increasingly argued that Canadian public opinion was 
frustrated by the inactivity of Canadian troops.22 Mackenzie King’s initial 
resistance to these pressures found support from Lieutenant-General 
Andrew McNaughton, who was initially loath to divide the five divisions 
of the Canadian Army which gathered in Britain in 1942.23 It had long been 
the opinion of Canadian government officials that the Canadian public was 
favourable to a strictly Canadian formation taking the field, as opposed to 
Canadian units serving under British command.24 The desire for battle ex-
perience, however, led by Minister of National Defence James Ralston and 
the Chief of the General Staff Lieutenant General Kenneth Stuart, along with 
growing public pressure (heightened by the lack of Canadian participation 
in Operation TORCH, the invasion of North-West Africa), led to the dispatch 
of the 1st Canadian Infantry Division and the 1st Canadian Army Tank 
Brigade for the invasion of Sicily on 10 July 1943, and the subsequent forma-
tion in Italy of the I Canadian Corps with the addition of the 5th Canadian 
Armoured Division.25 This separation of troops from the Canadian Army 
would later earn great criticism from historians.26 
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 The decision to send more Canadian troops to the Mediterranean was 
predicated on the idea that these soldiers would receive operational experi-
ence which, upon their return, would help the Canadian Army prepare 
for its role in the invasion of North-West Europe.27 McNaughton’s objec-
tion to these premises would accelerate his dismissal from command of 
the Canadian Army overseas. Historian Douglas Delaney notes that there 
had been “nettled negotiations” in the decision-making which led to the 
late 1943 dispatch of the 5th Canadian Armoured Division and I Canadian 
Corps Headquarters.28 After Allied leaders at the Quebec Conference of 
August 1943 decided upon expanding operations in the Italian peninsula, 
the Canadian Cabinet War Committee pressed Churchill for the deployment 
of a Canadian Corps there.29 In subsequent discussion between McNaughton 
and the vice-chief of the Imperial General Staff, General Archibald Nye, it 
was discerned that if any troops were sent at all, they should be infantry, as 
there was already more armour in the theatre than needed.30 McNaughton’s 
worries that this would leave an infantry-heavy balance in the remainder 
of Canadian Army in Britain of two armoured divisions, an assault infan-
try division and an armoured brigade, were dismissed with the suggestion 
that British infantry divisions would probably be put under command for 
Operation OVERLORD, the invasion of North-West Europe. Importantly, 
whether from McNaughton’s concerns for a balanced Canadian force in each 
theatre, or the decision to bring the famed “Desert Rats” of the 7th Armoured 
Division back from the Mediterranean, a Canadian Armoured Division was 
sent to Italy. In the fall of 1943, after heavy Canadian pressure was applied 
by the High Commissioner, External Affairs, the Prime Minister, and the 
Canadian military to both Churchill and Chief of the Imperial General 
Staff Sir Alan Brooke, it was ordered that Operation TIMBERWOLF, the 
dispatch of I Canadian Corps, and the 5th Canadian Armoured Division to 
the Mediterranean, would commence. Allied Forces Headquarters in North 
Africa, however, had not been informed of these changes, and upon learning 
of the decision, General Harold Alexander asserted that he would not need 
the extra armour in Italy, and that he would prefer an infantry division.31 
Both Alexander and Eighth Army commander Bernard Montgomery did 
not want another Corps headquarters or additional armour. For McAndrew, 
this conflict between, “contradictory national and operational demands were 
irritants in Italy that would not go away.”32 
 The discourse of mechanization in the early years of the Second World War 
can be observed running through all aspects of Canadian society. The concept 
of mechanized forces, with heavy emphasis on the tank as the war-winning, 
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mobile, offensive weapon, shaped early Canadian army organization. The 
Canadian government, military, and public all considered the Second World 
War a mechanized war, one in which machines could replace men on the 
battlefield. Due to these pressures and those of the British government, by 1943 
the Canadian army had two army-tank brigades, three infantry divisions, and 
two armoured divisions in Britain. McNaughton’s decision to send the specific 
forces he did to Italy had much to do with his desire to retain a balanced force 
in each theatre. Despite resistance from the highest level in the Allied com-
mand in Italy, a Canadian armoured division would be added to the order of 
battle. Canadian desire to boost morale, the need for battle experience, and the 
balance of armour and infantry units should all be considered before dismiss-
ing Canada’s contribution to the campaign as contrary to national interest.
 Terrain was a major reason why Montgomery and Alexander were critic-
al of the arrival of more armour in Italy. Veteran Al Sellers of the Governor 
General’s Horse Guards sums up this vein of criticism, much repeated in 
the campaign’s histories, in his statement that, “Italy was very, very poor 
tank country.”33 It would be foolhardy to suggest that mountains, mud, and 
terraced vineyards were not an impediment to mobility on the Italian pen-
insula, but to dismiss armour as useless in the campaign would be equally 
oversimplifying the matter. Brigadier W.C. Murphy, Officer Commanding 1 
Canadian Armoured Brigade, wrote that to dismiss the Italian peninsula as 
“not tank country” ignores the complex situation on the ground.34 Murphy 
noted that the Sherman’s climbing ability meant that German defenders 
could be surprised by the use of armour in terrain supposedly impassable to 
armour. Reports from 1 Armoured Brigade on operations noted that:
It was formerly generally conceded that t[ank] country was that 
type of country which offered good going, and contained suc-
cessive features, permitting good f[ields] of fire from hulldown 
pos[itions] and [support tank by tank or troop by troop]. It is 
suggested, however, that in Italy at least this is the very type of 
country which is now considered most undesirable as far as the 
t[ank] man is concerned...Such good going is confined to com-
paratively small stretches of the country, and almost invariably 
such stretches are covered by carefully sited Panther or Tiger 
t[anks] or [anti-tank] guns of various types.35
In the fall of 1944, the regiments of 5 Canadian Armoured Brigade were also 
using the unexpected climbing capacity of the Sherman tank during oper-
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ations. A report notes, “the siting of the dug-in Panther turrets in most cases 
was to cover down draw or re-entrants and they were knocked out at close 
range by moving along the tops of ridges which enabled t[roops] to get very 
close before being seen.”36 Terrain certainly played a role in the division of 
the all-arms team. Infantry wished to advance under covered terrain, while 
tanks sought open rolling hills where sub-units could take hull-down pos-
itions and cover the moving forces. In June 1944, such terrain was found in 
the Chiana valley by Murphy’s 1 Brigade, but as the brigadier later noted, 
good tank country also gave good fields of fire for anti-tank guns.37 In close 
country, the friction between the arms increased. Murphy recalled, “Italy, 
with its mountains, valleys, olive groves, vineyards, crops, walled cemeter-
ies, and other detestable features (that is, from a tank point of view) further 
complicated relations between the two arms. After all, the infantry wore 
cloth jackets, and the tankmen had several inches of steel to protect them, so 
why should not the tanks fight where the infantry had to go?”38 In response 
to the rapid increase in anti-tank technology, by 1944, infantry-tank doctrine 
was prescribing that in close country, infantry would have to lead.39
 Terrain, then, was not an unconquerable variable in Italy, but one which 
innovation and adaptability could overcome. Terrain like the “razor-back” 
hills in the Liri Valley, on 5th Canadian Armoured Brigade’s path towards 
Pofi was described as “practically impassable for t[anks].”40 The brigade ad-
vanced on two centre lines in order to find the path of least resistance. The 
close country emphasized armour’s need for close support from the motor-
ized infantry battalion. Strict timings could not be set, so the remainder of 
the brigade awaited the brigadier’s commands. Methods of maintaining 
direction in such country were difficult, but inventive techniques were em-
ployed using artillery air burst shells called in on the centre lines. As each 
arm adapted to the environment, the weapons-system as a whole became a 
more efficient machine.
 Baptism by fire in the rugged terrain spawned another mechanized 
innovation: armoured engineers. As the 1 Canadian Armoured Brigade 
advanced beyond Rome in the summer of 1944, the 1st Canadian Assault 
Troop was added to the order of battle. This troop provided yeoman support 
in mine removal, road improvements, in one instance blasting a road across 
a cliff face.41 The 5 Canadian Armoured Brigade had good results assigning 
a number of sappers to armoured regiments who were to travel in M3A1 
Stuart tanks, (lighter armoured vehicles designed for high speed known as 
“Honeys” in Anglo-Canadian service), performing engineering reconnais-
sance, clearing mines, and creating demolitions and diversion.42 For river 
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crossings, Valentine bridge-laying tanks were allotted to the armoured regi-
ments. The maintenance of roads was difficult, especially as tracked vehicles 
destroyed them rapidly.43 The British official historian noted that at times the 
bulldozer was as crucial to the campaign as the tank.44 While D4 bulldozer’s 
were allotted to the engineering units, the Royal Canadian Army Service 
Corps lobbied for a bulldozer for each of their formations.45 The Sherman 
tank was at times modified to meet these demands. In the advance to Coriano, 
Lieutenant Doug Graham dispatched three Shermans with bulldozer blades 
to clear crossings over a stream.46 When two of these machines broke down, 
he prepared three diversions himself just in time for the fighting echelon to 
arrive.
 Tactics had to adapt to conditions that were far from ideal. Tanks were 
considered to be poor for use in built-up areas, but in Italy standard small-
unit tactics were adopted for the use of armour in the urban environment. 
In the battle of Ortona, ‘C’ Squadron of the Three Rivers Regiment proved 
its worth in a support role.47 Blasting holes in houses with armour-piercing 
rounds, and following these up with high-explosive rounds was a technique 
used in the town that would later become standard operating procedure for 
Sherman operators in Italian villages. These innovations proved no pana-
cea,48 but were demonstrative of a new way of thinking, rooted in necessity.
 The tank, in and of itself, was not the magical replacement for manpower 
that politicians had dreamed of at the outbreak of war. All-arms cooperation, 
with an integrated weapons-system of engineering, artillery, infantry and 
armoured assets, was the means to military effectiveness on the Second 
World War battlefield. The history of the Canadian Army in Italy reveals 
great efforts were made to integrate modern motorized technology into a 
working system of multiple arms. 1 Canadian Armoured Brigade had long 
developed standard operating procedures for marrying-up with infantry. 
Their role as an army-tank brigade, an army asset to be attached to infantry 
formations when needed, meant that they would necessarily cooperate with 
a vast array of infantry. Officers of the brigade had produced a document 
for its cooperating infantry called the “Aide Memoire” for this purpose.49 
The document described the procedure for netting communications, marry-
ing up sub-units, and liaising with the artillery, infantry and engineers. 
Despite such procedures, after the hard-fought battle north of Rome, dur-
ing the breaking of the Trasimene Line, a scathing report on lack of support 
from the 2nd King’s Regiment in the 24 June 1944 advance on Vaiano was 
released.50 The infantry had gone to ground while the armour pushed ahead 
to its final objective. As night fell, the armour was forced to return to safety, 
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having shot up numerous German paratroopers, but failing to gain ground. 
The document refers to the previous 17 May 1944 attack with the Royal 22e 
Regiment, comparing this “perfect” tank-infantry cooperation, with that of 
the King’s Regiment. The comparison shows that the vital synergy of the 
all-arms team could be undermined by the circumstances of war. The King’s 
heavy casualties earlier in the Liri Valley meant that at the Trasimene Line 
it was missing vital leadership from experienced non-commissioned officers 
and subalterns. Lack of previous cooperation with the Three Rivers’ tanks 
reduced the potential of effective co-operation.51 Circumstance could play 
a large role in the successful adaptation of techniques to technology. The 
combined-arms team as a whole needed to share a working knowledge of 
tactics, or trust and combat motivation could wither. 
  The 5th Armoured Division had not had an excellent start to tank-in-
fantry co-operation. In the Arielli affair of January 1944, nearly two hundred 
casualties were inflicted on the untested 11 Canadian Infantry Brigade. The 
failure was assessed as a lack of all-arms cooperation.52 In February, a circu-
lar to all the commanding officers of 5 Canadian Armoured Brigade stressed 
that infantry confidence had to be improved by instilling the knowledge of 
what armour could do.53 When the division was concentrated for its training 
for the DIADEM offensive, it was the planning and execution of cooperative 
attacks by infantry, armour and artillery that was stressed. Unfortunately, 
exercises proved that there were still problems with marrying-up, and com-
munication at the company to squadron level. As the lessons learned report 
of the 5 Canadian Armoured Brigade noted after the battle in the Liri Valley, 
fostering an understanding between the various commanders of supporting 
arms and the importance of these feeling, in turn, that they were part of “a 
large family of all arms” was the critical lesson of the battle.54
 The 5th Canadian Armoured Division’s role in the breaking of the Gothic 
Line in autumn 1944 offers several instances of tank-infantry actions which 
show improvements in cooperation. The attack of the Irish Regiment and 
the 8th Hussars on Point 120 has been described as “a model of tank-infantry 
cooperation.”55 The armour “shepherded” the infantry onto the objective, and 
provided accurate direct fire support on arrival. A whole German company 
was destroyed by the Besa machine-guns of the Hussars, when the enemy at-
tempted to escape to the west. After the Strathcona’s had spent a harrowing 
night with the Perth Regiment at the bridgehead that the British Columbia 
Dragoons had sacrificed a great deal to open, the infantry were found to be 
incapable of pushing on. On 1 September 1944, the Princess Louise’s Dragoon 
Guards conducted their first all-arms attack in the infantry role, on Monte 
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Peloso. With ‘C’ Squadron in direct support, searching the wheat fields with 
their machine guns, the team advanced with great success. Supporting fire 
was given from the Strathcona’s ‘A’ Squadron from Point 204 to the south-east, 
and a large group of paratroopers forming up to attack there was cut down by 
‘C’ Squadron leaving 120 dead German paratroopers on the field of battle.56 
The after-action report of Major J. Smith reads like a quintessential example of 
a squadron’s support of an infantry battalion. Troops provided covering fire 
while others were on the move, the lead armoured troop joined the first wave 
of infantry, and the self-propelled M10 tank-destroyers moved up onto the ob-
jective to relieve the tanks to return to their forward rally, ready for a counter-
attack. The 5th Canadian Armoured Division proved the value of rehearsing 
marrying-up and took advantage of the fact that its units could develop a 
degree of familiarity in training and operations under the same formation.
 The relationship between armour and artillery is another important 
aspect of the all arms team, and one which also had to adapt to new mech-
anized tools. The study of the Royal Canadian Artillery’s role in the Italian 
campaign shows that technology’s true benefit was in its integration into a 
weapons system, of which the guns played a major role. Mobility became 
a major concern for artillery regiments. As the 1st Division’s artillery com-
mander Brigadier W.S. Ziegler noted after the Hitler Line battle, “at some 
stage during the advance the principal requirement to enable efficient artil-
lery support changes from ‘weight of fire’ to ‘mobility’”.57 A major benefit of 
armour was its role as mobile communications centres. The ability of tank 
radios quickly to relay targets of opportunity was capitalized upon by allot-
ting Forward Observers to armoured regiments. During the fighting in the 
Liri Valley, Forward Observers with the armoured squadrons were deemed 
“absolutely invaluable for bringing down quick fire.”58
 The use of highly mobile wireless sets on the front-lines was also of great 
value in the connection of ground forces to tactical air power. By late 1943, 
the “Rover tentacle” was in use, typically posting a White armoured scout 
car with the leading brigade, with multiple wireless sets which could connect 
to airfields, army headquarters, and fighter-bomber pilots.59 Numerous com-
plaints were lodged that the so-called Cab-Rank, the flight of fighter-bombers 
which circled directly behind the front-lines waiting for targets of opportun-
ity to be radioed in, was never populated with enough fighter-bombers to 
approach anything near reliability.60 Tactical air support, however, generally 
improved as the campaign continued, with the major caveat that with the 
winter of 1944-45 clouding the skies, ground forces were increasingly reliant 
on conventional artillery support.
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 The relationship between armoured and anti-tank regiments was also 
crucial, especially considering that doctrine was designed for the anti-tank 
gun to be primarily responsible for engaging enemy armour. Getting the 
towed anti-tank support to its useful position, directly behind the advan-
cing friendly armour, was another source of innovation. Tests of towing 
couplings in April 1944 were undertaken to determine the possibilities of 
hauling 17-pounder anti-tank guns by Stuarts (deemed only possible with 
“grouser” track extenders), and six-pounders by Shermans and M10s.61 The 
six-pounder anti-tank gun portee vehicle was found unsatisfactory due to 
its performance and size.62 After poor results in the Liri Valley, the staff of 
the 5 Canadian Armoured Brigade suggested these be replaced by Universal 
Carriers. Self-propelled artillery was at times the only fire support available, 
due to the failure of the tractor borne artillery to advance. Mechanized field 
howitzers and self-propelled anti-tank guns were developed to allow them 
to keep pace with rapid advances. The 64th Jeep Battery was one formation 
created specifically to tow anti-tank guns over rough terrain.63 Their praises 
were sung by armoured commanders who claimed, “in country where 
r[oads] are few and comprise mostly tracks, the Jeep Drawn 75mm gun is 
undoubtedly the answer.”64 The war diary of the 5th Canadian Armoured 
Brigade notes that during Lieutenant Edward Perkins’ famous action in the 
Melfa River bridgehead, the only artillery support that he received were 2000 
rounds from the jeep-drawn battery acting from across the river.65 Calls from 
I Canadian Corps in the summer of 1944 for more jeeps and M14 Half-Tracks 
from Allied Armies Italy, were met with refusal due to a lack of vehicles in 
theatre.66
 Despite the sensational popularity of tank battles, tank versus tank 
action was a rarity in the Italian campaign. In Anglo-American armoured 
doctrine, the anti-tank gun, in its various tractor-towed and self-propelled 
varieties, was meant to combat enemy armour. As a Canadian doctrinal 
circular stated, “it must be remembered that tanks are primarily for counter 
attacking BOSCHE infantry, NOT BOSCHE tanks.”67 The friction of battle, 
however, meant that anti-tank guns were not always in position when the 
panzers appeared. In tank versus tank action, the general rule was that the 
gun to fire first won the day. The Sherman’s power traverse gave an advan-
tage in this case over the manual controls of the Panther tank.68 Panthers in 
Italy also suffered from mechanical difficulties, with spare parts difficult to 
obtain.69 However, there are numerous accounts of the Sherman’s armour-
piercing rounds bouncing off the Panther’s sloped armour. Revising the 
trope of superior panzerkampfwagen’s should not be taken too far.
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 In the battle before the Melfa, two squadrons of the Strathconas came out 
even in a bloody duel with a Panther company concealed in the Liri Valley 
foliage.70 The high proportion of officers killed in the Strathcona’s fifty-three 
casualties is consistent with ongoing research which suggests that the prac-
tice of Sherman tank commanders to fight “unbuttoned”, peering out of the 
top hatch for all-around vision, was a practice with deadly results.71 When 
a tank commander completely dismounted, as happened often in the close 
country beyond the Melfa between Ceprano and Frosinone, his chances of 
becoming a casualty sky-rocketed.72 As the staff of 5 Canadian Armoured 
Brigade noted, tank commanders “can see very little unless they stick their 
heads and shoulders high out of the top of a high turret on a high tank. Most 
conspicuous!”73 Crew commanders were warned to expose themselves as 
little as possible and keep their shoulders within the tank.74 Some experimen-
tation was undertaken in removing one of the hatch covers in order to reduce 
the effect of, “making a V in the centre of which is the crew com[mander’s] 
head for a sniper’s target.”75 The solution to this lack of vision was for the 
infantry to act as the eyes for the armour. The subject of target indication 
in tank-infantry cooperation, was one which elicited much study by British 
operational researchers.76 Officers in the 5 Canadian Armoured Brigade 
noted “the most difficult signal to arrange is, one to the other, ‘Look at me, I 
am about to make one of our prearranged signals.’”77 While a few armoured 
melees occurred during the campaign, the preferred method of operations 
was the mutually supporting weapons system of the all-arms team.
 Criticism of Canadian doctrine began as early as the writings of official 
historian C.P. Stacey.78 In 1991, John English built on this critical narrative, 
blaming Canadian high command, in particular, for failing to develop appro-
priate leadership, training or doctrine in the Canadian Army.79 For English, 
Canada’s interwar army was distracted by, “strategic and regimental twin 
attractions [which] ensured the general neglect of the operational and tactical 
sphere of war.” In this sphere, English argues, the artillery barrage dictated 
the timing of the attack, robbing junior leaders of initiative on the battlefield. 
Regimental fealty blinded officers to the need for all-arms training and tank-
infantry cooperation was ignored. This standard critique was shared by his-
torian Bill McAndrew in the case of the Canadian Army in Italy.80 This inter-
pretation takes a freeze frame of Anglo-Canadian doctrine and applies it to 
the whole war, ignoring that doctrine was constantly evolving and adapting.
 Despite the well-known interwar publications of Canada’s own “apostles 
of mobility”, Canadian doctrine was largely derived from British sources, 
and was constantly changing as the lessons of battle were digested.81 The 
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steady evolution of doctrine can be seen in the changes to British instruc-
tional manuals regarding the deployment of armour. While early pamphlets 
prescribed an all-armoured initial wave, later doctrine had accepted a more 
robust interpretation of tank-infantry cooperation. Infantry were told that 
they would need to precede the tanks to destroy anti-tank guns, and the 
second wave adopted a more coordinated drill for fire and movement.82 
Doctrine for the armoured divisions during the early period remained very 
tank-centric, as was evidenced by their tank heavy organization of two 
armoured brigades, and only two infantry battalions (one motorized and 
the other in the support group). After British experience in North Africa, a 
restructuring of the Canadian armoured divisions balanced them out with 
one armoured brigade and one infantry brigade. After the Liri Valley, the 
5th Armoured Division added another infantry brigade in order to thicken 
up the front and allow for the leap-frogging of brigades to maintain momen-
tum.83 As the war progressed, cruiser-tank doctrine for armoured divisions 
began to approach that of the infantry tanks in the Army-Tank Brigades. By 
Spring 1944, the 5 Armoured Brigade was emphasizing that infantry must 
lead in breaking defences in close terrain, dominated by anti-tank guns or 
blocked by obstacles.84 Doctrinal circulations stressed that the goal of the 
tank-infantry attack was lodging the infantry securely on the final object-
ive. This gradual amalgamation of cruiser and infantry-tank doctrine was a 
function of their increasingly overlapping tasks. This is evidenced by the use 
of 5th Canadian Armoured Brigade in the break-in battle for the Gothic Line. 
McAndrew derisively commented of this battle that, “tankers in armoured 
divisions usually broke out of prepared defences, not into them.”85
 In the attack on the Gothic Line, there was no shortage of initiative, 
and certainly no signs of a ponderous over-planned artillery based Anglo-
Canadian doctrine. Great initiative is clear in both Bert Hoffmeister’s deci-
sion to bounce the line two days before the operation was supposed to 
commence, and in British Columbia Dragoon’s commanding officer, Freddy 
Vokes’, decision to press on toward Point 204 when a firefight erupted on the 
assembly area where his infantry support did not arrive.86 The mountainous 
terrain did not hinder the subsequent attack by the Strathcona’s, which were 
moving up to support the aggressive break-in battle of the British Columbia 
Dragoon’s. The Strathcona squadrons conducted text-book fire and move-
ment, with squadrons adopting firing positions for the attack on Pt. 322.87 A 
curious instance of the use of mechanization occurred when the enemy used 
farm tractors to distract and confuse the Strathcona’s and infantry from the 
Perth regiment, while counterattacking during the night.
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 Critiques of Allied mechanized equipment dwell all too often on tech-
nical comparisons between the opposing force’s main battle tanks. Far more 
important to military effectiveness were the integration of technology into the 
existing weapons system, along with the alteration of the ways that system 
was deployed. This adaptation of techniques to new equipment had begun 
before the Canadians were even sent to the Mediterranean. A great deal of 
new kit arrived to streamline the Canadians with the British war establish-
ment in theatre.88 The 1st Canadian Army Tank Brigade had been equipped 
with Sherman’s with Chrysler engines in the spring of 1943 while training in 
Scotland, in order to coordinate supply with British organization.89 The tran-
sition to new equipment was nothing new to the troopers, who had adjusted 
to four different tank models in as many years.
 When it came to equipment, the Fifth Canadian Armoured Division did 
not make an auspicious start on the Italian peninsula. As part of the negotia-
tions that led to the forming of the I Canadian Corps, it was agreed to take 
over equipment from British units that were leaving the Mediterranean the-
atre.90 Unfortunately, attrition in the North African campaign and unofficial 
trading of vehicles from 7th Armoured Division’s stores to other units of the 
Eighth Army meant that, when 5th Canadian Armoured Division took over 
the equipment, there were no tools, and there was a severe lack of spares.91 
The lack of four wheel drive vehicles was another major drawback of the 
old kit.92 In the summer of 1944, after the breaking of the Gustav and Hitler 
lines, and steady use for over a year, the Royal Canadian Army Service Corps 
reports noted that “many elderly veh[icles] are now at the end of their useful 
life.”93
 The Sherman tank has been central to equipment-based criticism 
of Allied armour. While the tank certainly had its limitations, there were 
also positive aspects of the armoured fighting vehicle’s design, which were 
capitalized on in the Italian terrain. One was the previously mentioned, 
“unexpected mobility...in mountain warfare.”94 Shermans could, at times, 
best the larger German Panther tanks, as in the first recorded “kill” on the 
approach to the Melfa.95 One possible advantage the Sherman had over the 
Panther was its quick turret traverse. While Panther gunners had to hand-
crank their turrets, the Shermans were equipped with a hydraulic traverse 
system. In the spring of 1944, some innovations appear to have been con-
sidered as further improvements for Sherman turret crews, as staff of the 
5 Canadian Armoured Brigade set to “inventing turret quickeners.”96 Great 
innovation and modification was present on the ground during the cam-
paign. In the 5th Canadian Armoured Brigade, Brigadier Desmond Smith 
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personally examined a Sherman to determine the modifications necessary to 
convert the vehicle into a command tank.97 Far more important than a strict 
comparison of muzzle velocity, armour thickness, and horsepower, was the 
integration of armour into the weapons-system as a whole. Anglo-Canadian 
doctrine hoped to destroy enemy armour with the anti-tank gun, and avoid 
the much sensationalized tank duel.
 Tracing the history of the Stuart tank during the campaign uncovers 
adaptation, innovation, and an evolution of techniques in response to equip-
ment. The M3A4 Light Tank, known as the “Honey” in British service, under-
went great modification during the Italian campaign. The Stuart was used 
by armoured regiments in their reconnaissance troops, with their turrets 
removed for greater visibility.98 The use of reconnaissance troops in general 
was another technique which evolved throughout the campaign. During the 
battles before the Hitler Line, the 1 Canadian Armoured Brigade noted that 
its regiments used the Stuart tanks largely to bring up supplies to the fighting 
echelons. After the breaking of the Trasimene Line in June 1944, these recon-
naissance forces were being used aggressively to seize bridges before enemy 
engineers could demolish them. Later in the campaign, during the breaking 
of the Gothic Line, the Lord Strathcona’s Horse reported its reconnaissance 
troop, “ferreting large numbers of paratroopers out of dugouts and fire 
pos[itions] from which they had done much sniping.”99 The reconnaissance 
regiments allotted to each armoured division were deemed to require tanks 
for effectiveness against enemy rearguards that included armoured fighting 
vehicles. Eighth Army reported that Staghound armoured cars could not 
compete off-road with armoured vehicles and that, during advances in the 
Liri Valley, the reconnaissance units had failed to maintain contact.100
 The Italian Campaign was certainly competing with north-west Europe 
for equipment, as is witnessed by the failure of Sherman Fireflys (with the 
standard 75mm gun increased to the more formidable 17-pounder) and track 
grousers (add-on extensions providing more surface area), to arrive in the 
theatre until late 1944.101 In the mid-October attack over the Scolo Rigosso on 
the village of Bulgaria, the Strathcona’s reported success with the first use 
of their 17-pounder Sherman 1C.102 The new technology, as usual, had de-
manded new techniques, and the lessons learned of the engagement recom-
mended keeping the 17-pounders in reserve as the long gun was difficult to 
camouflage and the enemy inevitably picked it as his first target. I Canadian 
Corps Intelligence had long known that the enemy had selectively targeted 
command tanks, known by their special markings or the manner they were 
used in action.103
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 To fully understand the challenges of motorized warfare, Second World 
War historiography’s fascination with the tank must be tempered with a con-
sideration of other forms of mobility. With the vast numbers of road-bound 
vehicles involved in mechanized warfare, it is no surprise that movement 
control problems stifled the advance. Major problems arose for the Eighth 
British Army in the Liri Valley, where staff officers noted “traffic was by far 
the greatest single cause of delay.”104 Delaney also addresses Eighth Army’s 
failings in the Liri Valley in respect to the allotment of routes and use of space. 
Delaney notes, “stuffing two corps into a corridor with only enough routes to 
service one corps properly was unwise.”105 He largely blames Eighth Army 
commander Lieutenant General Oliver Leese for attempting to fit the 6th 
British and 5th Canadian Armoured Divisions down the same main route 
during the pursuit up the Liri Valley.106 In the initial move to assembly areas 
for the exploitation of the breach in the Hitler Line, returning traffic from 
25 British Armoured Brigade further delayed the start-time.107 After the Liri 
Valley traffic problems the Canadian Corps formed a Traffic Control Office 
for determining road layout, selecting one-way routes, establishing a vehicle 
movement system, and monitoring roads for overuse.108
 As Churchill once said, “victory is the beautiful, bright coloured flower. 
Transport is the stem without which it could never have blossomed.”109 
Logistic impediments began for the Canadians before they even hit the 
beaches of Sicily, when the ship carrying much of their transport trucks 
was torpedoed in the Mediterranean. Only 114 of 500 trucks lost had been 
replaced by the end of the Sicilian campaign.110 Such problems heightened 
the Royal Canadian Army Service Corps’ challenge to maximize use of 
existing transport. On the move northward in Calabria, a system of continu-
ous running was established which kept vehicles on the road twenty-two 
hours a day by assigning maintenance crews and relief drivers to keep 
them moving.111 Supply is an ancient military problem, compounded by the 
additional vehicular needs of petrol, oil and lubricants. While armour could 
travel cross-country, the road-bound gas trucks had to fight traffic on the 
road. Tanker trucks were not always available, and at times supply of petrol 
was provided by trucks full of gasoline cans.112 On the operational scale, the 
storage and transport of petrol was a significant undertaking. Mobile pet-
rol filling centres and petrol depots were supplied by bulk petrol transport 
companies and pipelines were used for strategic movement of liquids.113 
A Canadian innovation helped those at the mobile filling centre dispense 
gasoline at the enormous rates necessary. The ASP Multiple Jerrican Filler 
was an adaptor which could fill eight cans at once.114 The supply of parts 
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was another problem of mechanization which could be crippling. During the 
rapid advance in Calabria, Norton motorcycles and jeeps were frequently be-
ing put out of action for lack of tires and spare parts.115 The Royal Canadian 
Army Service Corps reported a dearth of spare parts for motor transport well 
into the fall of 1944, which had left 3-ton lorries out of service due to a short 
supply of batteries.116 An idea of the scale of strategic logistic difficulties is 
provided by McAndrew in enumerating the I Canadian Corps’ move to the 
Adriatic sector in August 1944. The move involved 11,000 wheeled vehicles, 
280 carriers, 650 tanks, one million shells and 50 million litres of fuel.117
 The jeep was found to be especially useful for small-scale supply to the 
fighting echelons in rough terrain. The I Canadian Corps Jeep Platoon was 
an ad hoc unit formed for use in the Hitler Line battle to take advantage of 
the vehicle’s rugged mobility.118 With thirty jeeps and forty-five personnel, 
the units were parcelled out in sections to brigades, and attached directly to 
battalion and company headquarters. The jeeps could travel off-road, climb 
hills, cross fords, craters and low classification bridges and carry over a ton. 
They supported the infantry by hauling anti-tank guns, ammunition, hot 
rations and evacuating casualties. The infantry carrier, or Bren-gun carrier, 
was deemed too noisy at times for these tasks, and despite their small num-
bers, it appears the jeeps were highly useful in the Italian terrain. The platoon 
was thrown together from personnel in the Service Corps when needed, and 
performed well in both the Gothic Line battle and fighting in late November 
1944. The jeep was commonly used by officers who had to keep in physical 
contact with multiple units and was featured widely across the Canadian 
order of battle.
 Decidedly ancient methods were at times the solution to logistic prob-
lems over Italy’s rugged terrain, countering the thesis of adaptation to mech-
anization as the critical factor in the campaign. The men of the 1st Canadian 
Infantry Division first learned of this when one hundred mule saddles ar-
rived when training for mountain warfare in Inveraray, Scotland.119 An intel-
ligence report warned the Canadian muleteers that the “Sicilian mule was 
thinner and longer in the back than the Argentine breed which we know. 
They are of slight build, very long in the leg, muscular, surefooted and hard-
working…Owing to the cruelty and overloading that the mules suffer, they 
are vicious and resistance.”120 On 1 August 1944, the 1 Canadian Divisional 
Mule Transporter Company under Captain L. Jackson was formed.121 Local 
Sicilians, not wanting their mules to be requisitioned, put rocks inside their 
leg bandages to make them appear lame.122 Such tactics did not prevent 
Jackson’s officers from obtaining 90 mules for each of the 1st Division’s brig-
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ades. That the Allies were too fixated on mechanized means of transport 
is expressed in the post-war comments by the commander of the French 
Expeditionary Corps, Marshal Juin who believed that the Anglo-Americans 
were “overly dependent on their vehicles. In Italy wheels didn’t necessar-
ily mean mobility.”123 Especially in the wet winter months, movement for 
wheeled vehicles was difficult, even on the roads. For a period in the winter 
of 1943-44, when the 1 Canadian Armoured Brigade was concentrated for the 
first time, two of its regiments were supplied strictly by mule.124 Mules in the 
Italian campaign, while only providing a small portion of the Allies’ logistic 
capacity, remind the historian that mechanized technology could not solve 
all the problems of the war.
 The historical debate surrounding the strategy of the Italian Campaign, 
Canadian participation in it, and military effectiveness of the Anglo-
Canadian forces will continue into the twenty-first-century. Adaptation to 
mechanization is central to these important facets of the Second World War, 
and proves a corrective to several critical strains in the scholarship. At the 
highest level of Canadian leadership, discourse surrounding mechaniza-
tion as an alternative to manpower shaped the organizational balance of the 
Canadian Army, and elicited a favourable response to British requests for 
armoured formations. Once in theatre, these formations encountered real-
world obstacles to ideals of highly-mobile, armour-heavy forces. Far from 
useless additions to what would become the Allied Armies Italy, Canadian 
forces adapted their techniques to terrain incorrectly dubbed “not tank-
country”. A constant evolution is apparent in doctrine and tactics, and equip-
ment innovations continued throughout the campaign. Canadians adapted 
to the conditions that they faced, proving that technology is seldom of great 
import in and of itself. The crucial process for military effectiveness was the 
steady evolution in organization and techniques which sought to integrate 
new vehicles into the greater weapons system. The story of mechanization 
in the Italian campaign also is not a simple story of steady progress. Periods 
of high casualties could do much to decrease corporate knowledge. Barriers 
to mobility, especially in the wet Italian winters, could stifle the advance. Far 
from being a purely modern mechanical success story, at times that ancient 
logistic tool, the Sicilian mule, was the best means available to get supplies 
to troops over rugged terrain. Through the study of the Canadian Army and 
mechanization in the Italian campaign, a balanced and nuanced conception 
of the Dominion’s contribution is afforded which extends beyond a rebut-
tal to the historical criticism, but also offers an perspective of the military 
response to technology from tank-crew to the Cabinet War Committee.
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Task Forces: Making Canadian Armour 
Operationally Effective in Italy,  
1943-1944
Christine E. Leppard
On 24 May 1944, I Canadian Corps unleashed three battalion sized task forces through the remnants of the once-vaunted “Adolf Hitler Line” up Italy’s Liri Valley. Manned by some of the Third Reich’s 
best divisions in Italy, the “Hitler Line” had been a formidable barricade of 
wire, anti-tank ditches, artillery, and machine-guns that stretched from the 
Adriatic coast through the Liri Valley; the Germans had been determined 
to protect Rome at all costs from the advancing Allies. After four days of 
concentrated, set-piece brigade attacks by Major-General Chris Vokes’ 
1st Canadian Infantry Division (1CID), a hole had been punched through 
the line between the towns of Pontecorvo and Aquino. The exhausted 1st 
Division then passed the baton to Bert Hoffmeister’s 5th Canadian Armoured 
Division (5CAD) to complete the “break-out” phase. Hoffmeister organized 
task forces—super-sized battalions of motorized infantry, armoured vehicles, 
self-propelled artillery and engineers under one battalion commander—to 
chase the scrambling Germans, maintain pressure, and prevent them from 
re-establishing a defensive posture. Task forces were designed to hit hard, 
moving fast and relentlessly. 
Task forces were the progeny of Canadian tactical innovation during the 
Italian Campaign, developing from their attempts to adapt “fire and move-
ment” doctrine so that even in Italy’s rugged terrain, armour and infantry 
could coordinate and advance to contact quickly. From Sicily to the Hitler 
Line, task forces met with considerable success. Against German troops 
lightly holding a position before waging a fighting retreat with rear-guard 
delaying tactics, task forces had the speed and strength to keep up the pres-
sure. In the Liri, however, Hoffmeister’s breakout fell far short of Eighth 
Army’s expectations. Unlike previous task force engagements, small-arms 
fire was a major threat to 5CAD, pinning down the leading infantry. And 
although pre-battle training had emphasized the need to avoid situations 
where tanks led the assault, contingencies were not rehearsed to deal with 
occasions when they did. In all three Liri task forces, coordination broke 
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down into disparate infantry and tank attacks losing speed and momen-
tum and, consequently, the ability to maintain pressure on the retreating 
Germans. Recognizing that the task forces at Liri had insufficient strength to 
meet the situation, Canadian commanders did not use task forces again until 
faced with lighter resistance. The breakthrough of strong German positions 
was thereafter left to traditional brigade assaults. Ultimately, the study of 
task forces in the periods preceding, during and in the aftermath of the Liri 
Valley demonstrates the maturity of the Canadian learning curve by May 
1944. Task forces had developed as a method of adding speed and flexibility 
into Eighth Army tactical doctrine, and yet the Canadians had the capacity 
to understand their limitations, without reactively abandoning the entire 
concept when confronted by setbacks.
As Will Pratt demonstrated in his chapter, historians have typically con-
cluded that Italy was not “tank country” and terrain limited the operational 
effectiveness of armoured units. Making matters worse was British armoured 
doctrine, moulded primarily by the mechanical and calculated Bernard 
Montgomery who operated with strict fire plans and a deliberate end game. 
I Canadian Corps was under the command of Eighth British Army in Italy 
and naturally fought by the Montgomery method, by which three phases 
were considered necessary to crack prepared German defences. According 
to 1st Canadian Infantry Division’s (1 CID) 1942 training instruction, the first 
phase of an attack, “is based on fire and movement and timings are co-ordin-
ated to control these factors.”1 In the second phase tanks and infantry work 
together to reduce the remaining pockets of resistance. Phase three com-
prised a combined-arms echelon to exploit success by applying pressure on 
the retreating Germans.2 This phase was to be spearheaded by an armoured 
division, which was designed specifically to facilitate all-arms coordination. 
In all phases, limited objectives were to be consolidated because, as General 
Officer Commanding (GOC) 1CID Guy Simonds wrote, “The success of the 
offensive battle hinges on the defeat of the German counter-attacks.” More 
importantly, “The defeat of these counter-attacks must form part of the ori-
ginal plan of attack which must include arrangements for artillery support 
and the forward moves of infantry supporting weapons – including tanks 
– on the objective.”3 
Historian Bill McAndrew criticized the Canadian approach, arguing 
about the Sicilian Campaign that, “relying on firepower seemed to induce 
a tactical outlook which restrained the initiative on which battlefield man-
oeuvre depends.”4 However, after 10 July 1943 when the 1CID landed on the 
beach of Pachino, Sicily, experience taught the Canadians that there was 
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room for manoeuvre and initiative within the strictures of Eighth Army doc-
trine. The concept of task forces originated in the 1 CID attack on Leonforte 
on 22 July 1943, when the Loyal Edmonton Regiment became bogged down 
in the town. Prevented for 24-hours from coming to their rescue while 
they waited for engineers to repair the bridge leading to the town, Vokes 
and Simonds launched a ‘flying column’ up the switchbacks to Leonforte. 
One section of the Three Rivers Regiment and one platoon of the Princess 
Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI) were married up under the com-
mand of the PPCLI’s commander Captain R.C. Coleman.5 With speed and 
coordination, the formation met with considerable success. 
The idea was expanded upon in mid-August, when the 1 CID was ordered 
by Montgomery to maintain pressure on the Germans who were rapidly 
retreating towards the Etna Line, and blowing bridges, destroying ammu-
nition stores, and mining roads as they went. “Booth Force,” commanded 
by Colonel E.L. Booth of the Three Rivers Regiment, was composed of the 
armoured regiment, a self-propelled battery, anti-tank guns, the Seaforth 
Highlanders infantry regiment led by Bert Hoffmeister, and a reconnais-
sance squadron. Designed to maximize speed and flexibility, Booth Force 
was to strike east along the Northern bank of the Salso River, bypassing the 
German positions at Mounts Seggio and Revisotto, with the final objective 
of getting a toehold on the eastern bank of the Simeto River. “I think such a 
move,” Simonds wrote on the night of 4 August, “will startle the enemy and 
will probably result in a good mix up in the open country where the tanks 
will really be able to manoeuvre.”6 As historian Douglas Delaney points out 
in his biography on Hoffmeister, Simonds’ decision to pass by Seggio and 
Revisotto leaving the Canadians’ left flank exposed, “was a departure from 
the doctrinal practice of establishing firm bases and securing the flanks be-
fore commencing an advance.”7 Yet Booth Force was designed to maximize 
speed and flexibility to a limited objective, not propel a Patton-style breakout 
of the river valley. 
It worked, and well. Booth, with Hoffmeister beside him in his com-
mand tank, sent the Seaforths forward mounted on tanks of the Three 
Rivers. When the tanks were held up at the river, the infantry dismounted 
and pressed onward, with the tanks providing direct fire support. 
Communications were netted, and organization fluid; the operation was a 
resounding success. In the weeks after Booth Force and in preparation for 
the move to the Italian mainland, the Three Rivers Regiment and the rest 
of 1st Division attempted to institutionalize the lessons they had learned 
on infantry-armour cooperation in Sicily. Although task forces were not 
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discussed directly, their lessons were clearly discerned. For example, in a 
question-answer session with the 12th Canadian Armoured Brigade (The 
Calgary Tanks), Booth made it clear that tanks should never attack before 
infantry:
During action the procedure is as follows if the tanks are lead-
ing: the tanks bump opposition. All the fire from the enemy 
position is directed against the tanks and the area behind where 
the Infantry would be. Appalled by the fire, the infantry will go 
to ground and are no more use during the action…If the tanks 
are kept well back of the Infantry and give direct fire support 
when the Infantry are nearing their objective or meeting oppos-
ition the Infantry will go to ground but for their own protection 
will engage the enemy. The tanks can then determine, either 
by hand signals from the Infantry or verbal messages, where 
the opposition is coming from and can engage it from the best 
position.8 
In Italy, while trying to maintain pressure on the Germans as they retreated 
north to the series of defensive positions orchestrated by General Albert 
Kesselring, the Calgary Tanks would cooperate in two task forces: Boforce 
and X-Force. 
During the last months of 1943, the Canadians captured Ortona in one 
of the longest and bloodiest fights of the Italian Campaign. Afterwards, they 
were moved to a quiet sector around Campobasso to rest and train. During 
this hiatus, Montgomery handed over command of Eighth Army to Oliver 
Leese, so that Montgomery could return to England for “Overlord.” Harry 
Crerar’s I Canadian Corps headquarters arrived in the Mediterranean 
in November, and by January it was organized and operational. Under 
Crerar’s command were 1st Canadian Infantry division and the newly ar-
rived 5th Canadian Armoured Division. Although Crerar pressured Leese 
to get I Corps into action as soon as possible, his attempts were in vain; not 
only did Leese believe that I Corps and 5CAD were insufficiently trained 
for battle, the inclement weather prevented any operation at all for the first 
three months of 1944.9 By the time I Corps did go into battle in May, Crerar 
had returned to England to command First Canadian Army, and General 
E.L.M. “Tommy” Burns had taken over. Chris Vokes was promoted to 
GOC 1CID, and Hoffmeister to GOC 5CAD.10 Aside from one operation in 
January (the Arielli Offensive), I Canadian Corps would spend the months 
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January to May training in preparation for their turn at the crack German 
defences dug-in to the Liri Valley anchored by Monte Cassino, blocking the 
road to Rome.
Much of the Canadians’ training in this period was focused on all-arms 
coordination. In early March, 1CID organized “Unit Study Periods” which 
invited representatives from infantry, armour, artillery, engineer, and med-
ical units to attend “so that all may benefit from other arms represented.” 
Their topics of discussion were, “time spent in preparation,” “joint planning 
between infantry, tanks and artillery,” and “the employment of tanks and 
infantry in break-in-battle.”11 Fostering discussion between battalion com-
manders who had been—or might later be—working together in combined-
arms operations was an important component of their training. On 21 March 
1944, 1CID was asked to supply 10 officers and 54 non-commissioned officers 
to I Canadian Corps to help “improve the standard of training” by discuss-
ing lessons learned and training practices. They were then to return to their 
own units and instruct their peers how to train.12 
Most importantly, 1CID focused on training officers, non-commissioned 
officers, and troops in infantry-cum-tank attacks on the squadron-company 
level. On 28 March 1944, in “Training Instruction No. 3: Drill for Tank and 
Infantry Cooperation – [Squadron] and [Company] Basis”, I Canadian Corps 
ordered a “common basis between [squadron] and [company] commands” to 
be found and argued that “a plan must be evolved which will include all the 
necessary details” for all-arms coordination.13 A major training exercise was 
staged at Lucera that focused on brigade groups comprised of mortar units, 
forward observation officers (FOOs), infantry and other support arms oper-
ating under brigade control. 1CID worked with the 25th British Armoured 
Brigade. It was hoped, in particular, that the combined forces would “exercise 
the sappers, [Anti-tank] gunners and FOO parties from the [Field Artillery] 
as well as the [infantry].”14 For example, the 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade 
trained with 142nd Royal Artillery Corps and 51st Squadron of the Royal 
tanks, further grouping into battalion and squadron formations.15 These 
groups were not to be permanent. Joint-attacks would be rehearsed to en-
sure interchangeability. Although the emphasis of 1CID was “marrying-up” 
for break-in battles, skills were being developed that could also be applied 
to task forces. An 8 May training directive issued by 5CAD warned that 
training exercises might, “have not necessarily any perspective operational 
significance, but are for the purpose of providing practice and training in the 
planning of an operation.”16 
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The Carleton and York Infantry regiment, part of Adams Force in the 
Liri Valley, attended the 1st Division’s training near Lucera in April 1944. The 
five foci of training were stipulated as:
(a) Attack by [tanks] and [infantry] 
(b) Action on the objective with [tanks] in the anti-tank role and 
in the counter-attack role.
(c) Passage of minefields.
(d) Co-operation with [Anti-tank] guns including towing.
(e) The Churchill tank to all and maintenance problems to 
[officers].17
Then, on 5 May, the Carleton and Yorks’ regiments were “given an op-
portunity of examining both the Churchill and Sherman Tanks with the 
tank crews [of the 51st Royal Tank Regiment] present to explain points of 
construction and mechanism.”18 The next day, they engaged in training exer-
cises with the squadrons and live-fire training with anti-tank units.19 This 
first-hand examination of the strengths and weaknesses of Churchill tanks 
helped strengthen the Carleton and Yorks’ understanding of how mutual 
support could be provided and improved. 
Some of the early lessons of Booth Force were now standard operat-
ing procedures, particularly regarding communications and attack forma-
tions. For example, at Lucera, the Carleton and Yorks conformed closely to 
the tactical outlines set forth in I Canadian Corps’ “Training Instruction 
Number Three” which was disseminated to all units. Specific attention 
was afforded to communications, most importantly radio nets: “armour 
net to infantry. 18 set in tank to battalion command net, 38 set in tank to 
company command net.”20 Having both tank and infantry wireless sets in 
the command tank facilitated quick support. The Instruction goes on to re-
mind its companies that when marrying-up, they need to co-ordinate with 
the tanks where they will form up, timings for arriving troops, and pick 
guides from platoons and troops to go over routes to the forming up area. 
When the battle is underway, the “main role of [tanks] is to [support] in-
fantry – when possible [tanks] will move close enough to [infantry] to ob-
tain target indications. In close country such as olive groves, [tanks] must 
fall back, as cannot see to shoot, but will close again as soon as ground 
permits.”21 Notably absent from the training document is the procedure 
to be taken when infantry are held up by small arms fire that tanks are 
impervious to. 
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A similar training regime was occurring in 5th Canadian Armoured 
Division. In April, Hoffmeister’s division conducted two “battle drills”: 
SLUGGEM and THRUSTER. During the former, Hoffmeister organized a 
Tactical Exercise without Troops (TEWT) in which rifle company and tank 
squadron officers worked together in syndicates to plan attacks, which were 
then executed in dry runs. The purpose of SLUGGEM, according to Delaney, 
was “to develop sound procedures for infantry-tank cooperation, which 
meant working on methods for communication, command and control, tar-
get indication, and battle procedure.”22 Battalions rehearsed netting armour 
wireless sets to infantry. Placed in the command tank were to be number 
18 and number 38 wireless sets. The number 18 would be in contact with 
battalion command, while the Number 38 was to be netted with the infantry 
company.23 
THRUSTER was a live-fire division rehearsal of the skills and concepts 
developed in SLUGGEM. Hoffmeister grouped infantry and tank regiments 
together in predictable arrangements, ensuring that his troops were familiar 
with broad methods of cooperation that could then be applied in whichever 
organization he envisioned.24 Creating command and operational flexibility 
and familiarity was key. 
The combined arms lessons learned in Sicily and the first few months 
of Italy had sunk in at I Canadian Corps headquarters. While task forces 
were never the direct focus of training, both 1st and 5th Canadian divisions 
rehearsed the skills and tactics that could be applied to the battalion-led at-
tack formations. In May 1944, I Corps was given a chance to test its training 
in action. 
Since January, the Allied Armies in Italy had tried three times to crack 
the German Gustav Line, which ran from Monte Cassino across the Rapido 
and Garigliano rivers through the town of San Angelo. The strength of the 
German defenses combined with difficult winter conditions led to the deci-
sion to wait until spring to launch a fourth attempt. After the Gustav Line 
had been pierced, I Canadian Corps was to assault the Hitler Line, which 
ran from Monte Cassino through the towns of Pontecorvo and Aquino and 
down the Melfa River through the Liri Valley, just north of the Gustav Line. 
The Hitler Line was the last German defensive system before Rome. As per 
army doctrine, I Corps tasked Vokes’ 1CID first to break-through the line, 
and Hoffmeister’s 5CAD then to break-out of it. It was in the break-out phase 
that Hoffmeister employed task forces.
The Liri Valley breakout demonstrated that the combined-arms oper-
ations typified by task forces were still in a period of transition in May of 
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1944, and that the usefulness of task forces had a limit. Indeed, until the Liri 
the formations had not yet been tested against stiff German resistance, and 
they did not hold up well. Although the task force command structure en-
sured that tanks and infantry married up swiftly, coordination broke down 
once the battle was under way because the forces lacked the overwhelming 
strength to break the desperate Germans scrambling to re-establish a defen-
sive line. 
By 24 May, Vokes had punched a hole through the line between Ponte-
corvo and Aquino. Hoffmeister and 5th Canadian Armoured Brigade 
Commander J.D.B. Smith organized Vokes and Griffin Forces. Named after 
Chris Vokes’ younger brother Major Fred Vokes of the British Columbia 
Dragoons and leader of the task force, Vokes Force consisted of squadrons 
of the Dragoons, companies of the Irish Regiment (lifted from 11th Canadian 
Infantry Brigade), a self-propelled battery from the 4th Anti-Tank Regiment, 
Royal Canadian Artillery, a section of the 7th Light Field Ambulance, and 
a detachment of Royal Canadian Engineers 10th Field Squadron.25 Vokes 
was to lead his battle group to Mancini Farm, where Griffin Force would 
take the lead to the Melfa River. Griffin Force, led by Philip Griffin of the 
Lord Strathcona’s Horse, was supported by A Company of the Westminster 
Regiment (mounted infantry), and units of the same support regiments used 
in Vokes Force. In support, Chris Vokes organized “Adams Force”—so named 
for the battle group’s leader, Major Adams of the Princess Louise Dragoon 
Guards. The force included a squadron of Sherman tanks of the Royal 
Canadian Dragoons, two squadrons of Three Rivers Regiment (Shermans) 
borrowed from 1st Canadian Armoured Brigade and the Carleton and York 
Regiment. 
To Vokes and Hoffmeister, the tactical situation in the Liri Valley looked 
familiar. The Germans were retreating, and the Canadians were chasing 
them to ensure that they could not dig in and counter-attack. These same 
challenges had faced the Canadians in Sicily: (1) the need for speed; and (2) 
the nature of the terrain and German defences. As in Booth Force, “tank 
speed” was needed to quickly reach and cross the Melfa River before the 
Germans could dig in. Therefore, all three task forces were organized under 
a tank commander, who in previous months’ training had worked with in-
fantry and artillery commanders to integrate tactics. The theory was that, 
to maintain the speed of the attack, the tank commander could best utilize 
infantry to ensure that it screened the tanks.26
Hoffmeister did not have a lot of space to work with when organizing 
his attack. The entire front, from the boundary line with XIII British Corps 
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on the right to the Liri River on the left, was only three to four miles wide.27 
More importantly, Vokes had his foot in the door but the gap was not big 
enough to move a brigade through. Hoffmeister recalled that, “I was in Chris 
Vokes’ headquarters right up to the time we moved off and I’ll never forget 
the moment when Chris turned to me and said, ‘Bert this is the best we can 
do, there is not much of a hole, good luck to you.”28 In the staging area on 23 
May, the traffic was so congested that one sleeping Strathcona Trooper was 
crushed by a tank from the Governor General’s Horse Guards next to his 
own Sherman.29 To make matters worse, on 24 May, Leese designated the 
main highway through the valley—Highway 6 or “Heart Route”—the “sole 
preserve” of XIII Corps.30 The Canadians were thus relegated to secondary, 
mostly unpaved, roadways. This meant that there was not enough room to 
launch an effective division or brigade level assault. 
Although the 90th Wehrmacht Division had been substantially weak-
ened during the break-through, it faced only “the prospect of a walk over 
the mountains, should [it] wish to break off the fight and rejoin the main 
body.”31 German Panthers and Mark IV’s exceeded the Canadian Honey and 
Sherman Tanks in numbers and power, German snipers and infantry units 
honey-combed the orchards and the main roadways to the Melfa were fes-
tooned with mines.32 Furthermore, 5CAD’s right flank was exposed, as the 
Germans still held the heights of Aquino, which was located in XIII British 
Corps’ sector with enfilade over the Canadian line of advance.33 A success-
ful breakout rested on speed and flexibility to quickly overcome or bypass 
strong German defences. 
The Liri Valley terrain was also a tactical challenge. As Philip Griffin 
wrote in an article after the conclusion of the Italian Campaign, “Fire and 
movement was difficult as squadrons oft [sic] times moved…through sunken 
roads and cross traffic creeks.”34 Lieutenant Perkins, commander of the 
Strathcona’s reconnaissance squadron that led Griffin Force, agreed. In his 
‘Account of Action,’ he reported that one of his tanks got lost in the difficult 
country en route to the Melfa. Moreover, the crossing of the Melfa was, “a 
sort of ledge leading down into the river bed. This was very steep and dif-
ficult but still passable to tanks.”35 To top it all off, heavy rain had reduced 
roads to mud. Engineers would have to play a prominent role overcoming 
obstacles, while direct infantry support lessened the vulnerability of tanks 
as they traversed this difficult terrain. These elements would help armoured 
units maintain as rapid a pace as possible while clearing the strong German 
resistance.36 These considerations led Hoffmeister and Vokes to conclude that 
task forces would provide the necessary strength and combination of arms 
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to reach and establish firm bases on their objectives. The Adams, Vokes and 
Griffin forces were created. 
Initially, the pre-battle joint training paid off, as was particularly ap-
parent in the effectiveness of the command structure, the “marrying-up” of 
tanks and infantry for deployment, and capable communication coordina-
tion. Training had focused on creating understanding and trust—a team 
approach—between all units. Therefore, the tank commanders in charge 
of each task force were able quickly and effectively to coordinate plans to 
integrate. On 21 May, the commanding officer of the 11th Canadian Infantry 
Brigade’s Irish Regiment of Canada (infantry), Lieutenant-Colonel R.C. 
Clarke, attended a conference where he was informed that his regiment was 
now under 5th Canadian Armoured Brigade, and was to be “ready to oper-
ate in an armoured role.”37 The next day, the regiment was informed that it 
was to be part of Vokes Force, and on the 23rd the regiment moved to the 
forming up area, awaiting the next day’s attack. To ensure that his infantry 
regiments could keep pace with their tank counter-parts, Hoffmeister had 
stripped the Bren gun carriers from every unit in his division. He was able to 
gather enough to carry two companies of the Irish Regiment. The rest of the 
Irish were to ride on the back decks of the reserve tanks.38 Clarke and Vokes 
of the British Columbia Dragoons spent the night in the conference, and the 
attack went in the next morning.39 
The Irish and British Columbia Dragoons had less than twenty-four 
hours to prepare; their thorough training paid big dividends. By 0800 hours, 
24 May, the wireless sets were netted, and the units formed at the start line. 
The assault went in with B Squadron on the left, C Squadron on the right, and 
A Squadron in the rear. The Irish rode on the tanks or in the carrier vehicles 
alongside. As the Irish’s war diary romanticises, “they swept away all resist-
ance before them with hearty and eager determination.”40 Delaney concludes 
that, “The Dragoon/Irish battle group might not have possessed the full hit-
ting power of a brigade, but, in the short term, the task force could move 
and shoot without outside help.”41 Effective training and command structure 
ensured that the marrying-up of tanks and infantry occurred quickly and 
effectively.
The story was very similar for the two other task forces. On 17 May, the 
Strathcona commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Philip Griffin, held a conference 
in Regimental headquarters to discuss the operation of a regimental group; 
representatives of A Company of the Westminster regiment attended. The 
discussion included (1) the axis of advance; (2) the advance in close country; 
(3) the advance in open country; and (4) crossing an obstacle.42 On the mor-
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ning of 21 May, Griffin attended an Orders Group in Brigade headquarters, 
where he was given numbered air photographs of his objective, and assured 
of air and artillery support during his advance. Griffin then passed informa-
tion to all units under his command, including the Westminsters.43 He next 
proceeded to make some important changes necessary to effectively inte-
grate command, communication and control. The Strathcona reconnaissance 
squadron, led by Lieutenant Perkins, was reduced to five tanks when six of 
his Stuart or ‘Honey’ tanks were given to the engineers.44 Griffin organized 
the first regimental net used by the Strathcona’s headquarters; all wireless 
sets were tuned to the same wavelength so that everyone could hear every-
thing that was transmitted. Normally the Strathconas operated on a different 
wavelength for each squadron, so that they could quickly train and include 
new units.45 While the Strathconas had never employed the communication 
technique in battle before, integrated training gave Griffin the knowledge 
and competence to coordinate communications before the task force ‘jumped 
off’. At 11:32 on the morning of 24 May 1944, orders were received to move 
immediately. According to Griffin: 
The formation adopted was one squadron up, [reconnaissance 
troop] leading, followed by “A” Squadron in diamond forma-
tion. RHQ [Regiment Headquarters] and “A” Coy [Company] 
Westminsters travelled in white scout cars, following; two 
squadrons flanking rear “B” right “C” left each covered by a car-
rier platoon from the [Westminsters]. Behind the tanks followed 
the [Self-Propelled Anti-Tank Battery], the [Self-Propelled Field 
Battery], and the Jeep .75 mm [Battery].46 
The first time Lieutenant-Colonel Danby of the Carleton and Yorks 
liaised with Lieutenant-Colonel Adams of the Princess Louise Dragoon 
Guards was on the morning of 24 May. Adams issued Danby instructions, 
and coordinated marrying-up. The Carleton and Yorks were picked up by 
troop carriers and transported to the staging area aside the Liri River near 
Pontecorvo. The assault began the same day. The D and C companies first 
moved in carriers, followed by headquarters and support units.47 
In all three cases, the task force command structure was able exped-
itiously to carry-out marrying-up as had been rehearsed in the months 
before. This was a testament to the fluid bottom-up/top-down instituted 
learning system in place in the Canadian Corps, as well as the adaptive 
command structure focused on battalion headquarters. All task forces began 
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their engagements effectively integrated under one battalion headquarters. 
However, when the ‘fog of war’ descended, the task forces were faced with a 
situation that previous experience and training had not fully prepared them 
for: what would happen to the integration of the task force when infantry 
were pinned down and could no longer lead the attack? Previous task forces 
had not faced such determined resistance. Two generalizations can be made 
about the experiences of each of Hoffmeister’s three task forces on 25 May. 
First, tanks continued forward without infantry support thereby making 
themselves vulnerable; second, communications broke down and the infan-
try and tanks failed to provide mutual support until they had each reached 
their objective. 
According to Lieutenant-Colonel Landell of the Princess Louise Dragoon 
Guards, the chaos of the German retreat presented difficult conditions that 
were not to be underestimated. He later wrote of the chaos behind the Hitler 
Line: 
No one knows anything for certain and it is the unexpected which 
generally happens…. Infantrymen form up for the attack and 
discover that the objective is held by their own troops. Medical 
orderlies, on their way to the rear with wounded, pass through 
strongly held enemy positions and wave greetings, thinking that 
they are in their own reserve areas. Men are captured and in 
ten minutes accept the surrender of their captors. And above all 
fear, exhaustion, and lack of information rises over an insistent 
demand for speed, speed and more speed – deep into the rear of 
the enemy, to strike at his supplies, spread confusion wider and 
wider, turn his retreat into a rout and prevent him from forming 
another line.48 
The Germans had shown over and over that simply breaking through their 
lines would not break their spirit. Commanders needed to break their will to 
fight with speed and overwhelming force; task forces were the answer in an 
Allied attempt at operational kesselschlacht.
In practice, the ambitions for task forces collided with practical difficul-
ties. Shortly after Adams Force began advancing, bottlenecks forced the two 
leading Carleton and York companies to “revert to the familiar foot-slogging 
method of advancing” and did not advance with the tanks.49 Meeting light 
resistance, both the tanks and infantry took time to round up German pris-
oners. The Carleton and Yorks arrived in a little gully two miles short of the 
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Melfa at about the same time as the lead squadron of the Royal Canadian 
Dragoons.
Communications between the tanks and infantry had broken down 
when the infantry dismounted from their carriers and the two units lost 
contact. Maintaining effective communications was the foundation upon 
which task force success was built. In the end, thanks in part to the unified 
command structure and integrated communications, Adams force met up 
at the river and coordinated a set-piece attack over the Melfa on 25 May. As 
was consistent with training doctrine, the tanks gave direct supporting fire 
from the near bank of the Melfa, while the infantry crossed the river and 
established a bridgehead. The tanks then followed the infantry across. They 
consolidated the bridgehead and waited for the next phase of the assault to 
leap-frog their position.50 The advantage of the task force command struc-
ture was that when the units of Adams Force assembled on the bank of the 
Melfa, Adams was able to re-coordinate and launch an effective attack. He 
was only successful, however, when the infantry were able to lead the tanks. 
Because the reverse was well-known to be a dangerous formation, training 
time had been spent making infantry-led attacks work. Contingencies for 
separation and tank-led attacks had not been established, and Adams Force 
paid the price. 
A similar pattern of events happened with the Vokes Force. Traversing 
a maze of groves and small pockets of cultivated fields in a thick morning 
fog, Vokes Force got lost. This was not the problem, however, as task forces 
were designed to be able to react and overcome any battlefield contingency. 
The difficulty was that the tanks and infantry lost contact. Sergeant William 
Kurbis was in A Squadron’s Number One troop, which was in reserve behind 
the lead squadrons. He saw the Irish on the back of one of the tanks in front 
of him jump off. Initially believing that they had been knocked off by a tree 
branch, Kurbis stood higher up in his turret to coordinate with the men on 
the ground. Sniper bullets quickly educated him about why the infantry had 
dismounted. The infantry scattered into the woods to clear out the Germans. 
The tanks kept advancing. The tanks and infantry fought separate battles to 
Mancini Farm.51 
This was the very situation that task forces feared, and training had 
striven to avoid. Infantry and tanks were separated and lost, unable to give 
each other the protection needed while trying to re-locate their line of ad-
vance and reach their objectives. Experience had taught them that infantry 
were crucial in protecting tanks, as they had the ability to deal with both 
mines and anti-tank guns. When B Squadron’s Number Four troop turned 
Making canadian arMour operationally effective in italy
120
a corner looking for a ground feature to get the squadron their bearings, 
they encountered a Panther Tank. The Panther swung its gun toward Troop 
Commander Lieutenant Nigel Taylor’s tank. Trooper Cecil D. Shears blasted 
two armour piercing shells into the side of the Panther, disabling it. However, 
two antitank guns flanking the Panther opened up on Taylor’s tank, tearing 
off his cupola.52 Number Four troop was able to destroy both guns. If the 
infantry had been leading they could have, as training tactics stipulated, out-
flanked and knocked out the anti-tank gun while the Sherman despatched 
the Panther. 
Moreover, because of the separation, the tanks reached the objective 
ahead of the infantry and ran into heavy resistance, but after a short fire-
fight the reconnaissance units managed to consolidate Mancini Farm. The 
first units that arrived to support them were the Dragoons, followed by 
self-propelled guns. The Irish, however, did not arrive until hours later. This 
meant the tank and artillery units had to consolidate the objective as best 
they could without an infantry screen. Some of the reconnaissance units had 
to dismount and form a defensive perimeter around the tanks. The Vokes 
Force took its objectives, but experienced the same problems as the Adams 
Force. The Vokes Force lost speed as communication, integration and tac-
tical procedures broke down once the attack was underway, demonstrating 
that infantry-tank coordination was still in a period of transition. While 
some confusion was expected, without an established contingency plan the 
integration of the Vokes Force disintegrated beyond restoration. Unlike the 
Adams Force, the infantry and tanks of the Vokes Force were unable to re-
integrate and the Griffin Force had already passed through Mancini Farm 
when the Irish Regiment arrived at the objective. 
By 1500 hours 24 May, the Griffin Force’s reconnaissance units, led by 
Lieutenant Perkins, had reached their crossing on the Melfa, which was a 
small, secondary route at the junction point of two German corps’.53 The 
Germans were caught looking, and Perkins was able to get his tanks across 
the river without any determined resistance. However the Germans quickly 
realized where the brunt of the Canadian attack was directed, and began a 
concerted armoured counter-attack against the position. 
The task force was theoretically prepared for this contingency. Working 
together, tanks and infantry ought to have strengthened Perkins’ tenuous 
bridgehead, and repelled the German counter-attack. Again, however, the 
inability of tanks and infantry to remain coordinated throughout the cam-
paign proved problematic. The Westminsters were travelling in White scout 
cars alongside the Strathconas. The force encountered unrehearsed difficul-
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ties in terrain that slowed down the progress of the infantry cars but not the 
tanks. Engineers were on hand to assist the infantry but progress was far 
slower than planned. The Strathconas advanced on alone. The A Squadron 
reached the bank of the Melfa but was unable to cross and support Perkins 
when it became engaged in a fierce firefight with enemy Panthers located on 
the opposite bank.54 For a while, two separate battles were fought: Perkins’ 
unit was engaged with tanks and infantry on the far bank, and A squadron 
was engaged with Panthers on the opposite bank. 
Perkins immediately called for infantry backup, and was finally re-
in forced with the arrival of A Company of the Westminsters. Major J. 
Mahoney, commander of the Westminsters, had dismounted the company 
and raced for the Melfa. Engaged in their own battle, the Strathconas 
were unable to provide direct fire support to the infantry, who, only one 
company strong, were equally unable to silence the German tanks and 
infantry on the far river bank. The task force was able to hold the bridge-
head largely thanks to the individual effort of Mahoney. Later awarded a 
Victoria Cross for his unshakeable resolve, Mahoney ran between recon-
naissance, infantry and Strathcona units on both sides of the river trying 
to get the effort organized. Perkins and Mahoney were able to coordinate 
an attack with fire support from the tanks’ hull down position in order to 
clear a house being used as a German stronghold. 55 Moreover, by firing 
all their weapons at once from behind the bank of the River, they were 
able to deceive a German counter-attack into believing that the bridgehead 
was held by a larger force. They remained dug-in until the next morning, 
when 11th Canadian Infantry Brigade passed through their position to 
continue the attack. While the determination of Griffin Force at the Melfa 
was able to salvage a victory out of the German counter-attack, the job may 
have been easier had all units of the Westminsters dismounted and quick 
marched forward to the bridgehead. Instead, most of the motor company 
slowly felt “its way forward over difficult country going in the face of artil-
lery and small arms fire.”56 
In the aftermath of the campaign, corps, division and support unit com-
manders agreed that the pursuit phase of the operation had been far too slow. 
The main causes: “a lack of appreciation of the enemy and the plight he was 
in, and a lack of [training] and planning for pursuit.”57 The task forces, par-
ticularly the Vokes and Griffin Forces, conducted by the armoured brigade, 
were the focus of much disappointment. The battalion groups were stretched 
too thin to effectively maintain ‘tank speed’ onto the objective. Lessons were 
learned that suggested task forces were the improper formation for future 
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break-out battles. First, it was felt by all commanders that more infantry sup-
port was needed. While Hoffmeister had moved an infantry battalion under 
the command of 5th Armoured Brigade, he concluded that the infantry had 
not been used to its fullest potential. “[Commanders] should therefore, avoid 
if possible allowing this extra [infantry battalion] from becoming closely 
involved in the battle. It can well be left under [command of] the [infantry] in 
[support] of the armour.”58 The armoured brigade needed extra infantry to 
rush forward to target areas when they developed. Artillery heard a similar 
critique. The division had handed over too many field regiments to the brig-
ade, which then further decentralized them. A more efficient coordination 
was to rest the support of only one field regiment with the armoured brigade 
headquarters.59 In sum, it was decided that while small-unit infantry and 
tank coordination was necessary, more control had to be maintained by the 
brigade headquarters such that forces could be concentrated on key areas to 
maintain the speed of the attack. 
Following standard procedure, after battle lessons were gleaned from the 
operations, and I Canadian Corps issued “Training Instruction Number Four 
The Pursuit”. Some of the tactical problems incurred by Griffin Force were 
to be avoided by having the infantry “go forward without [their] [vehicles]” 
in situations where “demolitions hold up [vehicles] of infantry and infantry 
support arms”.60 Thereafter, 5th Canadian Armoured Division’s training fo-
cused on fixing some of the tactical problems encountered in the Liri Valley. 
For example, in August the division conducted “Exercise Canyon”, during 
which wireless silence was kept, forcing infantry and tanks to rehearse using 
visual signals.61 This would ensure that when the infantry were pinned 
down a degree of cooperation would be maintained. 
The most important lesson from the Liri Valley campaign was that in 
the face of stiff German resistance, task forces did not have the strength or 
coordination to move with adequate speed. The ability to learn this lesson 
demonstrates the maturity of the institutionalized learning structure prac-
ticed by the Canadian Corps. In the attack on the Gothic Line in October 
1944, 5th Canadian Armoured Division was again to lead the breakthrough 
towards Rimini. Hoffmeister re-grouped his forces, for example, so that the 
Princess Louise Dragoon Guards reconnaissance regiment could lead the 
11th Canadian Infantry Brigade attack, and 5th Canadian Artillery Regiment 
had a battery of towed anti-tank guns.62 Within his formations, brigade head-
quarters maintained control. Infantry and tanks “married up” but remained 
under the command of their own battalions, who were responsible to brigade 
headquarters. The lessons had been learned from the Liri. 
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The Liri Valley campaign was the high point of I Canadian Corps’ 
learning curve vis-à-vis task forces. Prior to the battle, 1st Canadian Infantry 
Division and 5th Canadian Armoured Division worked hard to implement 
and rehearse the lessons learned in previous campaigns, particularly re-
garding communications, marrying-up and attack formations. For the pur-
suit phase, Vokes and Hoffmeister organized combined-operations under 
the adaptive task force command structure. Three things were apparent after 
the campaign, however. First, infantry and tank tactics were still in a state of 
transition, as they were unable to remain integrated when the infantry were 
pinned down and communications were lost. Secondly, German defences, 
more-so than terrain and frontage, should dictate whether or not to employ 
task forces. Thirdly, that task forces left brigade headquarters unable to pin-
point trouble areas as they arose to maintain the speed of the attack. The 
concept of task forces was then shelved, and in the Canadians’ next major 
assault against the Gothic Line, task forces were not employed. The ability 
to recognize the limitations of an attack formation and re-think the pursuit 
phase represented a well-developed commitment to learning and applying 
the lessons of war. Task forces were adept at chasing German ‘fighting re-
treats’, but unsatisfactory in the larger aim of excelling through the Germans’ 
rear and breaking their will to fight after a strong defensive line had been 
broken.
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Weighty and Hefty Responsibilities: 
Junior Canadian Army Officers, 
Leadership and the Second World War
Craig Leslie Mantle
In the British tradition the only occasion upon which a junior officer may 
release himself from the obligation of thinking of his men and his task is 
when he is on leave.1
It is always necessary to prove your worth to hold the King’s Commission, 
to be willingly accepted by men as worthy to be their leader.2
Irrespective of whether leaders are ultimately born or made, Canada’s army prior to and during the Second World War employed various means – official publications, formal lectures, professional journals, 
special addresses – to instruct junior officers on that most essential of all 
military requirements, leadership, or in the parlance of the day, man man-
agement. Holders of the King’s commission were expected to gain the full 
confidence and absolute respect of the men under their command such that 
all would perform effectively and efficiently, whether in battle or not. The 
army assumed that if followers believed in and possessed esteem for their 
leaders, the former would more willingly obey so as not to disappoint the lat-
ter who had done, were doing, and would come to do, so much for them. The 
“trick” for officers, therefore, was to secure their men’s faith in their position 
as their legitimate and rightful leader. This chapter discusses how that was 
accomplished.
Whether in Canada, England or an active theatre of operations, the 
Canadian Army expected junior officers to acquire the cheerful, willing 
obedience of their subordinates by: a) adopting a “style” of leadership that 
can best be described as paternalistic, wherein the varied interests of their 
men were put before all else; b) demonstrating competence appropriate to 
their rank and trade; and c) conducting themselves according to the high-
est moral principles. Officers’ responsibilities did not end there however, 
being enjoined as they were to train their subordinates and keep them in 
both good discipline and high spirits.3 Taken together, all of this was “…the 
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classic technique of ‘man management’ as taught to officers, the approved 
method of securing the ‘willing compliance’ necessary to make soldiers risk 
their lives….”4
Limitations and Purpose
Much can be learned through a brief survey of the literature as it pertains 
to the “type” of junior officer the Canadian Army desired.5 The majority of 
the material consulted for the purposes of this work was written for those 
officers that occupied the lower end of the spectrum, that is to say, cadets 
and lieutenants, who, theoretically, had the most to learn about leadership. 
As a consequence, the focus of this chapter ultimately rests on junior officers 
exclusively, with the treatment of more highly-ranked officers and issues of 
“higher command” having to wait for a separate venue. As well, little men-
tion is made herein of the manner in which the army actually produced 
paternalistic, technically competent and virtuous officers; training is not the 
focus per se. The present discussion deals primarily with the ends of leader-
ship instruction (the principles by which the ideal officer was to live, the 
ultimate goal) rather than the means (the process by which the ideal officer 
was gradually developed - the how).
Without doubt, an investigation of the processes by which reciprocal 
relationships – an enthusiastic obedience in return for competent leadership 
– could initially be cultivated and then sustained over time lays bare some of 
the assumptions held by the army as concerns officer-man relations and the 
dynamics by which inter-personal affairs could be actuated.6 Assessing the 
type of leadership the Canadian Army desired of its junior officers in both 
the post-First World War and Second World War eras, moreover, provides 
partial insight into Canada’s military culture of the early- to mid-20th cen-
tury. As well, analyzing the content of various materials relating to leader-
ship, whatever their individual form, contributes to an understanding of how 
the army viewed its junior officers in terms of their overall responsibilities, 
but especially their obligations towards those over whom they exercised 
command. And finally, such an approach facilitates the establishment of a 
standard baseline as concerns inter-rank relationships, or in other words, the 
elucidation of the ideal or archetype to which all were encouraged to aspire.
Means of Instruction
Throughout the interwar and wartime periods, young Canadian officers (or 
cadets soon to be) were exposed to a variety of publications that expressed 
individual opinion on matters of leadership. Whether authors wrote in an 
129
craig leslie mantle
official or unofficial capacity, aspiring leaders witnessed a remarkably con-
sistent set of ideas concerning the best means to interact with subordinates; 
particular details may have differed, but general concepts remained largely 
the same. Interestingly, not all material was of Canadian origin either. To 
populate its professional military journals, such as the Canadian Defence 
Quarterly (CDQ) published between 1923 and 1939, and the Canadian Army 
Training Memorandum (CATM) issued monthly between 1941 and 1947, Canada 
borrowed heavily from the United Kingdom and its imperial possessions, 
the United States, and even Germany.7 Journals from which material specific 
to leadership was taken included, amongst a handful of others, Defence (UK), 
Field Artillery Journal (US), Infantry Journal (US), Journal of the Royal Artillery 
(UK), Military Review (US), and various Army Training Memoranda from both 
Australia and India. Regardless of provenance, material gleaned from other 
publications and reprinted in either CDQ or CATM had the potential to influ-
ence readers simply through its presence. While the direct impact of CDQ on 
leadership during the Second World War was probably minimal owing to its 
supersession by other more focused and widely available publications – pre-
war officers would have benefitted to a degree, but probably not those joining 
after hostilities had commenced – the CATM was in a much greater position 
to effect good leadership given its frequency of publication, easily accessible 
content and broad distribution. The CATM fulfilled a seminal role.
Canada’s army at the outbreak of war was by any measure tiny, the 
victim of continual budgetary reductions in the immediate post-First World 
War era and throughout the Depression that followed. Government apathy 
during the 1920s and 1930s, compounded by a war-weary and disinterested 
public, all but ensured that the army was under-funded, under-equipped, 
under-trained and under-manned upon the declaration of war in September 
1939. Canada’s contribution, originally pegged at but a single division, had 
by 1942 grown to an entire army (First) comprised of two corps (I and II) and 
all the support that that entailed. When the war was over, the army’s “total 
intake” numbered more than 730,000 persons;8 enlistments in the Canadian 
military in toto (navy, army and air force) numbered an impressive one mil-
lion from a population only eleven times that size.9 Perhaps the most import-
ant statistic, at least for present purposes, some 42,613 commissions had been 
granted to aspiring leaders between 1939 and 1946.10
With so many new officers, the CATM (and allied publications) provided 
one avenue through which a quick introduction to leadership could be ob-
tained. Being required reading for every holder of the King’s commission – 
“Every officer in the Canadian Army in Canada should receive a copy”11 – this 
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monthly tract offered short and pithy articles that introduced officers to the 
expectations of proper and acceptable conduct as concerned their interactions 
with subordinates. In essence, successive numbers of the CATM endeavoured 
to highlight the more salient aspects of officer-man relations and to give offi-
cers a solid grounding in how to elicit the best from their men. That being said, 
the CATM was also the Canadian Army’s professional journal of the day and 
did not limit itself solely to discussions of leadership, although articles dealing 
with man management were indeed a frequent occurrence. Commentaries 
on techniques of instruction and enemy weapons, for instance, gave further 
practical advice to young officers attempting to master every angle of their 
new profession, while contemporary operational narratives from campaigns 
throughout the world kept the fare interesting and varied.
If these two Canadian journals – CDQ and CATM – impacted Canadian 
officers, so too did British publications that dealt with leadership in one way 
or another. Since Canada generally followed Great Britain’s lead in mat-
ters military, War Office documents frequently appeared under separate 
Canadian cover. In some instances, in the interest of economy and efficiency 
no doubt, Canadian authorities simply re-issued a British publication, the 
only modification being a short notice affixed to the inside cover that pointed 
readers to the most relevant and pertinent sections. One pamphlet in particu-
lar “has been approved for use in the British Army but much of it is applic-
able to the Canadian Army.”12 
As an aside, some of the various Canadian and British publications 
directed towards officers in the hopes of making them better leaders at times 
appear (at least from a modern Canadian perspective of some 70 years on) 
somewhat presumptuous, even condescending. No doubt ghost-written by 
officers, perhaps very well placed and educated officers, many pamphlets 
spoke for and from the perspective of the common soldier, stating for instance 
what he does and does not like, how he will act when faced with a particular 
situation, what his beliefs are, how profoundly his emotions vary, what are 
his preferences in terms of drink, and so forth. The “soldier” as portrayed 
in many training documents comes across as a touch simple, somewhat 
naïve and just waiting for leadership (exercised by an 18-, 19- or 20-year old 
no less!), or in other words, as a foregone conclusion. When talking to their 
soldiers, for instance, officers were cautioned to “Speak shortly and to the 
point. Use plain words of one or two syllables. … Avoid eloquence as a rule.” 
At other times, they were to “Write letters for the men, as their education 
rarely fits them to conduct official correspondence.”13 The consistency of 
human nature undoubtedly ensured that some pieces of advice were sound 
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and broadly applicable – who wouldn’t like a hot meal, a warm bath and a 
comfortable bed at the end of a hard day’s work? – yet some pamphlets con-
veyed the impression that officers would only have to lead simple-minded 
soldiers possessed of a few basic needs. If those needs were met, so the argu-
ment ran, leaders would find themselves in command of loyal, dedicated, 
respectful and highly obedient followers. In a rapidly expanding army, such 
an approach was perhaps inevitable, in which the soldier was reduced to 
the lowest common denominator and proffered advice was non-descript and 
simple. The need to train officers quickly apparently necessitated that advice 
be generic and not overly complex; an officer would have to deal with those 
soldiers on an individual basis who did not fit the mould conveyed through 
his training materials.
Within the CATM in particular, and other training documents more 
generally, the assumption that officers could be made and that leadership 
could be taught was indeed omnipresent. New officers had much to learn; 
limited training days passed all too quickly and were filled with a variety of 
diverse subjects. Leadership or man management, important as it was, could 
only receive a fixed amount of attention. Officers were therefore required, in-
deed expected, to study independently,14 and a host of publications appeared 
throughout the war to facilitate their learning. 
An examination of training syllabi nicely illustrates the demands 
placed upon nascent officers. At the Brockville Officer Training Centre, for 
instance, Lieutenant-Colonel R.G. Whitelaw, a Permanent Force officer from 
The Royal Canadian Regiment who had served on the pre-war General Staff, 
kept his students busy: traditional military pursuits were important, with 
drill, marching and map reading each taking up 20 out of over 200 training 
periods; field engineering consumed 15; organization and administration, 
mechanical transport (cadets learned how to ride a motorcycle and drive a 
Bren gun carrier), gas protection, and rifle drill each accounted for 12; and 
bayonet fighting occupied another eight. In contrast, just four training per-
iods in 1941 were devoted to the twin topics of leadership and morale, one 
of which dealt with the “Customs of the Service and Mess Conduct,” while 
another focussed on the “Duties of a Platoon or Equivalent Commander in 
Barracks & Camp.”15 Officers who passed through Brockville no doubt re-
called little from these two instructional periods as they led their soldiers in 
battle against an aggressive, determined and mechanized enemy.
Such a wide variation in emphasis at an establishment designed to turn 
civilians into competent wartime leaders not surprisingly aroused partici-
pant comment. George Blackburn, for instance, later recounted that his days 
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at Brockville were concerned too much with drill and too little with leader-
ship.16 Wilfred Smith, on the other hand, held an entirely different opinion, 
offering that the heavy focus on the technical as opposed to the personal 
served a distinct and beneficial purpose:
…this knowledge and ability in infantry skills were particularly 
important in the Canadian Army, where egalitarian principles 
were so firmly entrenched that officers received little automatic 
respect by virtue of their rank alone. Respect was accorded when 
officers were considered to deserve it on the basis of knowledge, 
performance, and leadership.17
In the eyes of this officer at least, technical competence was just as important 
as the ability to foster sound interpersonal relations. Few men would follow 
a leader, no matter how friendly and personable, who could not fire his pistol, 
read his map or deploy his soldiers properly.
To further instruct on the topic of leadership, the spoken word frequently 
supplemented the written. On special occasions where large numbers of 
impressionable young officers were present, both civilian and military 
dignitaries frequently offered their opinion on how best leadership could 
be effected. Whether the minister of national defence, the commandant of 
a training school (like Whitelaw above) or a distinguished soldier sporting 
rows of ribbons, various speakers all made an effort to imbue their listeners 
with a sense of the profound, namely that they would soon be in a position of 
great responsibility in which only competent leadership would truly suffice. 
The comments of each individual varied of course, as did their quality and 
brevity, but each address, in its own way, strove to motivate and to reinforce 
the concepts to which the young listeners had already been, or would soon 
be, exposed. Although doubtless of the same value as publications given 
their infrequency and transient nature, special addresses not only bolstered 
the importance of certain leadership concepts, but also made more than 
clear what senior officers expected of subordinates. Upon taking command 
at Brockville in June 1942, for example, Milton Fowler Gregg, V.C., of First 
World War fame, addressed a new class of cadets. His comments were such 
that one observer favourably remarked:
Quietly, without rant or histrionics, [Gregg] brought home to 
the men their responsibility and duty; that which they owe their 
country, their superior, the men they would lead and, above all, 
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their responsibility to democracy and civilization. His talk was 
stirring, a dare and a challenge. A challenge that all men pass-
ing through Brockville must accept. The junior leaders of the 
Canadian Army owe an incalculable debt to Colonel Gregg, not 
only for his conscious fine work but for the type of leadership 
which he exemplifies on which so many unconsciously model 
themselves.18
Canadian officers were therefore inundated from various quarters with 
advice and suggestions concerning leadership, truly a wealth of information 
from which lessons could be absorbed and potentially employed.19 All in 
all, the various publications and addresses to which aspiring officers were 
exposed contended that leadership was very much a function of human 
relations … obviously and naturally! Each in their own way, however, such 
discussions offered insight into the fundamentals of this relationship and 
suggested means by which its dynamics could be influenced. The material 
presented in lectures and published articles took a number of different forms. 
By and large, the majority of discussions proffered advice and suggestions, 
generally instructing young officers as to what actions they should take, and 
by extension, what actions they should avoid. Much of this dialogue offered 
a “checklist” of sorts that would ensure success, so it was assumed, if aggres-
sively pursued.20 Officers were expected to possess very specific qualities – 
magnanimity, gregariousness, a sense of honour, justice and fair play – and 
the instructions that they received would help bring these qualities to the 
fore. Second, discourses on leadership also informed officers in no uncertain 
terms what their men expected of them. Knowing what subordinates desired 
of superiors encouraged the latter to interact with the former in a very delib-
erate and particular manner so as to meet these sundry requirements.21 And 
finally, some material attempted to explain the psychology of the soldier. By 
understanding soldiers’ motivations and their anticipated behaviour, officers 
could theoretically impose themselves on these thought processes to great-
est effect. Appreciating how subordinates thought, again so the assumption 
ran, would make it easier for a leader to influence and encourage certain 
behaviours.22 Whether deliberate or not, these three “types” of material, that 
provided advice, explained expectations and explored psychology, allowed 
officers to see the complex issue of leadership from multiple angles and dif-
ferent perspectives, all of which would hopefully aid in their understanding.
So what specifically did the Canadian Army encourage in regards to 
leadership in order to cultivate and maintain strong officer-man relations? 
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What type of officer was desired? How were officers expected to interact 
with their men? It is not intended here to simply list every action that an 
officer could take to gain the confidence and respect, and thus the willing 
compliance, of his soldiers, as the resulting list could theoretically have no 
end and would ultimately serve very little purpose; the same can also be said 
of subordinates’ expectations of superiors. Individual pamphlets and special 
addresses serve those purposes all too well. Rather, the main themes of the 
literature will be identified and briefly discussed in order to understand in 
broad terms what the Canadian Army viewed as the pre-requisites for good, 
effective leadership. Better it is not to give undue importance to details while 
overlooking essentials. Whatever their individual nature, particular actions 
ultimately flowed from these general principles, and so it is of greater utility 
to place more emphasis on the latter than the former. As will be seen, the 
type of officer that the army desired was one that: a) cared for his men in 
every respect; b) was competent in the execution of his duties; and c) upheld 
a high moral standard. If such was achieved, he, and the army in turn, would 
be well on their way to success. 
Paternalism in Theory
In essence, both prior to and throughout the Second World War, the 
Canadian Army encouraged leaders to adopt a paternalistic attitude toward 
subordinates in the hopes of ultimately enmeshing all in a close, sympathetic 
relationship. The concept of paternalism was certainly not unknown, for as 
other historians such as Gary Sheffield, Helen McCartney, David Englander, 
Richard Holmes and John Baynes have all illustrated, it mediated officer-man 
relationships during the Great War.23 In a corpus of work dealing with the 
manner in which subordinate and superior interacted with one another, 
these authors have discussed the paternalistic exchange in the context of the 
British Expeditionary Force between 1914 and 1919, taking into account in the 
process such complicating factors as class, type of unit (Regular, Territorial 
or New Army) and pre-war social influences, amongst others. Quite sim-
ply, and very briefly, the non-commissioned offered loyalty and deference 
to the commissioned in return for competent leadership, both behind the 
lines and especially in battle, and a high degree of care, wherein superiors 
looked out for the interests and welfare of subordinates. Noblesse oblige stood 
as paternalism’s credo in that privilege entailed responsibility. Benefitting 
from more comfortable and favourable conditions of service, those befitting 
a gentleman, officers were to play the role of father figure, gain an under-
standing of and sympathy with their men, show concern for their lives, and 
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see to their needs before their own, whatever they may be.24 If such was the 
case, if an officer was at the same time paternal and competent, his soldiers 
would theoretically follow him with more enthusiasm and vim than another 
officer who was less so on either account … or both. A paternalistic style of 
leadership was certainly in evidence in the British Army of the First World 
War and was probably present in the Canadian Expeditionary Force too; at 
present, the underdeveloped state of the literature on this point specifically 
prevents the drawing of any firm conclusions, however it seems likely, based 
on preliminary investigations, that such was indeed the case.25 If paternalism 
was present in Canada’s army of the Great War, as it most surely was in one 
form or another, then it should come as no surprise that such a style was in 
evidence during the Second World War also.
Paternalism in Practice
Such an approach, in which officers ensured that the basic physical and 
psychological needs of their men were met, was intended neither to be in-
dulgent, nor pampering. Actions along paternalistic lines were meant to en-
courage loyalty, trust, confidence and respect, all of which would hopefully 
translate into obedience at the crucial moment. Paternalism was very much 
intended to create the type of relationship, based on strong bonds of mutual 
affection, in which quick obedience was freely given in recognition of, and 
return for, good treatment. The army itself acknowledged during the Second 
World War that paternalism served a very utilitarian, even selfish, purpose, 
and did not aim to make subordinates happy just for happiness sake. “The 
main object of welfare,” so one pamphlet made explicitly clear, “is to keep 
the men as happy and contented as possible, so that they may be at all times 
fighting fit and fit to fight.”26 One CATM article further observed:
Besides the duty we owe in looking after them, it [paternalistic 
leadership] forms the basis of discipline. It ensures the ready re-
sponse for the extra bit of effort when required. If men remember 
the times you have gone out of your way to help them, and that 
you always put their interests before your own, you have made 
them your debtors and your appeal has more authority and force, 
as few men like not to repay debts of this kind.27
A junior officer was expected to fulfil a number of different responsibil-
ities toward his men – advocate, provider, defender, confidant, friend and 
aide. Fulfilling such roles entailed the sacrifice of an officer’s spare time in 
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the interest and service of his men.28 To reinforce this notion, one wartime 
publication noted:
The more you ask of your men in the way of effort and resistance, 
the more must you see to their comfort and welfare, and a good 
officer will ask a lot from his men, at the same time doing a lot 
for them. You cannot ask without giving, and you ought to give 
before asking.29
Seeing to their “comfort and welfare” encompassed a broad range of activ-
ities and was indeed unlimited. Anything that could be done was to be done. 
It included, but was not limited to, ensuring that leave was administered 
properly; that men ate wholesome meals with the rations on hand; that they 
received correspondence from and were able to write letters to their kinsfolk; 
that their private affairs were in order; that they had a chance to speak with 
their officer about any subjects of concern; that their health was maintained; 
that they participated in sports and games; that their sexual lives were not 
misguided; that they were entertained; that they had the chance to further 
their education; and that their religious beliefs were supported.30 Officers 
were therefore encouraged to often ask themselves, “‘What little thing more 
can I do for my men?’”31 In everything, and at all times, an officer was to be 
“for” his subordinates. In a very real sense, their troubles were his troubles. 
By seeing to their varied interests, he could foster the confidence and respect 
upon which the ideal officer-man relationship was based and ensure that 
his soldiers at all times remained focussed on the task at hand.32 It was for 
this reason that at Brockville George Blackburn and his fellow cadets “had it 
pounded into you by every instructor during officer’s training that the wel-
fare of the men always comes before your own.”33
 If a junior officer was to be successful in any of his sundry roles, he first 
had to know his subordinates on more than a superficial level. He simply 
could not do his job properly if he did not know each man whom he com-
manded. In addition to mere vital statistics, an officer was to be familiar 
with the personality, intelligence, family circumstances and abilities of all of 
his soldiers. Personal knowledge could be gained in any number of ways,34 
but participation in sports was universally advocated, so much so that even 
adjutants, the principal staff officers of individual units, were encouraged to 
partake in collective physical recreation.35 Only by knowing his subordin-
ates could a superior even begin to address their difficulties or act on their 
behalf.36
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 A number of dignitaries took hold of this particular theme, referring to 
it often during various addresses to which officer cadets were exposed (or in 
their opinion, no doubt, subjected!). Speaking to a class at Brockville in 1942, 
Lieutenant-General Ken Stuart, the Chief of the General Staff, remarked that 
studying and getting “to know each one of your men” was one of the real 
“delights of regimental soldiering.” Like any artful skill, however, it required 
constant and repetitious practice: “If you can strike the right note, you can get 
the results you wish from any individual. Your problem is to keep on playing 
your notes until you strike the right one.”37 Minister of National Defence J.L. 
Ralston offered similar counsel to graduates in the fall of 1942: “set yourself 
to learn immediately the names of the men, where they come from and a 
little something at least of their background, what they did before they came 
into the Army, what their fathers did, something about their families and 
something about their ambitions.” He commented further that learning their 
personal details “will make you more human. It will help you get the best out 
of them.” The minister continued, not incorrectly:
A man who has to keep aloof from his men to maintain his [pres-
tige] isn’t the kind of stuff to make a good Canadian officer. They 
[the soldiers] don’t want to be babied, but they have a right to 
expect your constant and vigilant interest in their welfare.38 
Such intimate knowledge better positioned an officer to assist his men when 
personal problems arose, thereby ensuring that they remained focussed on 
their immediate task, be it training or operations. A soldier simply could not 
concentrate on his military duties if he was constantly distracted by prob-
lems of a more personal nature.39
 By knowing his subordinates’ feelings, moreover, an officer was better 
able to maintain discipline. Understanding how each man felt in general al-
lowed issues of concern to be resolved early with ease rather than corrected 
later with difficulty.40 It is for this reason that “An officer must be always read-
ily accessible to his men, both for interviews and the hearing of complaints.”41 
Officers were required to create within their respective commands a condu-
cive environment, one that was both encouraging and facilitative, in which 
subordinates felt free to approach their superior: “The men must feel that they 
can come and talk to their officers naturally about their private difficulties, 
and must know that when they do so they will get sympathetic hearing.”42
 Furthermore, because some men needed gentle persuasion to perform, 
while others required forceful direction and others still required no prompt-
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ing at all, knowing what “technique” worked best with each individual, 
knowledge that could only be gained through prolonged and meaningful 
contact, allowed an officer when time and opportunity allowed to tailor his 
words and actions in order to connect with his subordinates in a manner 
that resonated with them best. Indeed, “The more one knows of the men’s 
characters, the easier will it be to handle them.”43 An officer could certainly 
begin the process of forging strong relationships by taking an active interest 
in his men and using that knowledge to greatest effect.
 To further the creation of affective bonds based on mutual loyalty and 
respect, junior officers were encouraged to allow their men an opportunity to 
come to know them as individuals too. Because remaining distant and aloof 
would not facilitate either the creation or continuance of strong relationships, 
“the officer must go out of his way to know the men personally and let them 
get to know him and see that he is not really such a bad fellow after all.”44 
Because of the powerful bonds that were created in the process of coming 
to know one another, men were more likely to follow an officer with whom 
they had developed a friendly, yet professional, rapport. Whether owing to 
tradition, human nature, a pervasive military culture or something else alto-
gether, men frequently viewed their officers with a healthy dose of suspicion 
and reserve, one publication going so far as to assert that some men are “ter-
ribly suspicious about the honesty of their officers.”45 The heavy emphasis on 
inter-rank contact was therefore intended to break down such psychological 
barriers, to show the former that the latter was really on their side and was 
not to be feared. As one article made clear:
You must have a cheerful, unhesitating obedience of all the men 
under your command. This can only be obtained by knowing 
your men and they knowing you. Appreciate the situation of 
each man under your command. Show them that you are 100% 
for them at all times and you will get 100% co-operation at all 
times from them.46
The foregoing was perhaps a little optimistic, but the underlying idea was 
more than sound.
 Acting on behalf of their soldiers had its limits however. Officers were 
cautioned that in this most essential of duties, “friendliness is not to be con-
fused with familiarity, which must always be an enemy of good discipline.”47 
A certain distance had to be maintained if appropriate respect was to exist be-
tween superior and subordinate. Practically speaking, too close a relationship 
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might possibly have impaired the imposition of discipline, since one’s friends 
would have been much harder to punish than one’s soldiers. Officer and man 
could be close acquaintances, but they certainly could not be close friends.
 In order to create and maintain strong relationships that could with-
stand the trials and difficulties of battle, the army also encouraged superiors 
to respect subordinates – their person, their intelligence, their sense of fair 
play. Meeting the sundry psychological needs of the non-commissioned 
could take many forms, but interwar and wartime publications, along with 
various speeches and addresses, frequently emphasized the need for officers 
to listen, to explain, and to be just. In the army’s opinion, “The soldier does 
not mind a severe code [of discipline] provided it is administered fairly and 
reasonably.”48 Members of McGill University’s Canadian Officers’ Training 
Corps were similarly instructed:
Officers, W.O.’s [Warrant Officers] and N.C.O.’s [Non-Com-
missioned Officers] will adopt towards subordinates such meth-
ods of command and treatment as will not only ensure respect 
for authority, but also foster the feelings of self-respect and 
personal honour essential to military efficiency. They will avoid 
intemperate language or an offensive manner.49
By treating soldiers as individuals and with a modicum of respect, rather 
than as mere automatons at the complete disposal of the army, as a resource 
as it were, officers could further encourage the loyalty and confidence so es-
sential to effective officer-man relations. All in positions of authority were 
frequently enjoined to “regard and treat ... subordinates with the courtesy 
and respect which is peculiarly due to every person who cannot defend him-
self against discourtesy and disrespect.”50
 With the full force of military law behind them, officers could theoretic-
ally expect their men to instantaneously obey their orders without question. 
Yet, the army realized (and so too did the best officers it would seem) that a 
more willing obedience would result if leaders took the time to explain to their 
followers the reasons behind particular courses of action, again if feasible. 
Although not obligated to do so, the benefits in performance that oftentimes 
resulted encouraged such an approach. As Lieutenant-General G.G. Simonds, 
General Officer Commanding II Canadian Corps, saw it, “If you explain to the 
Canadian soldier what is required of him and give him a good reason for it he 
will produce the goods every single time and do it twice as well as any other 
individual.”51 Again, perhaps a little optimistic, but the idea resonates. Letting 
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the men know how they fit into the overall plan was equally motivating. 
Simonds likewise believed that “Officers must keep their troops in the picture 
at all times. The Canadian soldier does not give his best when he is not in 
the picture.”52 Explanations along these lines also ensured that soldiers knew 
enough of the overall plan to improvise and to rely on their own individual 
initiative to achieve the objective if circumstances demanded.53
 Rather than treat soldiers as mere instruments of war, officers were en-
couraged to regard their men as members of a larger team, a team to which 
in reality they all belonged. As one lecturer instructed:
I don’t want you to go away, however, with the idea that the 
men must be treated like dogs – very far from it. You don’t 
want to curse or damn every time you notice things go wrong. 
Sometimes a word of encouragement, or a patient listening to an 
explanation, or a smile when pointing out the fault will go a long 
way. Remember that, though we are officers and the men are pri-
vates, still we are all comrades in the great dangers and the great 
struggle; make the men feel that you realize this comradeship 
and love it.54
Or in other words:
Ours is a force of men who have voluntarily offered themselves 
to serve their country in the cause of democracy, and it will do 
discipline no harm if officers and N.C.O.’s recognize that men of 
all ranks are fellow-workers in a common cause, to be treated with 
the respect which one man owes to another in a free country.55
 Like other leadership practices, respecting one’s subordinates could 
encompass a multitude of different actions. All in all, however, the army rec-
ognized that an officer who acknowledged his men’s intelligence, abilities, 
role, insights, and so on, could increase the strength of attachment between 
them. A relationship based on such respect, so the army contended, would 
be more robust than one in which it was lacking. A “know-it-all” leader who 
remained aloof, who treated his subordinates with contempt and who de-
manded implicit obedience would surely be less successful than his confrere 
who was the exact opposite in every possible respect.
 That paternalism was central to the officer-man relationship is beyond 
doubt. A young officer had to concern himself less with his own individ-
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ual approach to leadership, that is to say, what form his minute interactions 
with his men would ultimately take, and more with the fact that he was now 
obligated by virtue of his commission to look out for his subordinates on 
every account. One Canadian pamphlet that received wide distribution (and 
was apparently adopted by both British and American forces) asserted that 
a platoon commander “needs to feel, and must show, interest and concern 
in everything that affects the welfare and comfort of each man.” It continued, 
“The backbone of good morale remains discipline, but that discipline needs 
first to be self-discipline. The platoon officer must be able to count on himself 
to put all platoon values ahead of his own selfish interests.”56 An officer’s 
particular approach might change from day to day, and from circumstance 
to circumstance, but the ideal of paternalism remained inviolate and sacro-
sanct. The regimental historian of Toronto’s famed 48th Highlanders of 
Canada articulately expressed this notion a decade after war’s end, writing 
as he did:
It was not that the young subaltern had to decide whether a tough, 
a superior, a conciliatory or a first-name basis was best with the 
men: he had given some thought to that . . . and could adjust to 
that. The dismaying change was that everything about each of 
his men was now his business, whether he was on or off parade, 
doing fatigue or gone AWL [Absent Without Leave], drunk or 
sober, and not excluding the condition of his callouses, what to 
do about his own or his wife’s infidelities, and how much rent a 
soldier’s family should pay. The young officer had most to learn 
about the army way. He had to know the thinking of both the 
men and the N.C.Os., and also the attitude of those up above. Not 
the least thing he must learn was how to stand diplomatically if 
need be between his men and the top; when they were wrong 
he would nearly always take the blame. … In a time that was 
still afar, when officers and men shared the same hazards and 
hardships [i.e., battle], he would see why this intimate knowledge 
of his men was wise. It would help him know what to expect, or 
could demand from his men.57
Competence
Being “for” his subordinates, however manifested in practice, did not 
automatically fit an officer for the weighty responsibilities of command and 
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leadership, especially in battle. An incompetent paternal officer could be 
a dangerous liability just the same as a bungling martinet. While a pater-
nalistic and respectful disposition certainly aided in securing a cheerful 
obedience, such an approach was but one component of a much larger and 
more complex equation. If an officer was to be a leader in the truest and 
most accurate sense of the term, he had to know his job well. By demon-
strating proficiency in all matters commensurate with his rank and trade, 
whether administrative, supportive or tactical, an officer could likewise 
gain the confidence, respect and trust of his men. As one publication made 
clear, “You must know your job. If you do not you can have no confidence 
in yourself, and the men can, and will, have no confidence in you either.”58 
In a sense, competence was merely an extension of paternalism. If an of-
ficer was to care for his subordinates in every respect and attend to their 
interests, he had to be able to lead them effectively in battle (from the front, 
it might be added)59 and ensure that their lives were not needlessly wasted 
through incompetence or indifference. For non-combatant officers, on the 
other hand, a high level of personal competence would ensure that their 
men’s time and effort were not ill-placed. As such, the commissioned were 
constantly reminded:
Your men must instinctively look to you. To achieve this end, you 
must earn their respect, for your knowledge, for your assumption 
of responsibility, and for your decisiveness of action. If you know 
what you are doing, your self-confidence will inspire the confi-
dence and respect of your men and be mirrored in their actions.60
An officer who was competent and who displayed a genuine interest in his 
men – two hallmarks of effective junior leadership – was no doubt easy to 
follow.
Personal Conduct
The army also believed, however, that irreproachable personal conduct 
would further assist officers in gaining the respect, and thus the willing 
obedience, of their men.61 An immaculately turned-out and natty subaltern 
was supposed to serve the very same purpose, as one training document 
made clear: “To be extremely smart and alert should be the ambition of every 
CAC [Canadian Armoured Corps] officer.”62 Being the embodiment of the 
military ethos, officers were expected to set the example for all to emulate 
in order that the sundry components of that ethos – a distinct and proper 
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military bearing, aggressiveness, a corporate spirit, trustworthiness, and so 
on – might be transmitted to and absorbed by the soldiers whom they com-
manded. A superior could not (from a moral perspective at least) demand 
that his subordinates exemplify the military spirit when he himself was not 
a true and genuine exemplar of that spirit in turn. An officer was very much 
expected to lead through positive example. It was for this reason that Colonel 
G. Brock Chisholm observed:
Everything the platoon officer does or says is discussed. His be-
haviour on and off parade, in mess, out for the evening, on leave, 
is reported fully and critically. He is presenting a picture of a 
soldier to his men. If they can find any defects in his character 
they will do so, as an excuse for not giving up their own former 
points of view in favour of his [that is, for adopting the military 
perspective as their own]. The officer is being judged as worthy 
of acceptance or not, all the time, 24 hours a day. His behaviour 
and bearing are determining what kind of soldiers these men 
will be.63
Soldiers in the field held similar views as the erudite colonel. Officers 
were supposed to be paragons of virtue who were expected never to cross 
certain behavioural boundaries. Some “things,” as many found out to their 
eventual detriment, were simply “not done” and were definitely “not on.” 
Earning the respect of their soldiers was predicated on officers acting in such 
a manner as to indicate that they actually deserved their men’s respect; what-
ever its individual nature, improper conduct encouraged a certain level of 
disdain and made it that much harder for subordinates to willingly offer that 
respect upon which effective officer-man relations were ideally predicated. 
George Blackburn recalls that one officer…
whose stock-in-trade is dirty jokes, within days after the arrival 
at the Battery became an object of contempt for many in his troop. 
On making discreet inquiries, you were told it wasn’t that they 
were put off by the subject matter of the jokes, but rather that 
their officer would indulge in telling them. They simply expected 
a man whom they were obliged to salute, and whose orders they 
had to carry out without question, to be a cut above the average, 
with an advanced sense of decency and morality.64
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The Way Forward and Final Thoughts
As is undoubtedly clear, the above analysis of various publications and ad-
dresses that focus on leadership presents the ideal, the type of leader that the 
army hoped every junior officer would aspire to be and eventually become 
with time, study and practice. Not only was an officer to be highly competent 
in the execution of his specific duties and the embodiment of all that was 
virtuous, but he also was to be paternal towards his subordinates, acting 
almost as a surrogate father. But where does one go from here? As it turns 
out, the potential paths are many indeed.
With the establishment of the ideal, historians may subsequently opt to 
“measure,” to compare, individual officers against this standard, this very 
high standard, to determine if in fact the concepts expounded upon through 
diverse avenues were actually implemented and became more than just plain 
theory. All in all, some officers seem to have approached the archetype to a 
remarkable degree,65 yet others most certainly did not and fell far short on 
many counts.66 Why did some junior officers fail to approach this ideal? Were 
the reasons systemic, personal or environmental? Why, to the contrary, did 
others succeed?
Moreover, while the theoretical steps to proficient officership seem rela-
tively simple and straightforward, even logical at times, actually applying 
them was undoubtedly much more difficult, especially in situations where 
lives and the outcome of individual operations hung precariously in the 
balance. Much about the complexities and requirements of leadership could 
certainly be learned through training pamphlets, lectures and the odd ad-
dress, offering as they did, when taken together, considerable insight into 
one of the most challenging responsibilities that officers would ever have to 
assume. Such an introduction must have been enlightening, especially for 
those who never had had the opportunity to “lead” their fellow citizens in 
one respect or another prior to joining the army. Individuals who came from 
business, church groups, large families or other social organizations un-
doubtedly possessed an advantage – some leadership principles apply in all 
circumstances, regardless 67 – yet even they too had much to learn and come 
to grips with. At the end of their training, officers may have possessed the 
theory behind good leadership, but only when placed in command could 
their theoretical understanding be put into practice, elements of which were 
undoubtedly modified, invented anew or discarded altogether. Theory and 
praxis are rarely congruent. David Borys’ insightful examination of Civil 
Affairs operations during the latter stages of the war, also included in this 
volume, certainly lends credence to such an assertion; officers who fulfilled 
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this vital function may have taken an instructional course, but it seems that 
they truly learned through practice and experience in the field, faced as they 
were with real-life challenges that a training course in Canada or England 
would have a hard time replicating with any sense of realism or moment. 
And so, from this perspective, historians might be inclined to inquire 
whether or not the various means of instruction actually had the desired effect 
of turning raw civilians with no or limited military experience into com-
petent officers who could lead their soldiers under extraordinarily difficult 
circumstances.
Furthermore, the individual means by which leadership principles 
were communicated – whether in the form of publications of various sorts 
or addresses by distinguished personalities – were infused with a host of 
assumptions that, when fully explored, will surely provide insight into the 
social dynamic of the Second World War-era and some of the salient features 
of Canadian military culture at the time. Assessing the impact of these as-
sumptions would surely be a profitable exercise also. As has been suggested 
above, the CDQ, the CATM and other training pamphlets relied heavily on 
self-development and passive absorption; officers received these publications 
and were expected to read, digest and later implement its contents as appro-
priate. George Blackburn, for instance, observed that unless junior officers 
had attended the Royal Military College of Canada in Kingston, they “gained 
their knowledge in a hit-and-miss fashion – as much from their own initiative 
in studying pamphlets issued by the British War Office as from the loosely 
structured courses set up by their units.”68 No wonder then that when faced 
with the imminent prospect of letting down his regiment in an upcoming 
exercise, Bert Hoffmeister, from the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, pur-
chased War Office pamphlets in Aldershot, England and taught himself how 
to write an operation order, so frustrated (and not a little anxious) was he by 
his own lack of training.69 With the requirement to quickly train officers to 
meet the needs of a much-expanded force that after June 1944 in the case of 
Northern Europe and July 1943 in the case of Sicily and Italy was engaged in 
high intensity combat operations, such an approach was perhaps inevitable, 
yet what were the consequences? Were junior officers trained too quickly 
or incompletely? Was too much left to their own devices? Did the quality of 
leadership at the platoon-level suffer as a result, and if so, how and to what 
extent? Where did subalterns actually learn leadership, during operations 
against a determined enemy or during preparations for the same? Again 
referring to Borys, it would seem that much was learned “on the fly” when, 
of course, the consequences of failure were at their highest.
junior canadian army officers and leadership
146
Other questions that historians might possibly ask are numerous indeed 
and can certainly not all be listed here. What, for instance, one might addi-
tionally inquire, was the impact of the First World War, veteran non-commis-
sioned and commissioned officers (who oftentimes served as instructors), a 
more egalitarian society, and so on, on officer-man relations then in evidence 
during the 1939-1945 war? Along similar lines, how effective were various 
training establishments (like Brockville where Whitelaw and Gregg com-
manded) in producing competent leaders? Difficult, complex and involved 
questions to be sure, but all questions that must be asked and answered in 
order to arrive at a complete and comprehensive understanding of junior 
leadership in Canada’s army during the “second Great War.” Again, what 
has been described above is merely the ideal, the archetype, to which all were 
encouraged to aspire, one very small piece of a very large puzzle.
And so, in the end, the Canadian Army during the interwar period, and 
especially during the Second World War itself, encouraged young officers to 
be paternalistic in their relationships, competent in their actions and upright 
in their deportment. Success in each undertaking was intended to secure the 
confidence, respect and loyalty of subordinates, all of which it was hoped 
would encourage a more willing, indeed enthusiastic, obedience. One pub-
lication summarized the whole matter succinctly, “Leadership of the high-
est order is required of every officer.”70 Stated differently, but with no less 
significance:
Never forget for a minute that the men in the ranks are the salt 
of the earth, that they deserve the best possible leadership, and 
that it is your privilege, as well as your great responsibility, to 
have the honour of commanding them. Every officer must try his 
utmost to be worthy of that honour and responsibility.71
That responsibility for the “best possible leadership” was immense, com-
posed as it was of multiple facets that the young leader had to master. 
Because soldiers were unlikely to follow with any enthusiasm those leaders 
who treated them poorly, did not know their job sufficiently or failed to act 
in a manner that encouraged respect – they would follow because they had 
to, not because they wanted to – the army’s heavy emphasis on paternalism, 
competence and rectitude was very much intended to improve the officer-
man relationship to the point where obedience was freely given in exchange 
for, and out of acknowledgment of, sound treatment. By seeing to their vari-
ous responsibilities, junior officers were to be more than just an “ornamental 
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appendage”72 within their individual units. The best, it seems fair to suggest, 
were fatherly and able and virtuous. Effective leadership ultimately required 
constant attention and effort: relationships had to be continually fostered, 
skills had to be continually improved, and one’s conduct had to be continu-
ally monitored. Weighty and hefty responsibilities indeed! 
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Trained to the Nines?1 Readying the 
South Saskatchewan Regiment for War
Russ Benneweis
In the Second World War, the majority of the Canadian Army spent five days training for every one day in combat. And yet historians largely ignore the subject of training despite its strong correlation to combat per-
formance.2 Instead, they have used their analyses of the Canadian Army’s 
combat performance to infer about the quality of its training. A thorough 
examination of time spent preparing for combat is overdue. The purpose of 
this chapter is to assess the quality of training of the South Saskatchewan 
Regiment [S. Sask. R.], as a case study to better under the Second World 
War experience of the Canadian Army.3 Examination of key aspects of the 
regiment’s training—the early years and the introduction of ‘battle drill,’ 
preparations for Dieppe and its aftermath, the quality of regimental com-
manders, and training for Normandy—demonstrates an uneven record of 
achievement. Bearing in mind the inherent difficulties of military training 
in general and especially in an army composed primarily of citizen soldiers, 
this chapter does not to suggest that all training was useless. In battle, the 
S. Sask. R. and indeed the Canadian Army as a whole succeeded as often 
as it failed. Rather, it sets out to establish a link between methods utilised 
in the preparation for combat and battlefield performance, and ultimately 
illustrates areas where a greater degree of realism and standardisation may 
have saved lives on the battlefield.
The Early Years and Introduction of Battle Drill
Having learned from the confused mobilisation in 1914, Canadian political 
and military leaders agreed in the 1930s to create a series of deployment 
plans that would allow for a speedy and organised reaction to a future war. 
Defence Scheme No. 3 was designed to take effect in the event of an over-
seas war requiring the formation of a Canadian expeditionary contingent. 
The plan called for three Canadian divisions, a corps headquarters plus 
necessary ancillary troops to be raised, and would eventually serve as the 
model for the 1941-1942 Canadian Army Programme.4 The composition of 
the expeditionary contingent would consist of “units of the Canadian Militia, 
wearing the badges and the titles of regiments long familiar to the [local] 
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public, and inheriting traditions and esprit de corps which were a part of 
Canadian history.”5 
The South Saskatchewan Regiment was one of the many units raised 
under Defence Scheme No. 3. On 1 September 1939, mobilisation of the S. 
Sask. R. began at:
Weyburn [Saskatchewan] under the command of L[ieutenan]t  
Colonel J.E. Wright. [He] immediately telephoned the officers 
of the S[outh] S[askatchewan] R[egiment] instructing them to 
attend a rendezvous at Weyburn at 1500 h[ou]rs in the Legion 
Hall. When they arrived it was made known to them mobili[s]
ation had begun and the S[outh] S[askatchewan] R[egiment] had 
been the only Infantry Unit in M[ilitary] D[istrict] 12 ordered to 
mobilise, an honour given in accordance with their previous ef-
ficiency record…The spirit of the Unit can be easily seen; when it 
was made known that it was a voluntary enlistment, the officers 
presented themselves one hundred percent for the call of King 
and Country.6
The recruitment of enlisted personnel proceeded at a more pedestrian pace, 
commencing on 5 September with a total of eighteen men being taken on 
strength [TOS] the first day.7 The trickle of volunteers continued in the com-
ing days; eleven on the 11th, nine on the 14th, nineteen on the 27th, twenty-
three on the 29th and nine on the 30th.8 Lower than expected inductions 
forced the unit to establish recruiting depots in the surrounding commun-
ities of Ceylon, Regina and Moose Jaw.9 Recruiting drives continued across 
southern Saskatchewan into October with the regiment reaching its allotted 
number of 26 officers and 774 other ranks by October 11.10 Although reaching 
full establishment in slightly more than a month can hardly be considered 
tardy, it was certainly much slower than the common Canadian narrative 
implies. This begs the question: did 28th and 46th Battalions’ veterans dis-
courage their sons from joining the S. Sask. R., or did their sons opt instead 
for the navy or the air force? The complicated subject of war enthusiasm in 
Canada during the Second World War has not yet been fully addressed by 
Canadian historians.11 
The initial September 1939 buildup was followed by instruction from 
Ottawa in March 1940 to re-open recruitment, as a revised and larger war 
establishment had been issued.12 The war diary entry for 26 March called for 
515 extra recruits to bring the unit to its updated strength of 996 all ranks.13 
By mid-April the battalion had achieved its recruiting goals.14
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Training to this point consisted mostly of route marches and rudiment-
ary drill. The first winter of the war was particularly harsh, forcing much of 
the training to be conducted indoors. However, in October a non-commis-
sioned officers’ school was opened and, “[t]he results of early and good NCO 
training became evident as the fall and winter progressed. Those first NCOs 
became the backbone of future leadership in the battalion. Many of them 
were eventually W[arrant] O[fficer]s and commissioned officers on the field 
of battle.”15
Mobilisation plans in Defence Scheme No. 3 included instructions for 
Permanent Force [PF] men to be assigned to militia units to assist with train-
ing. In the case of the S. Sask. R., this originally meant the assignment of 
a lone PF sergeant to the battalion. The war diary entry for 14 September 
mentions a new training syllabus had been worked out and that on the 15th 
physical training had begun under ‘his supervision’.16 The power arrange-
ment in such a situation may have been difficult, for it is unclear by unit 
records how it was actually negotiated. Surely it required magnanimous 
gestures on the part of officers and tactful leadership by the PF NCOs.
A severe army-wide shortage of even the most basic equipment, such as 
boots, uniforms and weapons, greatly impeded practical training through-
out the winter of 1939-40.17 War Diary entries in November 1939 illustrate 
increasing frustration with the lack of proper clothing and equipment, and 
how these shortages adversely affected training progression and morale.18 
The unit did not receive its full equipment allotment until 3 February 1940.19
Nonetheless, heightened weapons training slowly entered the train-
ing syllabus by the beginning of 1940.20 In June the unit was moved to 
Camp Shilo outside of Brandon, Manitoba and together with the Calgary 
Highlanders and the Queen’s Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada formed 
the 6th Infantry Brigade of the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division.21 According 
to the battalion historian at this time, “[t]raining commenced in earnest; night 
compass marches, patrols, range work, trench digging, bayonet practice, 
route marches, and platoon and company tactics in attack and defence.”22 
Army life and the harsh weather at Shilo led some volunteers to reconsider 
their decision to enlist:
Blistering hot days suddenly turning to torrential rains, and 
short-lived tornadoes felling tents and filling cook houses with 
dust, soon toughened the men to meet the vagaries of the weath-
er. Towards the end of August the rigours of army life proved 
too much for many men and transfers and discharges were 
arranged.23
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While 6th Brigade laboured at Shilo, the commander of 2nd Canadian 
Infantry Division was unsatisfied with training progress in his division. In 
a letter dated 3 July 1940 to the Minister of National Defence, Major-General 
Victor Odlum described the state of his formation as “not only not gaining 
ground but…actually deteriorating. No advanced training has been possible, 
and I have not been in a position to exercise any command.”24 In the same 
letter Odlum noted that it would be wise for “the Division to move almost 
at once to an area where it could undertake that collective training without 
which it can never be a Division in more than name.”25 In a subsequent letter 
to the minister the following day, Odlum continued that, “[a]t the present 
time, [he had] no such force as a 2nd Canadian Division. The framework 
exists, and the personnel [are] mobili[s]ed, but it is so scattered, and so un-
trained, that it is not yet a division…[T]he units have had instruction in only 
the more elementary subjects and are no further advanced than they should 
be in two months of effective training.”26 Odlum concluded by asking to be 
relieved of his command, “the sooner…the better,” should the division not be 
brought together for collective training and instructors capable of teaching 
the art of soldiering already overseas not be returned to Canada. Nearly a 
fortnight later, the Minister advised Odlum not “to simply be an advocate 
but rather to help to consider all factors which have to be taken into account,” 
and that his not-so-veiled threats did “not assist in dealing with a situation 
which is complex enough.”27 Although it was later decided that the 60 year-
old Odlum was not fit to command in the field, experience led him to realise 
that training methods had to be dramatically improved. 
In the coming months, training slowly advanced beyond the battalion 
level. The first brigade tactical was held 27 August 1940. It was a rudimentary 
but pedagogically important advance-to-contact exercise designed to train 
the troops in moving to an attack position via motorised transport, and in 
the setting of defensive positions. Nine errors made during the exercise were 
listed in a document titled, ‘Notes on Conference following Brigade Tactical 
Scheme.’ It illustrates the level of training achieved by the unit to that point 
and that brigade officers, in this instance, were attempting to learn from 
their mistakes. Incidents of special concern included: stressing the need of 
following the instructions contained in the Operational Orders to the let-
ter; conducting signals in a timely, proper fashion; carrying out suitable 
reconnaissance prior to, during and after contact was made with the enemy; 
and the proper function of the [motorised] carrier platoon.28 Unfortunately, 
the notes concerning lessons learned during the brigade exercise were the 
only written example of such in the battalion’s war diary for the duration of 
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training. It is difficult to imagine how a common doctrine could have been 
systemised throughout the battalion, let alone the entire Canadian Army, in 
such a manner.29 
During this period the battalion continued to conduct advance-to-con-
tact exercises in its preparation for combat. Each platoon undertook a sixty 
mile, two-day motorised transport move after which tactical exercises were 
carried out. Subsequently, each company completed a combined motorised 
transport/route march of not less than two days, again with the accompany-
ing tactical exercise. At the battalion level, the S. Sask. R. completed a four-
day, four-hundred mile move, while the entire brigade later carried out a 
one-hundred-and-fifty mile move as a group, of which twenty-five miles was 
by foot.30 
In October, the battalion was transported to Toronto and the Horse 
Barracks at the Canadian National Exhibition Grounds where they remained 
until embarkation for England in mid-December.31 The primitive living con-
ditions endured by the men severely tested unit morale and stifled realistic 
training. Basic lectures, drill, and route marches filled the men’s days.32 The 
unit entrained for Halifax on 13 December 1940 and after a nine day voyage 
aboard the troopship Pennland landed on Christmas Day, 1940 at Gourock, 
Scotland.33 Following a daylong journey by train, the bulk of the regiment re-
joined its advance party34 at Morval Barracks in Cove, Hampshire on Boxing 
Day.35
After a round of landing leave,36 the S. Sask. R. began what would even-
tually be three-and-a-half years of training in Great Britain. Short refresher 
courses were run, consisting mainly of indoor lectures on such basic tenets 
as march discipline, 2-inch mortar instruction, aircraft recognition, and gas 
and respirator procedures.37 Two important exercises designed to give the 
unit experience in night movement under blackout conditions and in the 
quick deployment of defensive positions were conducted in January.38 While 
basic in nature, these exercises were important training aids made espe-
cially so by the Canadian Army’s decision to invest heavily in supply and 
transport.39 Though movement exercises were important, they did little to 
enhance the fighting ability of the individual soldier or the battalion. To date, 
the unit had only rudimentary weapons training and had no experience in 
combined-arms attacks. The battalion was hardly a “dagger pointed at the 
heart of Berlin.”40
Beginning in late 1941, one exception to the training routine for the S. 
Sask. R. was the introduction of ‘battle drill.’ Early training sessions were 
conducted by Major McTavish, who, along two other battalion officers, 
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would attend the Canadian Army’s Battle Drill School when it opened later 
that winter.41 How he conducted ‘battle drill’ training prior to the course is 
unknown. Nevertheless, one is able to behold the slow creep of ‘battle drill’ 
into the battalion’s training over the course of January, 1942, a platoon at a 
time.42
The concepts of ‘battle drill’ and ‘Battle Drill Training’ are easily con-
flated, but must be differentiated. ‘Battle Drill Training’ entailed a wide range 
of training activities, including ‘battle drill,’ while the latter concentrated on 
rote practise of tactics on the parade square. Officially: 
‘Battle Drill,’ according to the manual Fieldcraft and Battle Drill, 
means the reduction of military tactics to bare essentials which 
are taught to a platoon as a team drill, with clear explanations 
regarding the objects to be achieved, the principles involved 
and the individual task of each member of the team. ‘Battle Drill 
Training,’ on the other hand, is more comprehensive. It consists 
of a high standard of weapon training, purposeful physical train-
ing, fieldcraft, battle drills proper, battle discipline and battle 
inoculation.
 Battle Drill training is founded upon the axiom that until every 
soldier looks on himself as a ruthless killer, using cover with the 
facility of an animal, using his weapons with the practised ease 
of a professional hunter and covering the ground on the move 
with the agility of a deer-stalker, infantry battle training will be 
based on false foundations. Its object is, therefore, to inculcate 
into a body of fighting men a system of battle discipline and team 
spirit, and to give every man a knowledge of certain basic “team 
plays” which will guide him in any operation he may undertake 
in battle. It has the further advantage of making the men physic-
ally fit, relieving boredom in training, and inoculating the soldier 
and his commander against the fear and noises of battle.43
It has been suggested that ‘battle drill’ and ‘Battle Drill Training’ spread 
like wildfire through the Canadian Army.44 Yet, the ‘battle drill’ fad45 does 
not seem to have affected the S. Sask. R. nearly as much as it is reported in 
other units of the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division. Indeed, mention of this 
new form of training in the war diary and its appendices are spotty, sug-
gesting that the battalion was either slow in its incorporation or had become 
leery of its training value.
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A snapshot view of ‘battle drill’ and ‘Battle Drill Training’ from the 
perspective of a battalion other than the Calgary Highlanders is revealing. 
It is widely recognised that the Calgary Highlanders was the driving force 
behind the surge of ‘battle drill’ popularity in the Canadian Army during the 
Second World War.46 After witnessing a performance of ‘battle drill’ training 
by British 47th Division, Lt.-Col. F Scott of the Highlanders became convinced 
that ‘battle drill’ was not only a useful training tool but also a revolutionary 
answer to the problems of boredom and malaise affecting his battalion.47 
Although it has been presumed to have been pervasive, the degree to 
which ‘battle drill’ influenced training in battalions other than the “fanatical 
disciples”48 of the Calgary Highlanders has not been researched. Indeed, the 
S. Sask. R. did not elevate it to such heights that it eclipsed the battalion’s 
many other training methods. Evidence shows that ‘battle drill’ was seen as 
one training technique, but nothing more. That the Calgary Highlanders was 
not chosen to participate in the Dieppe raid suggests that mastery of ‘battle 
drill’ may not have been highly sought after by British High Command. Lt.-
Gen. Montgomery, who played a large role in the selection of the 4th and 6th 
Brigades for Operation Jubilee49, was critical of ‘battle drill’ disciples, noting 
that “[i]t does not seem to be understood that Battle Drill is really a proced-
ure, applicable to unit and subunit action [and that] the company [within the 
battalion] still has to be taught how to carry out the various operations of 
war.”50
In fact, there was very little innovativeness to ‘battle drill.’ The term 
itself dates back at least to 1917 when Ivor Maxse applied, “the principle of 
drill to tactical training for modern warfare,” and the principles of drill into, 
“such combat functions as platoon organisation, deployment into tactical 
formations, [and] the advance to contact.”51 An original précis written by the 
47th British Division during the Second World War and later copied by the 
Calgary Highlanders actually stated that “Battle Drill does not teach any new 
or revolutionary tactics, but is based on the tactical principles set forth in 
F[ield] S[ervice] R[egulations] and the Army Training Manuals.”52 Using a 
sporting analogy, the history of ‘Battle Drill’ in the 47th Division noted its 
proper role as a way to give the, “junior commander a firm base on which to 
develop his individual initiative, much in the way a young cricketer is taught 
the basic principles of stroke play on which later he develops his own style.”53 
In 1943, the regularity of ‘battle drill’ in the battalion’s training syllabus 
was overtaken with the call for increased parade square drill. Henceforth the 
battalion would conduct at least one hour per week, every week on march-
ing and saluting drill and to undertake ‘battle drill training’ once every three 
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weeks.54 That no mention was made of ‘battle drill’ in the revised infantry 
training instructions in the early fall of 194455 may illustrate that, “[battle drill 
was] indeed a pedagogical dead end,”56 and did not as argued, “encapsulate 
the general thrust, pulse and…effectiveness of the Canadian Army training 
at the lower end.”57 
The introduction of ‘battle drill’ coincided with a period of reduced 
morale in the battalion, and the Canadian Army as a whole. The main prob-
lems encountered, “were boredom, homesickness and disappointment” as 
the men trained to the, “point of staleness.”58 Canadian commanders saw 
‘battle drill’ and ‘Battle Drill Training’ as methodologies that, “offered more 
exciting and challenging training. To many it seemed the antidote to bore-
dom.”59 In this sense, ‘battle drill’ would seem more an end than a means to 
an end. 
The state of morale in a military formation is an intangible element, dif-
ficult to measure.60 Morale fluctuated within the S. Sask. R. over the training 
years, but probably never exceeded good. Disciplinary problems, a classic 
signal of low morale, dated back to the fall of 1939 when a number of original 
volunteers were arrested for brawling and for vandalising businesses in 
Regina with Germanic names.61 Morale plummeted with the cancellation of 
Rutter and the results of Jubilee. Faced with another winter in England, regi-
mental morale dropped again in late 1943.62 Canadian soldiers have generally 
been viewed as patriotic, eager and well-trained during the waiting years in 
Canada and Great Britain, but it was not always the case. This should come as 
little surprise. Taking into account four-and-a-half years of training, much of 
that in a foreign land within the stifling confines of military discipline, with 
no hope of home leave and with little communications possible to loved ones, 
it is a wonder the men held up as well as they did.
Unfortunately for the men of the S. Sask. R., time not spent on ‘battle 
drill’ or parade square drill did not necessarily mean it was utilised for 
useful training measures. Indeed, considerable time was taken from mean-
ingful combat training for a variety of reasons during the unit’s tenure in 
Great Britain. The battalion received dozens of Most-Distinguished Visitors 
(MDV’s) over the years, ranging in importance from the King to brigade com-
manders. Generally, the more distinguished the MDV the longer the unit 
polished drill and deportment. A brigadier’s visit usually constituted a day’s 
practise63 while the greater part of July, 1943 was spent preparing for Exercise 
Flag, the occasion at which King George VI presented the unit its colours.64 It 
is not exaggerating to state that months of training time were lost preparing 
for the reception of MDV’s. 
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Extensive semaphore training was another activity with questionable 
utility conducted by the S. Sask. R. during its stay in England. Starting in 
March, 1940 practise in the use semaphore communications occupied a 
regular place in the battalion’s training syllabus into the spring of 1944, but 
especially in the months following the Dieppe raid.65 Training of this na-
ture indicates a fundamental lack of understanding of modern warfare on 
the part of Canadian leadership and an instance where leaders really were 
preparing to fight the last war. It could also have been a manifestation of the 
need to fill five-and-a-half days a week of training syllabus for years on end.
More training time was lost when the entire 2nd Canadian Infantry 
Division was shifted to the south coast of England on 2 July 1941 to serve 
ostensibly as an anti-invasion force. But beating back an unlikely invasion 
was not the only reason for the relocation as:
This movement may have been partly inspired by a desire to give 
a salutary change to the troops involved…Aldershot ha[d] not 
been a popular station with Canadian Officers and men; and ex-
perience seems to show that an occasional change of scene is the 
best means of combating the boredom which is only too likely 
to arise among the troops not actively employed. Conversations 
with various officers of 2 C[ana]d[ia]n Div[ision] seem to leave 
no room for doubt that this particular move [had] a good effect 
on the morale of the division. Among other advantages, it has 
brought the men the opportunity of bathing in the sea.66
The battalion remained at station on the south coast for the subsequent 
eleven months, finally moving to the Isle of Wight in May, 1942 to begin 
training for Dieppe. The unit did participate in a number of exercises, in-
cluding Bumper, while on the coast but did little ‘battle drill training.’67 The 
menial nature of the work and a note of exasperation are evident in the 
war diary entry for 6 January 1942 stating that, “[r]evetting and digging of 
defence positions [were] still being carried out in Co[mpan]y areas.”68 Less 
than a week later, the unit was ordered to move the defensive positions a few 
yards further from the sea. “Digging commenced on new [p]os[itio]ns”69 on 
12 January 1942 and continued throughout the remainder of the month.70 In 
terms of teaching the men new and innovative doctrine to be used in combat, 
little was accomplished during the unit’s time on the south coast. However, 
the battalion training regime was about to undergo a sudden and radical 
change as an assault on occupied France was in the unit’s immediate future. 
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The Dieppe Interlude
With the move to the Isle of Wight, the battalion’s assault training for the 
Dieppe operation began. It entailed, “[r]ugged assault training…forced speed 
marches, cliff and wall climbing, unarmed combat, breeching wire obstacles, 
(and) hours of practi[s]ing landings from A[ssault] L[anding] C[raft]s.”71 
Individual and unit training progressively became more specialised to even-
tually include, “village and street fighting drills, crossing wire obstacles on 
a defended beach in both section and platoon order, gun and installation 
destruction, climbing by platoon, platoon and Company withdrawal, 2” and 
3” mortar drill, stalking and sniping, drill on board ship, drill on Assault 
Landing Craft, drill after boat beaches [a] if silent landing is achieved and [b] 
if enemy opens fire upon landing, [and finally] drill at rendezvous and drill 
at consolidation.”72
 Training progressed to include mock landings by the assaulting brig-
ades. Exercises Yukon I and Yukon II were full-scale dress rehearsals for the 
Dieppe operation. The battalion’s intention during Yukon I was to land and 
secure ‘Green Beach,’ to destroy all enemy within its perimeter, and to hold 
the bridgehead until ordered to re-embark. From the perspective of the 2nd 
Canadian Infantry Division, the exercise did not go well. Historians’ views of 
Yukon I range from a ‘dismal failure’ to a ‘cock-up’.73 Yukon II was authorised 
because of the horrendous results of its predecessor. The latter scheme went 
better, but only comparatively so.74
 Following another round of polishing-up training for the battalions 
chosen to conduct the assault, the division was deemed ready. The cancella-
tion and eventual reinstatement of the raid is well-known; however the con-
sequences to individual and unit training are not as well-understood. Leaves 
were granted in large numbers during the month of July and in early August 
for the men to “blow off steam.”75 Although the stated objectives for August 
were to develop offensive attack skills from platoon level to the battalion as 
a whole, training was eased considerably from the beginning of the month 
right through to the days preceding the raid.76 No refresher assault training 
or exercises practicing amphibious landings were conducted in preparation 
for Jubilee. 
 The cost of Jubilee to the battalion was devastating; of the 25 officers and 
498 other ranks landed at Dieppe, 19 officers and 321 other ranks were casual-
ties. Three officers along with 81 other ranks were killed.77 If there truly was 
a lesson from the Dieppe operation, it was that amphibious assaults were 
extremely difficult and much greater training of the attacking force was ne-
cessary. The definitive history of Operation Jubilee must include substantial 
research on the adequacy of training conducted by the assaulting units.
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The Aftermath of Dieppe
In the months following Jubilee, the battalion set about reconstituting itself. 
‘Training as per syllabus’ was a constant theme of the battalion’s war diary. 
Although the allure of large scale exercises and ‘battle drill’ have captured the 
imagination of military historians, much more of the soldier’s time was spent 
training by the book. For the S. Sask. R., this consisted of the same essential 
ingredients for nearly five years: route marches, drill, bayonet training, gren-
ade practise, clearing of mines and booby traps as well as the ubiquitous Test 
of Elementary Training (TOET) on the rifle. Although a convenient method 
of occupying the men’s time, it must have been incredibly tedious for the sol-
diers who practised it and the junior officers and non-commissioned officers 
who administered it. Cumulatively, the men spent months doing bayonet 
practice. One must wonder if improvements in morale and combat efficiency 
could have been achieved had the training syllabus been spiced up. 
Nor did ‘training as per syllabus’ change appreciably in the Canadian 
Army after months of combat in Northwest Europe. The war diary entries of 
a reinforcement unit reveal that ‘training as per syllabus’ in the spring of 1945 
remained nearly identical to training carried out by the S. Sask. R. in 1941. 
Besides the addition of individual training on the infantry flamethrower, 
‘training as per syllabus’ consisted of the same mundane ingredients.78 The 
great deal of time spent ‘training as per syllabus’ did not produce propor-
tional benefits and was, seemingly, instituted by a Canadian High Command 
that failed to understand the need to establish a more-creative and -product-
ive training regime for its soldiers. 
Like ‘battle drill,’ large scale exercises have received a great deal of atten-
tion from military historians. From the points of view of staff, ordnance, and 
transport personnel, Waterloo, Bumper and Spartan were necessary rehearsals 
to an army training for war. They also served to wash out incompetent com-
manders—although controversy remains regarding the removal of A.G.L. 
McNaughton for his performance in Spartan in March, 1943.79 Judging by 
the performance of divisional commanders in Normandy, the Canadian 
Army may have benefited had it run additional weeding-out exercises prior 
to D-Day.80 Besides hardening, large scale exercises did little to enhance the 
fighting potential of the individual soldier or his unit. Rather, dozens of long-
forgotten battalion and brigade exercises were carried out to achieve this end. 
The degree of standardisation of training in these smaller exercises within 
the Canadian Army as a whole has yet to be determined. While not as in-
triguing to the scholar, these smaller exercises occupied a far greater propor-
tion of the unit’s training than did large schemes such as Spartan and Bumper. 
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An example of the many smaller-scale schemes conducted by the bat-
talion in the aftermath of Dieppe was Exercise Repeater, set in March, 1943. 
Repeater was designed to practise the platoons in ‘fire and movement’ man-
oeuvres in cooperation with battalion support weapons.81 Exercise Bang was 
a rifle company scheme held a week later to rehearse clearing a minefield 
while under fire.82 Though late in coming, Repeater and Bang were excellent 
training tools for the battalion. 
Another example of what the battalion rehearsed to hone its combat abil-
ity was an innovative attack method that called for the section to be divided 
into three groups—two rifle groups and one Bren gun group—rather than 
the usual two.83 The reasoning behind the three-group attack formation was:
[t]o exploit the herd instinct, which expresses itself in the natural 
tendency for friends to group together in order to fight together, 
and for men to group round their leader …. The section com-
mander, instead of commanding each man in his section, will 
command three groups – Nos. 1 and 2 Rifle Groups and No.3 
Bren Group. Whatever the size of the section, these three groups 
should be maintained, so that the section commander has only 
three men under his direct command. The section commander 
will decide to be with whichever group is most suitable in accord-
ance with the situation and particular task at hand …. Groups are 
formed from friends as far as possible, in order that friends keep 
together and fight together. One man in each group, which is not 
commanded by an N.C.O., acts as leader. He should be chosen 
because of his natural gifts of leadership and because the rest 
of the group looks to him as a leader …. Groups can be used in 
any formations and at any intervals, to suit the ground and the 
tasks in hand; but they must keep in touch with the section com-
mander and not be with them.84
On Christmas Eve, 1943, the battalion participated in one of its most 
important training exercises to date. Exercise Crescendo was run by each bat-
talion of 6th Brigade and was designed to allow infantry battalions practise 
attacking an enemy position in the daylight, with particular reference to:
(a) The f[or]m[atio]n and method of adv[ance] of the unit and 
sub-units.
(b) Fire s[up]p[ort] by b[attalio]n w[ea]p[o]ns and s[up]p[ort] 
arms.85
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Exercise instructions state the scheme’s methodology was copied from 
a master generated by British General Headquarters School of Infantry and 
that this was to be the model of attack which the Canadians would take into 
battle in 1944.86 On 27 and 28 January, 1944 the battalion conducted a quick 
attack exercise, code-named Zip.87 The objects of the scheme, conducted on a 
platoon-by-platoon basis, were the rehearsal of sound battle procedures by 
platoon commanders, the formation of adequate fire plans and the proper 
use of ground, cover, and fire and movement in the course of the attack.88 The 
importance of studying the training period of the Canadian Army is never 
more evident, for the doctrine to be used in battle was being settled on. Its 
success in disseminating and systemising the doctrine throughout the army 
has not yet been determined. These platoon, company, battalion and brigade 
level schemes did a great deal more for the fighting potential of the S. Sask. R. 
than large-scale efforts such as Exercises Waterloo, Bumper and Spartan. 
Battalion Commanding Officers
With so much of the training devolved to battalion and even sub-unit levels, 
the importance of commanding officers at the battalion level is self-evident. 
Practically nothing is known, however, of the role and performance of bat-
talion commanding officers during training. Canada’s official historian of 
the Second World War, C.P. Stacey declared, with no evidence, “that the 
Canadian Army...suffered from possessing a proportion of regimental offi-
cers whose attitude towards training was casual and haphazard rather than 
urgent and scientific.”89 Perhaps this was the case. Further examination of 
the Canadian Army’s training is necessary to verify or refute Stacey’s claim. 
There were instances, however, where commanding officers of the S. Sask. R. 
took proactive measures to improve training methodology. 
An example was Exercise Curl, a brigade exercise held on 27 March 1944. 
Curl was designed to allow 6th Brigade to practise the art of marching to-
wards an imaginary front with the added complication of taking turns pass-
ing through fellow units on the move in order to afford each battalion the op-
portunity to serve as brigade vanguard.90 The battalion’s poor performance 
in what should have been a simple exercise raised the ire of the Brigadier 
Young, commander of 6th Brigade. It seems inconceivable that four-and-a 
half years of battalion training along with participation in large movement 
exercises such as Bumper, Benito and Spartan had not been sufficient to master 
this relatively minor battle tactic. The battalion commander, Lt.-Col. Clift, 
ordered the men to practise the techniques carried out in Curl during the 
march back to barracks that same day, after which the S. Sask. R. war diar-
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ist reported that the battalion “had improved immensely from the first at-
tempt.”91 This quick and proactive remedial effort by Clift and a complete 
dearth of evidence suggesting laxness by any of the commanding officers of 
the battalion during training may counter Stacey’s contention.92 
Additionally, regimental commanders can hardly be blamed for train-
ing woes within their units when directives from above often set battalion 
agenda. The Canadian Army persisted in calling for anti-invasion exercises 
long after the threat of a German attack on England had passed. Exercise 
Panther was one such scheme conducted months after Dieppe; while it may 
have helped to train the battalion staff, its benefits to the combat readiness of 
the battalion were dubious.93 Moreover, the practice of senior commanders 
abdicating leadership roles to serve as exercise director, such as Brigadier 
Young during Exercise Hike in the spring of 1944, was further detrimental to 
overall combat readiness.94 Much of the training the battalion was ordered 
to undertake was stale, predetermined and against an imaginary enemy. In 
March, 1944 for example, the battalion took part in Exercise Shamrock. Three 
months before the invasion, Shamrock was a scripted battalion exercise with 
an imaginary enemy force and no artillery or armour support.95 As with so 
many training exercises, a lack of spontaneity devalued the scheme.96 
Many rehearsals involved components of the battalion other than the 
rifle companies. A high degree of professionalism is evident in battalion 
records regarding training undertaken by the signals section and mortar pla-
toon. In one of the few examples of institutionalised training, the battalion 
mortar platoon embarked on a three-day Brigade Mortar School “to improve 
and standardise the standard of mortar training in the B[riga]de.”97 The 
course consisted of three days of lectures followed by a day of shooting both 
in the daylight and in darkness—a first for the South Saskatchewan mortar 
platoon.98 It is surprising that the first night shoot of the battalion’s mortars 
took place nearly four years into the war!
The battalion participated in two potentially instructive exercises in 
August, 1943. Codenamed Hammer and Pickaxe, the purpose of these most-
complicated to date schemes was to practise an attack scenario by tanks 
in cooperation with infantry.99 An addendum to the exercise instructions 
of Pickaxe illustrates a desire on the part of Canadian High Command to 
maximise training results:
The objects of the exercise will be carefully explained to every 
off[ice]r, NCO, and private soldier participating. This is necessary 
in real operations to achieve the best co-operation; and is just 
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as necessary in tr[ainin]g to get the best results from the effort 
expended. The explanation and “briefing” must be continuous 
through the exercise. Arrangements will be made to issue “News 
Bulletins” each night, which will record the progress of the fight-
ing. Umpires are being instructed to question as many men as 
possible to find out what they know about the enemy, our tr[oo]ps,  
and the com[man]d[er’]s intention.100
As in combat, though, what is set down on paper and what actually 
occurs in an exercise seldom coincide. In both exercises, the ‘friction’ of 
combat led the battalion to put in unsupported attacks after being unable to 
marry-up with supporting armour. The official umpire’s ruling that the bat-
talion suffered numerous casualties while “attacking an enemy strongpoint 
unsupported”101 grimly foreshadowed the results of Operation Atlantic.102 The 
exercises required a high degree of exactitude which broke down almost im-
mediately—not unlike the complicated operations designed by Guy Simonds 
in Normandy for the green troops of 2nd Canadian Infantry Division and 4th 
Canadian and 1st Polish Armoured Divisions. In assessing the training value 
of exercises like Hammer and Pickaxe, it is imperative to look past the stated 
aims and concentrate on scheme results. 
For an army adhering to an artillery doctrine for the attack, it is surpris-
ing that there is no record of the battalion advancing behind a live barrage 
during training. This, combined with a lack of armour/infantry coordination 
during training, meant the men of the S. Sask. R. would have to learn these 
critical techniques the hard way—in combat. A clearly defined, practised, 
and institutionalised doctrine incorporating artillery and armour together 
with ‘battle drill’ techniques may have benefited the men in battle. In such 
a scenario, artillery could have shot the men close to their objectives while 
tactics practised during ‘battle drill’ training, used in coordination with ar-
mour, may have led to greater success and lower casualties. 
A fatal flaw in the overall Canadian training process was to devolve 
training responsibilities down as far as platoon and company levels only 
to impose a strict top-down system of command in combat that limited the 
initiative of platoon, company and battalion commanders. As previously 
argued, the degree to which a common fighting doctrine was institution-
alised throughout the Canadian Army remains unknown. Numerous war 
diary entries from the S. Sask. R. stating that training was at the discretion 
of platoon, company and battalion commanders would suggest that it was 
slight.103 Upon joining the battalion in early 1941 a recently commissioned 
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subaltern, and PF soldier since 1938, witnessed firsthand the unstructured 
manner in which training was scheduled. Upon asking for a program of 
training for his platoon, he was told to write his own as there was noth-
ing to follow.104 Further impeding standardised battalion training were the 
crippling losses at Dieppe and the repatriation of sixteen of the unit’s most 
experienced non-commissioned officers in early March, 1942 to serve as in-
structors for the rapidly expanding Canadian Army.105 
Unlike the Canadians, the United States Army quickly recognised 
that a lack of qualified trainers posed serious issues and worked quickly to 
maximise training efficacy. Following an unsatisfactory training inspection, 
the Chief of Staff of General Headquarters (GHQ), US Army, Lieutenant 
General Lesley McNair, likened unqualified trainers to, “the blind leading the 
blind,” and the army as having, “verified the inevitable – that inadequately 
trained officers cannot train troops effectively.”106 The US Army—though 
numerically much greater than the Canadian—faced the same problems: 
training a rapidly expanding army, often with inexperienced or incapable 
officers and NCOs. As opposed to the Canadian system of devolving the 
generation of training directives to battalions, companies and even platoons, 
“GHQ (US Army) decided on a centrali(s)ed training process, which took 
many decisions out of the hands of small-unit leaders.”107 Further research 
is necessary to determine which national system produced greater results.
Final Preparations for Normandy
For the S. Sask. R., 1944 began with a trip to Scotland for Exercise Frosty. Really 
an assemblage of smaller schemes, Frosty would occupy the battalion for the 
first half of January.108 Every aspect of warfare, and not just explicit ‘combat 
training,’ requires practise. From 2-12 January the battalion conducted a num-
ber of smaller schemes, each of which was intended to simulate a portion of 
the battalion’s eventual channel crossing. After a day of preparatory lectures 
and films, the battalion began hands-on training. Over the next ten days the 
men practised climbing scrambling nets, boarding Landing Craft, hammock 
slinging and boat pulling. Exercise Ramp taught them the skills needed for 
night-time disembarkation from a Landing Ship, Infantry followed by pas-
sage through a beach transit area. Essentially a repetition of Ramp, Exercise 
Kedge was run the next morning and included a move from the transit area 
to an assembly point. 
Training continued with a rehearsal in the loading and disembarking 
of battalion vehicles. To provide visual realism to the entire process, the bat-
talion screened a film of the American amphibious assault at Salerno. The 
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realistic sub-exercise Trident completed training undertaken during Frosty. 
Trident saw the men embark in Landing Craft, Vehicles during darkness and 
board a Landing Ship, Infantry via scrambling nets. The soldiers were then 
ordered to sling hammocks and to spend the night aboard ship. In the early 
hours of the next morning, they were served a hot meal and disembarked for 
landing on an undefended beach commensurate to their follow-up role. As 
practised in Ramp and Kedge the men passed through the designated transit 
area after reaching shore to the assembly point and dug in. At that point the 
umpires sounded the cease-fire order for Trident bringing Exercise Frosty to a 
successful conclusion.109
Despite the successful exercise, however, the situation in 6th Brigade 
had deteriorated significantly by the beginning of 1944. A training directive 
written by its commander, Brigadier Guy Gostling, illustrates a breakdown 
in command structure:
I am not satisfied that my instr[uction]s with regard to weekly 
drill of their com[man]ds by Pl[atoon] Com[man]d[e]rs was in 
fact carried out in Dec[ember] and I remind all units that this is 
an order!...Orders must be obeyed. If an order is issued by this 
H[ead] Q[uarters] which appears to C[ommanding] O[fficer]s to 
be unreasonable or which, for some reason or other they feel they 
cannot comply, then it is their duty to take the matter up with 
the B[riga]de Com[man]d[er] and not merely fail to carry out the 
instr[uction]s by default; for instance…that Pl[atoon] Com[man]
d[er]s carry out a certain specified type of instr[uction] on speci-
fied occasions—i.e. close order drill.110
A number of the platoon commanders had likely concluded that additional 
parade square drill was useless, that years of boring and redundant square 
bashing was the cause of poor drill, and the last thing the men needed to 
cure their malaise was more of the same. Nevertheless, Gostling dismissed 
the ‘boredom’ aspect of training as a necessary component of the achieve-
ment of soldierly competence:
Much tr[ainin]g which involves details similar to above is con-
sidered by many Off[ice]rs and O[ther] R[ank]s to be “monoton-
ous”. Since repetition of such details hundreds of times is the only 
way in which they can be drilled into becoming a habit, a certain 
amount of monotony will be inevitable. It is, however, true that 
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if repetition is allowed to be carried out in a sloppy manner it is 
many times more monotonous than if it is carried out with strict 
attention to every little detail because there is a very real psycho-
logical satisfaction in doing something superlatively well. It is for 
this reason that highly trained t[roo]ps do not find carrying even 
“parade square” drill monotonous because they derive a great 
feeling of satisfaction out of doing something which they know 
they are doing almost to perfection.111
In the same report, Gostling rebuked the men for finding novel means of 
relieving their boredom, “It has been noticed that there is much indiscrimin-
ate tossing around of thunderflashes and [No.] 77 Grenades. This will cease 
forthwith and any personnel discharging [them]...will be expected to be able 
to give a realistic reason for what is being simulated.112 Gostling was also 
concerned with the methods of those doing the training, four years into the 
war:
[R]ecent exercises have disclosed that quite a weakness exists in 
handling attacks at this particular level. Off[ice]rs notably lack 
tr[ainin]g in the emp[loyment] of supporting arms in conjunction 
with their own t[roo]ps…Too much tr[ainin]g is still being carried 
out in a haphazard manner. Vitally important details are being 
omitted or are carried out incorrectly and as far as can be seen 
in many cases the off[ice]r or N.C.O. instructing seems neither to 
know nor care.113
To remedy these deficiencies, Gostling urged his subordinates to 
maximise realism while rehearsing, through: the organisation of sound 
battle procedures by platoon and company commanders; the formation of 
adequate fire plans; plus the use of ground, cover, and fire and movement in 
the course of the attack.114 Gostling concluded that, “more effort [be] put into 
[the] organisation of tr[ainin]g by the off[ice]rs, [for] it is a fatal flaw to carry 
out tr[ainin]g under unnecessarily unreal conditions.”115 
Gostling’s directives are instructive. He must be given credit for recog-
nising the lacklustre training being carried out in his unit and for recom-
mending solutions. However, his order to ramp up parade square drill, one 
of the primary causes of malaise in 6th Brigade, is puzzling. Two months 
after tabling this report Gostling was relieved of his command; officially for 
an, “inability to make sound decisions and (to) issue clear concise orders 
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(that) will inspire confidence in subordinates during active operations.”116 
Perhaps Gostling was fired for allowing the brigade to deteriorate to a state 
where subalterns openly disregarded directives when setting platoon train-
ing syllabi. This further muddies the waters as to where to place blame for 
lacklustre training in the Canadian Army. Stacey blamed regimental officers, 
Gostling laid the fault at officers at sub-unit levels, and senior command-
ers fired Gostling for an inability to train subordinates. There seemed to be 
plenty of culpability to go around. Gostling finished the war in command 
of a reinforcement unit. The Canadian Army’s practice of assigning sacked 
formation commanders to senior leadership positions in reinforcement units 
is problematic in itself and requires further study. 117 
Part of 2nd Canadian Division’s training for its forthcoming role as a 
breakthrough force was to prepare for an assault crossing of a river or a tidal 
estuary, most likely the Seine.118 With this objective in mind, the division 
participated in Exercise Step from 2-8 April 1944. Step was designed: 
[t]o exercise com(man)d(er)s and staffs in the handling of t(roo)ps  
in:
(a) breaking out of a br[idge]head.
(b) the adv[ance] of the div[ision] on a single thrust line.
(c) the crossing of a river obstacle.
(d) the assault of an enemy pos[itio]n using live ammunition.119
The S. Sask. R. conducted an unopposed crossing of the River Cuckmere 
as part of the exercise, but little else. Although the 6th Brigade intelligence 
log for Step noted that the tanks of the 29thArmoured Reconnaissance [South 
Alberta] Regiment were ordered to assist the S. Sask. R.,120 there is no record of 
the two units actually being able to ‘marry-up’ to practise the vitally important 
coordination of armour and infantry.121 Unfortunately, 6th Brigade would not 
participate in the subsequent Exercise Kate, a more-advanced river crossing re-
hearsal in Yorkshire later that spring. That one entire brigade failed to conduct 
a single opposed river crossing exercise debunks the notion of 2nd Canadian 
Infantry Division as a highly trained force in this important tactic.122
In mid-March the battalion received a number of reinforcements from 
2nd Canadian Infantry Division Reinforcement Unit. In total, five officers 
and 150 other ranks were attached to the battalion until it went into action 
when they would be utilised as replacements for initial battle casualties. The 
reinforcements were divided up and posted to specific companies for train-
ing and acclimatising to ease the transition.123
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The battalion moved to the coastal region between Dover and Canterbury 
in late April, 1944 where it would remain until its embarkation for the contin-
ent in July. The move was codenamed Foible to disguise its true intentions, 
but had no training value.124 Due to space limitations, ‘further and final’ 
training hereafter would mostly be limited to drill, route marches and sports 
activities. 125
Two notable exceptions were a ‘weapons circus’ courtesy of the divisional 
support battalion, the Toronto Scottish Regiment, and a long-delayed oppor-
tunity to undergo badly needed training in the techniques of armour/infan-
try coordination with the British Columbia [Armoured] Regiment [BCR]. The 
men were able to get up-close and personal with a number of heavy weapons 
of the ‘Tor Scots’ including 4.2-inch mortars, .303 calibre Vickers medium ma-
chine guns, and 40mm Bofors and 20mm Oerlikon cannons. Unfortunately, 
live shoots demonstrating the tremendous power of these weapons were 
not undertaken.126 For the entirety of the battalion’s campaign in Northwest 
Europe, the Toronto Scottish would provide invaluable fire support to the S. 
Sask. R. Unfortunately, little effort was spent coordinating the actions of the 
two battalions during training. 
The distressing lack of emphasis on armour/infantry coordination in 
the battalion’s training has already been noted. In an attempt to rectify this 
omission, the commanding officer of the BCR’s, Lt.-Col. D. Worthington,127 
lectured the officers of 6th Brigade in coordinating armour and infantry. The 
following day, B Squadron of the BCR’s was temporarily attached to the S. 
Sask. R. so that the two arms could learn about the other. The paired units 
were further sub-divided when troops of tanks were assigned to particular 
rifle companies within the battalion. The war diary entry for 28 April 1944 
described the day’s events as a time of “get[ting] to know one another.”128 
From there the training intensified, with the tankers demonstrating mount-
ing and dismounting drills and giving the infantrymen a thorough descrip-
tion of their tanks’ armour protection and armament.129 The men were next 
given an opportunity to practise riding in and on the tanks. The battalion 
concluded its tank/infantry training with three days of practise in organis-
ing a ‘forming up position’ prior to an attack, the coordination of an attack, 
and the consolidation of ground captured during the advance. Neither live 
ammunition nor an opposing force was utilised to enhance the realism of 
the training.130 The relatively rudimentary nature of this vital training barely 
two months prior D-Day is startling.
While the battalion rehearsed laying minefields on the night of 13 May 
1944, the practice of bouncing searchlights off low-lying clouds to illuminate 
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the battlefield was initiated. ‘Artificial moonlight’ as it was called would be 
used extensively by the Canadians in Normandy. Early impressions were 
favourable as Lt.-Col. Clift noted that “the general opinion is that the use of 
S[earch] L[ight]s would certainly be of value on a dark night.”131 Once used 
in combat, ‘artificial moonlight’ would prove a mixed bag of results, some 
tragic. 
The battalion participated in an interesting rehearsal in late May, 1944. 
Together with the Fusiliers Mont-Royal, the S. Sask. R. would act as the 
enemy to British 59th Division in Exercise Spes. The politics of nationalism in 
the exercise instructions severely curtailed the defensive measures that the 
S. Sask. R. could employ:
For political reasons, which I am unable to reveal to you, I have 
been forced to order you to withdraw from [the] pos[itio]n [you 
occupy] not later than 2000 h[ou]rs 15 May and may be compelled 
to tell you to do so earlier. Despite this you will use your force…
with the aggressiveness which has so long been the characteristic 
of our Army.132
 Following the D-Day landings, the battalion bided its time in anticipa-
tion of combat. Organised sports and cross-country marches filled the men’s 
days. On 3 July, the battalion embarked for France.133 The officers and men of 
the S. Sask. R. were about to find out how they stacked up against a tough, 
resourceful and desperate German enemy. Bitter combat in France, Belgium, 
Holland and Germany cost the S. Sask. R. 83 officers and 1275 other ranks in 
total casualties, including 46 officers and 414 other ranks killed.134
Conclusion
A great deal can be learned about an army by the way it trains. This chapter 
is about one battalion amongst many, and may not exemplify the training 
conducted by the Canadian Army in the Second World War. It is a starting 
point, however, to a subject that requires more work in order to determine the 
quality of training in the broader Canadian Army and comparatively with 
the British and American armies. Further questions remain: Who trained the 
trainers? What impact did the Canadian School of Infantry and the many 
training pamphlets published during the war have on unit training? Was 
there a Canadian way of war established during the long training period 
leading up to combat? What were the roles of divisional, brigade and bat-
talion commanders during training?
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A successful army teaches its soldiers to learn from their mistakes, in 
combat and during training. It must make use of every possible moment. 
This chapter suggests that the training afforded to the battalion, and pos-
sibly more broadly to 6th Brigade and 2nd Canadian Infantry Division as a 
whole, was insufficient. It is a testament to the courage of men of the South 
Saskatchewan Regiment that they achieved what they did in North-West 
Europe, considering the lacklustre training they received prior to combat. 
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Unsung Heroes: Canadian Civil Affairs 
in Northern France
David Borys
As Allied soldiers, sailors and airmen fought for a toehold on the shores of Northern France on 6 June 1944, Civil Affairs officers began conducting a wholly different type of campaign. This was 
one fought not with bullets and brawn, but with supplies and knowledge 
under a directive to provide relief to the beleaguered and destitute civilians 
of war-ravaged Europe. Civil Affairs was a branch of the Army responsible 
for ensuring that the civilian population in Europe did not interfere with 
military operations.1 It was in Northern France that the men of Civil Affairs, 
First Canadian Army, received their trial by fire, dealing with the movement 
and relief of refugees and the reestablishment of law, order and infrastruc-
ture. By absorbing the lessons from every experience, they developed the 
skills necessary to handle the myriad problems they were to face in Northern 
European towns and cities. Indeed, the recovery of Boulogne, Calais and 
Dunkirk marked significant milestones for the development of Civil Affairs 
in the Canadian Army. These operations were highly successful in limiting 
civilian casualties and preventing civilian impediment of military oper-
ations. In doing so, they established a Civil Affairs doctrinal template for 
future urban operations in North-West Europe. 
 Civil Affairs had long been an important part of the modern British 
Army, and this was especially so during the Second World War, when the 
branch sought to address civilian problems in Africa, the Mediterranean 
Theatre, and finally in North West Europe.2 The primary objective of Civil 
Affairs working in liberated countries was to restore order, help re-establish 
local governments, and then co-operate with them.3 In France the work 
of Civil Affairs was complicated by local concerns about control. Leader 
of the Free French General Charles De Gaulle, for example, worried that 
Civil Affairs would infringe on French sovereignty, and therefore Civil 
Affairs was not supposed to seem like a military government even though 
in practice, Civil Affairs’ objective was “to exercise administrative control 
and supervision…in order that the civil machinery may be set going as 
early as possible and in such a way as to benefit the allied war effort.”4 In 
North West Europe then, Civil Affairs had also to succeed at diplomacy 
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and politics, in addition to aiding and cooperating with local officials and 
populations.5 
 Equally important to Civil Affairs operations in Europe was refugee 
control. The Allies feared that large mobs of refugees would impede military 
operations like they had in France in 1940. Civil Affairs was tasked with mak-
ing sure this was not the case again in 1944.6 To do so, Civil Affairs was to 
liaise between the civilian population and the military; and to limit disease, 
disorganization and general unrest in order to prevent civilian impediment 
to the activities of the fighting troops.”7 
 Civil Affairs grouped together roughly 240 officers who were then 
sub-divided into detachments, which became the basic working unit of the 
Civil Affairs branch. Detachments included between ten and sixteen officers 
who specialized in various areas (administration, public safety, supply, 
law, labour, public health, etc.), several other ranks, as well as the necessary 
equipment and material. After July 1944, detachments were divided into 
two types: “spearhead” and “static”. Spearhead detachments followed div-
ision headquarters into newly liberated territory to determine the primary 
problems and provide immediate and short term relief. With emergency 
measures in place, Static detachments established their base of operations to 
coordinate a long term commitment to local issues. Detachments were typ-
ically commanded by a Major, and groups by the Senior Civil Affairs Officer 
(SCAO) who commonly held the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. Civil Affairs 
officers were also attached to corps and army headquarters in the form of 
general staff officers (GSO), often at the rank of Lt. Colonel. In the War Office, 
the SCAO was Major-General P. Kirby, the senior civil affairs officer in the 
Allied armies. The highest ranking Canadian Civil Affairs officer was Brig. 
General W.B. Wedd, appointed SCAO of First Canadian Army in February 
1944. As one historical officer noted, “Brigadier Wedd, in addition to his mil-
itary qualifications [D.S.O., M.C., E.D.] possessed a background of experience 
in civilian life…He had for some years been the European representative of 
the Massey-Harris company, the largest agricultural exporter in the British 
Empire, and many years residence in Europe had made him familiar with the 
language and characteristics of the people in the countries through which 
the Canadian Army was to pass.”8 
 Training for the men intent on entering Civil Affairs was conducted in 
England at the Civil Affairs Staff Centre in Wimbledon, but in December 
1943 the Royal Military College in Kingston opened a preparatory course for 
Canadian candidates. Most of the Canadian candidates were between the 
ages of 35 and 50, rendered available for “other than normal military duties” 
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because of age or a lack of ability to command, etc.9 The Dean of Arts from 
the University of Alberta, Professor G.M. Smith, was appointed Director of 
Civil Studies and in conjunction with Major T.F. Gelley, a member of the RMC 
directing staff, and in liaison with administrators at the Wimbledon school, 
set about organizing the curriculum. The college went on to complete three 
full courses and a partial post-graduate course in Civil Affairs. 141 officers 
came through the Canadian Civil Affairs Staff Course. By August of 1944, 
however, demand for Civil Affairs officers became so great that the course 
was disbanded and all of its students transferred overseas for use.
 Training, although sophisticated, was by no means wholly sufficient 
in preparing Civil Affairs officers for the problems that they would face in 
Northern France. When Civil Affairs units landed in France on D-Day, they 
began to re-establish a fully functioning civil administration. This difficult 
assignment was complicated by the fact that many of the officials in the pre-
D-Day French administration were Vichyites with pro-Nazi sympathies, 
presenting Civil Affairs officials with a complicated vetting process. The 
lessons of Italy had shown that the dismissal of every official who worked in 
the pre-liberation government led only to serious administrative gaps, thus 
it was important at every level to consider which officials were Vichyites and 
which were for an independent France but had chosen to stay and attempt to 
work within the German occupation system.10 
 The vetting process of officials within France’s political sub-divisions was 
aided by De Gaulle’s Comite Français de Liberation Nationale (CFLN) who had 
produced a list of replacements for all major positions throughout France.11 
Almost all senior French administrative officials, regional commissioners, 
prefects and sub-prefects, were to be replaced upon liberation, while at the 
lower administrative levels many were to remain in their position. However, 
the relationship between Civil Affairs and the CFLN was complicated by the 
deteriorating relationship between Charles De Gaulle, American President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill. As 
diplomatic relations became strained it was imperative that the Allies ap-
peared to be not merely custodians of the Gaullist regime, placing De Gaulle 
in power immediately upon liberation. They had to at least present a picture 
to the French people that the choice of government was to be theirs. As the 
SHAEF handbook for Civil Affairs in France noted, “The delicacies of the 
political situation which [we] will obtain lends additional emphasis to this 
point. The utmost care must be taken that no impression is given which may 
be construed as forwarding the political interests of any particular group, 
faction or party.”12 However, the extreme popularity of De Gaulle was 
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recognized by the Allied leadership, and his officials on the ground were 
already working closely and effectively with many Civil Affairs officers, thus 
his ascension to the leadership of the country was thought by many to be a 
foregone conclusion.
Caen was Civil Affairs’ first major test in an urban setting. As Major Reid 
wrote, “No account of Civil Affairs in France would be complete without 
some reference to Caen which, being the first town to present any serious 
problems, tested many theories and taught many lessons which were to 
influence and guide the conduct of Civil Affairs throughout the entire cam-
paign.”13 The city of Caen was located roughly twenty kilometres from the 
Normandy beach-head, and was originally slated to be captured on D-Day. 
As a communication hub near the landing zone, the control of Caen helped 
German units block Allied progress further inland, making Caen a decisive 
battle ground for both sides. Stiff German resistance meant that it was a full 
month later, on 9 July, before the first Allied units entered Caen, and another 
ten days before the city was free of German troops. Vicious street-fighting 
meant significant losses were taken by both sides. Approximately two-thirds 
of the city was completely demolished with half of its residents rendered 
homeless. 
Leading the relief effort was Canadian Civil Affairs Detachment 201, 
which entered Caen on 9 July and was followed over the next few days by 
advance elements of detachments 208, 209 and 219. By 12 July full detach-
ment compliments were established in the city and, while fighting still raged 
throughout the area, Civil Affairs officers were already at work. According to 
a Canadian Army report, “The civilian authorities had provided an efficient 
service for clearing readily–available bodies out of ruins, but it was estimated 
that 600 bodies still remained buried under debris. These, however, were so 
deeply buried that they were not an immediate source of danger to health.”14 
Of more immediate concern were the heavily damaged water distribution 
system and lack of electrical power which prevented the use of pumps, leav-
ing the city without running water or a working sewage system. Debris in 
the streets greatly hampered the movement of supplies to areas in need, and 
severed the eastern and western ends of the city.15 The limited movement 
of supplies was a serious concern for military planners, as it was estimated 
that roughly 20,000 to 25,000 people had to be fed in Caen in the first days of 
liberation.16 
 Consequently, the temporary housing arrangements made for the dis-
placed people of Caen was rather unsanitary but surprisingly, the medical 
situation was not as bad as predicted. “The French services for looking after 
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the wounded in the hospitals…were working admirably when Civil Affairs 
entered the town on 9 July.”17 Civilian casualties were regularly evacuated, 
keeping hospital beds empty for emergency use. There were some shortages 
of medical supplies, but none of the sixty doctors living in Caen were re-
ported evacuated or killed. 
 The inhabitants of Caen gave the Allies a mixed reception. Although 
glad to be liberated, the extensive bombing of the city understandably tem-
pered the enthusiasm of the natives. Perhaps overly optimistic, one report on 
Caen read, “The morale of the population was good. Most inhabitants do not 
understand the reason for severe Allied bombardment of the city…However, 
only among those who have lost immediate relatives does resentment oc-
casionally appear.”18 Mr. Daure, the Prefect of Caen, reported candidly to 
one Civil Affairs officer that, “The strength and efficacy of the bombardment 
made some people compare it to the well-known methods of the enemy.”19 
Two leading religious officials lamented, “We have suffered an undeserved 
fate. Apart from the grievous sufferings of the population, many old build-
ings and churches have been destroyed…”20 However, all reports suggest 
that, overall, the population welcomed liberation, as the Prefect eagerly 
reported to the Allies “there is not the slightest doubt that the people are 
delighted to be liberated.”21 
 The primary objectives for Civil Affairs detachments in Caen were to 
move the homeless population out of the city and away from the fighting as 
quickly as possible while at the same time attempting to restore public ser-
vices. The movement of refugees was a two-phase operation. The first phase 
dealt with civilians situated on the north bank of the Orne River; the refugee 
situation was stabilised by 16 July. The second phase involved civilians on 
the south bank of the Orne and lasted from 19 July to 29 July. During both 
phases, small pockets of German soldiers continued harassing Allied troops 
while heavy fighting raged on the south bank and beyond. Civilians were 
not fully out of danger until they were well away from the combat zone. 
One of the more tragic incidents occurred on the night of 13/14 July when 
heavy German shelling struck a mass evacuation, causing heavy casualties 
amongst the civilian population attempting to flee the city.
 An after-action report on Caen written by Brigadier Wedd from Civil 
Affairs First Canadian Army HQ, detailed the lessons learned during the 
operation. “Since this was the first attempt at large scale control of refugees 
in France, it is obvious that mistakes were inevitable.”22 These operational 
mistakes, however, provided the opportunity to learn significant lessons, 
especially in refugee control. First, “unless military necessity so required, do 
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not make refugees of people who are perfectly willing to stay put.”23 Once 
the refugee problem began to stabilize, there was a tendency for Civil Affairs 
officers to order the evacuation of all persons living in designated city shel-
ters. As the Civil Affairs report on Caen stated, “Sleeping in a shelter does not 
make a refugee of a person…”24 Some shelters provided more than adequate 
protection and once over-crowding was stymied, these shelters were con-
sidered sufficient, sanitary living quarters for the interim period. In certain 
detachment jurisdictions all persons inhabiting shelters were considered 
refugees and forced to evacuate, unnecessarily increasing the number of 
refugees being moved out of the city. This put a strain on the available trans-
portation as well as over-stretched supervision personnel. Furthermore, the 
increasing numbers of unnecessary refugees congested pre-set evacuation 
routes, slowing down the entire evacuation process as well as increasing the 
chance of civilian casualties from enemy bombardment. In order to prevent 
unnecessary refugees, a classification system was created, based on the “state 
of homelessness, willingness to evacuate, and whether or not they have a 
definite destination in mind.”25 The classification of civilians under strict 
guidelines was intended to show Allied willingness to respect, within rea-
son, the wishes of the local inhabitants. 
 The report also called for the establishment of a consistent policy on 
refugees throughout the area of operation. In Caen, Civil Affairs officers had 
ordered compulsory evacuation in some areas and voluntary evacuation in 
others, creating considerable confusion. Furthermore, the report demanded 
that evacuations not begin until all detachments were thoroughly organized. 
The urgent need immediately to remove civilians from Caen appeared to 
override any organized, official plan causing more confusion and chaos than 
was necessary. 
 Finally, one of the most important lessons discussed in the Caen report 
was the need for one officer, with support staff, to be placed in charge of the 
entire refugee operation. Although the whole operation was commanded by 
a SCAO, the specifics of the refugee problem were left to each detachment 
to sort out, causing operational inconsistencies between detachment bound-
aries. As one report read, “Place one single officer in charge of refugee work 
and movement control. Do not override his authority, do not give him staff 
which he does not require, and let him delegate as much as possible of his 
work to local authorities.”26 Furthermore, this officer would be in charge of 
obtaining from all detachments under his command a complete list of avail-
able accommodations in each detachment’s operational area prior to libera-
tion so as to maximize the efficient distribution of refugee groups.
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 Another major problem encountered by Civil Affairs officers became 
apparent in the weeks after the operation for Caen was completed, when 
refugees began making their way back to their homes, regardless of the 
warnings and bulletins issued by military authorities. These waves of un-
controlled refugees posed serious threats to military security, communica-
tion and supply lines. Civil Affairs officers dealt with this return migration 
problem almost identically to the initial waves of refugees moving away 
from urban centres. Civil Affairs and French Liaison Officers (LO) distrib-
uted “posters, and personal appeals to the civilian population…and also in 
some cases [took] more drastic action against those who disregarded such 
instructions.”27 This mixed approach of education and coercion stemmed the 
flood of returning refugees until their numbers were “restrained to a number 
which did not materially interfere with Army traffic.”28 
 Although good for military operations, acts of refugee movement-control 
created tension between desperate civilians and the military personnel pre-
venting their return. Often groups of refugees were forced to move through 
fields adjacent to the main roads creating nomadic tent cities, as refugees 
carried with them “most of their worldly possessions. They came with huge 
wagons, all manner of carts, bicycles laden with bedding, clothes and bottles 
of cider. Many even attempted to bring cattle with them.”29 The lack of avail-
able transport increased the problems facing refugees and put further strain 
on military resources. As one officer noted, “The problem of transport, is, at 
the present time, the only serious one caused by refugee movement.”30 Some 
groups of refugees were uncovered, hiding in various areas throughout the 
battle zone. For instance, a group of 3,000 refugees was discovered living in 
grottoes near Grande Couronne just south-west of Rouen. Most were stranded 
without food or water. Detachments were forced to alleviate this situation by 
telling refugees, “to send representatives to the nearest Divisional Collecting 
Point to obtain food, milk and water.”31 The provision of supplies to these 
refugee groups was not only the humanitarian choice, but reduced the likeli-
hood of civil unrest hampering military movement.
 After Caen a Civil Affairs detachment was to be allotted to each Corps 
on the basis of one per division, thus creating ‘spearhead’ detachments that 
would work closely with division headquarters (HQ). Once initial civilian 
support had been provided, spearhead detachments would be relieved by 
‘static’ detachments, coordinated between Corps and Army HQ. This al-
lowed for the spearhead detachments to move forward with their respective 
division. “Each division got to know and to depend upon its own particular 
‘spearhead’ detachment. The members of the detachment understood and 
readying the south saskatchewan regiment for war
186
were able to deal with the problems and personalities in their respective 
areas or divisions.”32
	 Ultimately, the arrival of Allied soldiers in Caen created a chaotic scene 
of civilian and military interaction. The primary responsibility of the Civil 
Affairs branch was to prevent the civilian population from impeding mil-
itary operations. For the most part this was deemed successful, yet significant 
numbers of civilians were killed and injured, and many more were needlessly 
displaced. The lessons derived from the Caen operation reinforced the need 
for the removal of civilians from the battle space prior to the commencement 
of a military operation in order to limit collateral damage. Furthermore, Caen 
provided valuable lessons on the prevention of civilian casualties from post-
combat issues like food, water and medical shortages. These lessons created 
a solid foundation of much needed experience for the men of II Canadian 
Corps Civil Affairs. 
Throughout July, II Canadian Corps had been fighting under the com-
mand of Second British Army. This changed on 31 July, when for the first 
time First Canadian Army Headquarters became operational in a theatre of 
war. The experienced Civil Affairs staff at II Corps, and now at Army head-
quarters, would prove invaluable to Harry Crerar’s army headquarters in the 
coming months. By the late summer of 1944 the Allies had broken free of the 
Normandy bridgehead and were moving rapidly towards the River Seine, 
an advance that began overwhelming the already stretched supply system 
of General Bernard Montgomery’s 21st Army Group. On 4 September 1944 
the British 11th Armoured Division captured Antwerp, which had a port big 
enough to alleviate the strain on the Allies’ supply system. All that remained 
was for the British to clear the German defences from the Scheldt Estuary, 
which fed into Antwerp. But Montgomery, with eyes on the Rhineland and 
hungry to end the war by the end of the year, chose instead to turn towards 
Germany immediately. Had the bridge at Arnhem not been too far, his deci-
sion would have been deemed a worthy risk; but the bridge was too far, and 
the consequences of his decision were costly for the Allies in general, and the 
Canadians in particular, because at this point Montgomery surmised that 
the capture of a series of coastal ports along the Northern French coast could 
help alleviate, temporarily, the logistical problems plaguing his units. General 
Crerar’s army, situated on the left, coastal flank of the Allies’ advance, was 
ordered to hurry towards the Scheldt, and along the way capture the series of 
smaller coastal ports in France and Belgium, including Boulogne, Calais and 
Dunkirk, to help alleviate the supply problem. These coastal cities during the 
years of German occupation had been turned into fortresses. Gaining control 
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of these fortified garrisons meant brutal street fighting that put thousands of 
civilians in danger. The attack on the channel ports was allotted to General 
Guy Simonds’ II Canadian Corps; their first major test was the liberation of 
Boulogne. 
 The Civil Affairs operation at Boulogne established a successful method 
of reducing civilian casualties through mass evacuations while also ce-
menting a doctrinal formula for future Civil Affairs operations in urban 
areas. The success of the Boulogne operation, codenamed Operation Wellhit, 
was a direct result of the reforms implemented and lessons learned after the 
Caen operation. At first, Civil Affairs officers sought to remove only civilians 
living within the city of Boulogne itself. However, there was suspicion of 
a serious security leak outside the city, prompting 3rd Canadian Infantry 
Division to evacuate “a belt some three to four miles deep encircling the 
city.”33 The evacuation was conducted in conjunction with French authorities 
including officials of neighbouring communes, the Mayor of the town of 
Montreuil-sur-Mer, the FFI (the French Forces of the Interior, a large, loosely 
knit resistance group) and the Secours National (a civilian organization 
intended to aid civilians during wartime). Civil Affairs officers were thus 
working closely with French civil and para-military authorities in carrying 
out Boulogne’s evacuation scheme. 
 The plan called for a general evacuation of the area between the 
Wimereux River to the north, the Boulogne Forest to the east, and what is 
known as the Outreau Peninsula to the south as far as the village of Ecault. 
This was a large area and four major collection points for refugees were 
established. These points were located near significant villages and towns: 
Bellebrune to the north-east of Boulogne, Wirwignes to the east and two to 
the south-east near the small village of Zelique. The evacuation area was div-
ided into two zones, A and B; the northern boundary for Zone A consisted of 
the Wimereux River with its southern boundary consisting of the Boulogne-
Desvres road, running west to east through the centre of the city. Zone B 
incorporated the area south of the Boulogne-Desvres road all the way to the 
sea.34 Thus, refugees from Zone A were directed towards collection points 
near Bellebrune and Wirwignes, while refugees from Zone B were directed 
towards the two collection points south-east of the city. From these collec-
tion points, refugees were transported to Montreuil via train and military 
vehicle convoys, roughly forty kilometres south of the city of Boulogne. Once 
in Montreuil, they were handed over to French civilian authorities and either 
housed by the town of Montreuil and its outlying communes or allowed to 
go and stay with relatives elsewhere until the fighting moved on. Civilians 
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were notified of the evacuation scheme through leaflets printed by 3rd CID. 
These leaflets were either dropped from planes over German occupied areas 
or personally handed out in Canadian occupied areas. These notices would 
often find their way into the hands of civilians in enemy occupied territory, 
thus notifying them of the intended scheme. The leaflet production was over-
seen by Deputy Assistant Adjutant General (DAAG) Major Keith of 3rd CID 
and distribution was to be the responsibility of local unit commanders and 
their troops. 
 There were, in practise, two evacuations in and around Boulogne. The 
first focused on the evacuation of the outlying areas of the city, essentially 
the Canadian front lines. The second evacuation concerned those civilians 
immediately within the city limits. These civilians were allowed to leave 
by the German commander, Lt. General Ferdinand Heim, who arranged 
a temporary truce with the Canadians in early September to carry out the 
evacuation of the civilians from the city.35 Thus the Canadian portion of the 
Boulogne evacuation scheme was in essence the second phase in a two phase 
operation, the first being carried out by the Germans. 
 The Canadian refugee operation offers a valuable instance of civil-mil-
itary cooperation as both Canadian officers and French civilian authorities 
worked closely together to ensure success. As Lt-Col. Walker wrote optimis-
tically prior to the attack, “It seems to me that there is every reason to think 
that this scheme should function easily and effectively. I think it is a first-rate 
example of the French looking after themselves and we assisting them.”36 
Although the evacuation plan was intended to remove the majority of civil-
ians from the battle space, Civil Affairs officers recognized that many civil-
ians would choose to remain in their homes. Furthermore, there was a fear 
that the Germans might prevent the civilians from leaving, so to use them 
as human shields. Lt-Col. Ernest Cote, Army Adjutant and Quarter Master 
General for 3rd CID, was reported to have been “very much concerned about 
the position of [civilians] in Boulogne and action to be taken to care for them 
on entry into the town. He felt that the reputation of the [division] depended 
in considerable measure on the way in which [civilians] were handled.”37 
Therefore, Civil Affairs officers devised a simple yet realistic plan for ensur-
ing that these civilians were cared for the minute the fighting seized.
 The first step was to develop an accurate picture of Boulogne in regards 
to the three primary concerns of Civil Affairs detachments, medical supplies, 
water, and food. With the help of the French liaison officer, Commander 
Mengin, Civil Affairs officers knew that the food situation in Boulogne was 
becoming more critical every day, especially with respect to milk supplies for 
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younger children. As well, medical supplies were short, and the water situa-
tion was urgent. Cote felt that in order to be quickly effective the forward 
Civil Affairs detachments needed to enter Boulogne “practically with the 
leading troops and be able to state to [civilian] authorities that feeding, water, 
[medical] care would be available the same day.”38 
 For water, Cote called for the delivery of 20,000 gallons in the first 12 
hours, followed by 50,000 gallons every 24 hours after the initial supply. For 
this supply, Cote requested transport reinforcement from the corps level to 
assist divisional transport in carrying out this scheme. Cote also ordered that 
enough food rations be provided for the estimated remaining population for 
a period of three days, when the normal supply routes from the countryside 
could be re-established. Furthermore, due to the “advanced state of under-
nourishment and the condition of the children, the rations should contain 
considerable extra milk and soft foods…”39 Medical supplies, consisting 
primarily of bandages, anti-toxins (for diphtheria and typhoid) as well as 
anaesthetics were shipped. Although there was only one doctor attached to 
the detachment 214, Cote felt that the delivery of medical supplies should 
be supplemented with an English Red Cross team as well as a French sur-
gical unit in order to increase the number of trained medical personnel in 
the city. One report noted, “There have been no serious epidemics of com-
municable diseases and with few exceptions hospital beds are adequate for 
civilian needs. Indigenous medical supplies are still available only in limited 
quantities, shortages being met by distribution of Civil Affairs supplies and 
equipment.”40
 The procurement of supplies by Civil Affairs detachments was consider-
ably aided by various French government and non-government organiza-
tions. Although during military operations supply requests were handled by 
the headquarters of the formation commanding the military zone, once ser-
ious operations moved forward requests were to be made by French regional 
authorities directly to their superior administrative body. These requests, 
which would be consolidated into bulk orders, would in turn be handled by 
commanding officers of Lines of Communication who would draw the stores 
from Civil Affairs Inland Depots (CAID) or pass the larger requests up the 
chain of command. Officers of Civil Affairs detachments would act as sup-
ply advisers to local French officials and not be directly involved in supply 
requests. By September the French authorities already, “computed require-
ments for all supplies for the months of October and November.”41 Because 
of this system, and the cooperation between French civilian and military 
officials, supply problems throughout most of France were negligible, even 
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in areas that were still experiencing combat. However, the lack of transporta-
tion was still “the limiting factor in the resumption of normal food distribu-
tion…”42 In an attempt to combat this problem, “Certain French Transport 
Companies have been formed. These [were] equipped with British vehicles 
and are manned and maintained by French military personnel administered 
by the French Military Authorities.”43 
 The results of the evacuation plan and the preparation for civilian 
needs in Boulogne was a major success. Casualty rates were extremely low 
and Civil Affairs detachments provided basic needs immediately upon 
entering the town. There were no reported civilian casualties once combat 
stopped, and the evacuation of large numbers of civilians kept the casualty 
rates low. 
 While troops of 3rd Canadian Infantry Division assaulted Boulogne, 
plans were already being drawn up for an attack on the larger city of Calais. 
Civil Affairs plans were very similar to those from Boulogne and spoke to 
the success with which they had achieved their operational objectives with 
little collateral damage. It was imperative for the Allies to occupy Calais in 
order to eliminate German use of the large naval guns entrenched around 
the city and towards Cap Gris Nez. This would free up Boulogne’s port facili-
ties as well as giving added protection to channel shipping. 
 The assault on Calais commenced on 16 September, spearheaded by 
Brigadier Spragge’s 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade. Spragge’s troops fought 
while 20,000 civilians remained in the city. Heeding the lessons from Caen 
and Boulogne, operational plans were drawn up for the evacuation of these 
civilians into the countryside. Unlike Boulogne, however, fighting began 
in Calais prior to this scheme being carried out. German Lt-Col. Schroeder 
refused to allow the civilians to leave the city. For much of the operation, 
civilians huddled in their houses, cellars, shelters, and trenches. It was not 
until late September, when the German garrison seemed near defeat, that 
Schroeder allowed the 12,000 Calais civilians to leave. Schroeder intended to 
use the civilian evacuation as a tool to disrupt the Canadian attack, forcing 
military resources to be redirected towards civilians rather than hostilities. 
According to the 7th Division War Diary, Brigadier Spragge, “was more 
than slightly put out by the whole affair and cheerfully would have killed 
Schroeder if he could have got his hands on him.”44 Fortunately, the now 
experienced Canadian Civil Affairs thwarted Schroeder’s plans, and the 
civilian evacuation was conducted smoothly. Collection points were estab-
lished at various intervals surrounding Calais in order better to coordinate 
the move of refugees to the country side. 
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 Unlike Boulogne, the food situation in Calais was not deemed critical, 
but the water supply was. Major Alker’s spearhead detachment entered 
Calais and quickly established a clean water supply. Medical supplies were 
considered short, but could be quickly supplemented. Overall the evacuees 
were swiftly removed from the battle space and distributed into the country 
side. Spearhead detachments were already close on the heels of Canadian 
troops and when the German garrison surrendered on 30 September, Civil 
Affairs officers were already working on re-establishing water and electricity 
while food and medical supplies were being moved into the city.
 Dunkirk was the final port town along the coastal route of the 
Canadian advance. Soldiers of the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division made 
several small-scale assaults but found stiff resistance. Operationally—if not 
symbolically-Dunkirk lacked the significance of Calais and Boulogne, so 
it instead was surrounded and masked. In early September the Germans 
attempted to negotiate with General Foulkes, GOC 2nd Division, to al-
low for 20,000 civilians to evacuate. Debate ensued at 21st Army Group 
Headquarters between senior Canadian and British officers on whether 
or not to allow the evacuation. That the evacuation was proposed by the 
commander of the German garrison led most to believe that an evacuation 
was likely somehow to benefit the Germans at Canadian expense. Simonds, 
for one, was against the evacuation “on Security grounds.”45 Furthermore, 
senior operational planners felt that the city would eventually fall without 
the need for heavy bombardment. Thus, the “saving in life by evacuation 
would perhaps not be great in light of the hazards of moving women and 
children to an emergency camp this time of year.”46 The lack of available 
transport would further enhance the hardship of the evacuees. The evacua-
tion might also give the Germans considerable opportunity for infiltrating 
agents. 
 Nevertheless, the meeting agreed that, “it was true that an appreciable 
saving of life would be effected and this humanitarian consideration must 
not be overlooked.”47 Pressure from the French Red Cross also helped form 
the decision. So, with the operational experience gained at Caen, Boulogne 
and Calais, Civil Affairs officers of II Canadian Corps enacted a highly suc-
cessful evacuation of Dunkirk on 5 October 1944. Foulkes’ 2nd Division had 
already moved into Belgium by late September, supporting II Canadian 
Corps’ clearance of the Scheldt Estuary and the approaches to Antwerp, thus 
the ‘masking’ of Dunkirk was carried out by several successive formations: 
the 4th Special Service Brigade, the 154th British Infantry Brigade and finally 
the 1st Czechoslovakian Armoured Brigade. II Canadian Corps Civil Affairs 
readying the south saskatchewan regiment for war
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officers were involved heavily throughout the evacuation scheme, even after 
2nd Division had moved into Belgium.48
 The communes in the areas surrounding Dunkirk were warned on 3 
October to prepare for refugees. Several refugee reception centres were 
already in operation in the area and these became the cornerstone of the 
evacuation program. As Col. Henderson wrote, “These camps are [organ-
ized] and operated by the FFI and French voluntary social workers…I visited 
one at the railway station at Esquelbec and found it a model of cleanliness 
and good organization.”49 While most refugees left the city on foot, medical 
cases and the elderly were transported via ambulances. Four train loads of 
refugees were also moved out of the city towards Esquelbec and Lille. Once 
in the countryside “All [supplies] were to be provided by the Sous-prefet 
from [civilian] resources. Communes in which refugees were to be dispersed 
accepted full responsibility for their maintenance.”50 
 Civil Affairs officers praised the French for consistently providing for 
civilians throughout the various evacuation schemes. In the case of Dunkirk, 
Colonel Henderson wrote, “I should like to give credit to the Sous-prefet [of 
Dunkirk] for the way in which he org[anized] his resources and directed his 
personnel to carry out the plan outlined by Civil Affairs.”51 Another report 
read, “The French authorities have been most helpful in finding accommo-
dation, providing communal feeding and arranging for medical care.”52 In 
many cases, Civil Affairs officers were used primarily to coordinate the myr-
iad French organizations helping with evacuations. In the case of Dunkirk, 
integration of the civilian organizations was achieved just 24 hours before the 
refugees began pouring out of the city. This was no small accomplishment, 
as the groups involved included the Red Cross, the ‘Civilian Defence Passive’, 
various French civilian medical organisations, and disparate segments of the 
Resistance.53 
 On the ground, interaction between Civil Affairs officers and the resist-
ance fighters occurred primarily when Civil Affairs tasked the FFI54 to act 
as temporary policing units to coordinate relief distribution and refugee 
control. Furthermore, the army used these men for guarding German pris-
oners, acting as local guides, auxiliary police duties and even to perform 
mopping up operations against small pockets of Germans by-passed by the 
main assault. The close interaction between Civil Affairs officials and the 
FFI men created a relationship whereby Civil Affairs became pseudo-liaisons 
between the Allies and these paramilitary groups. In one instance, Lt-Col. 
Cote ordered fifty-eight French naval men to return home after they came 
to him claiming to have the authority of an unknown French major with or-
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ders to seize German weapons stored in the town. This prompted a flurry of 
activity highlighted by the Prefect of the Pas de Calais expressing grave con-
cern to Commander Mengin (French LO to II Canadian Corps Civil Affairs) 
about whose hands these enemy weapons may be falling into. The prefect 
specifically requested that these weapons not fall into the hands of the FFI.55 
Although recognized officially as a branch of the Allied military, the regional 
character of FFI personnel was greatly affected by political, social, and eco-
nomic ideologies. In this case, certain FFI groups in the Pas de Calais region 
were rumoured to be pro-communist and the prefect was greatly concerned 
by the prospect of armed communists. Lt-Col. Cote solved this minor crisis 
by cordoning off the town and destroying the weapons caches, save for a few 
hundred small arms which he distributed as he saw fit.
 Problems also arose, however, with the “over-zealous activities” of re-
sistance groups when dealing with arrests of suspected collaborators.56 Upon 
liberation, manyresistance groups, previously hidden, emerged well-armed 
and well organized and began arresting known or suspected collaborators. 
However, unlike in Belgium or the Netherlands, the French authorities, with 
aid from Civil Affairs legal experts, sought quickly to deal with the grow-
ing numbers of arrested suspects. In many cases, “a special commission, of 
two judges and one police officer” was established specifically to investigate 
charges laid down by the various resistance groups and to authorize “the 
release, internment or trial of the accused.”57 Thus, the vetting of arrested 
suspects prevented a buildup in local or make-shift prisons, as well as estab-
lishing legal procedures for suspected collaborators.
 The problems with resistance groups in France never reached the levels 
later seen in Belgium. The Gendarmerie were all well-armed, organized and 
“most willing to cooperate in any matter on which their assistance has been 
requested.”58 Enforcing the law, even against armed resistance groups, did 
not pose a great difficulty for gendarmes, backed by Allied and Free French 
authority. As a report in late September stated, “In France, the state of law 
and order is generally satisfactory.”59 Furthermore, the use of resistance 
groups for various activities like guarding prisoners, refugee control and 
even ‘mopping-up’ activities kept them busy and unified, contributing to 
war against Germany. In general, “The discipline of the majority of the FFI 
and the Maquis is excellent.”60 
 The evacuations of the French coastal towns, based on the plan used at 
Boulogne and derived from the lessons of Caen, were highly successful. By 
keeping the population levels within the urban centres to a minimum, Civil 
Affairs detachments were able effectively and rapidly to deploy and assist 
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the few remaining civilians. Much to the chagrin of men like Col. Schroeder, 
the successful evacuations combined with the cooperation of various in-
digenous civilian agencies limited the impact of non-combatants on military 
resources. Furthermore, in contrast to Caen, civilian casualty figures were 
reduced to the hundreds. As one report stated, “Although fresh reports of 
concentrations of refugees are being received – mainly from the Channel 
coast…no special problems have arisen and the French authorities appear 
to have the matter well in hand.”61 Thus the hard lessons derived from Caen, 
coupled with the success at Boulogne, provided a template for future evacua-
tion operations and marked the beginning of a string of civil affairs successes 
by the First Canadian Army. Although Belgium and the Netherlands once 
again cast the Civil Affairs officer in the role of problem solver, the valuable 
experience and doctrinal lessons learned in France would prove invaluable 
for the tasks ahead.
Notes
1 Directorate of History and Heritage 
(DHH). Major A.K. Reid. Canadian 
Participation in Civil Affairs/Military 
Government: Part 1: Background and 
Beginning. Canadian Miltitary Head-
quarters (CMHQ) Reports: Report 140. 
July 1945, 3.
2 Civil Affairs in the modern British 
army was established in the sands of 
the volatile Middle East during the 
Palestinian Campaign of the First 
World War. Men of the British Colonial 
Service were put into military uniform 
and tasked with civil administration 
and coordinating the relationship 
between the occupying British forces 
and local civilians. This first organiza-
tion was known as the Occupied En-
emy Territory Administration (OETA).
  The Administration was revived in 
1941-42. After the liberation of Abys-
sinia (modern day Ethiopia), the term 
“Enemy” was eliminated from the 
OETA—a recognition of the allied 
status of liberated Abyssinia. After 
the re-capture of British Somaliland, 
the name was overhauled to the Brit-
ish Military Administration (BMA), as 
the term “occupied territory” bore too 
much similarity to the recently con-
quered enemy territories. Although 
these early campaigns gave British ad-
ministrators experience in what would 
become modern civil affairs, these 
operations lacked the one significant 
element that would characterise later 
Civil Affairs operations in Europe: the 
control of and cooperation with large 
populations in built-up urban areas.
  Civil Affairs was again re-named 
in the summer of 1943 when the Al-
lies invaded Sicily, now known as the 
Allied Military Government of Occu-
pied Territory (AMGOT) to reflect the 
multi-national coalition. It was within 
AMGOT that American, British and, 
for the first time, Canadian, officers 
received specific training in areas of 
civil administration. According to 
First Canadian Army Civil Affairs 
historian Major Angus Reid, “in the 
initial stages of the invasions of Sicily 
and Italy, the new organization had 
considerable difficulty in performing 
the functions for which it had been 
designed. This was due largely to a 
general failure on the part of [field] 
commanders to recognize its scope 
and their own responsibilities for as-
sisting the organization.” Directorate 
of History and Heritage (DHH). Major 
A.K. Reid. Canadian Participation in 
195
david borys
Civil Affairs/Military Government: Part 
1: Background and Beginning. Canadian 
Miltitary Headquarters (CMHQ) Re-
ports: Report 140. July 1945, 3.
  However, many fundamental 
structural and organizational devel-
opments occurred during the Italian 
campaign. As Prof. Edward Flint 
writes, “The Italian campaign illus-
trated the impact on Civil Affairs of 
the significantly larger problems…in 
an industrialized nation compared to 
the conditions experienced in Africa.” 
Flint, Edward R. The Development of 
British Civil Affairs and its Employment 
in the British Sector of Allied Military Op-
erations During the Battle of Normandy, 
June to August 1944. Unpublished doc-
toral dissertation. Cranfield Univer-
sity. 2009. p 137. These developments 
were coupled with numerous growing 
pains that were an inevitable product 
of an organization’s early developmen-
tal stages. In fact, Flint points out that, 
“As a result and despite some areas of 
success, the institutional memory of 
politicians and military commanders 
was one that regarded AMGOT as an 
abject failure.” Ibid., 137. In hindsight, 
however, it is clear that much of the 
experience gained in Italy provided a 
foundation for Civil Affairs in North-
West Europe. 
3 Upon entering Germany, the intention 
was to replace the Civil Affairs des-
ignation with Military Government 
and replace or rearrange personnel 
to reflect this shift in administrative 
design.
4 DHH, Reid, report 140.
5 Although this would fall under the 
category of Military Government it 
was merely a change in title for many 
of the Civil Affairs officers.
6 Other reasons for preventing refugees 
from using main road networks was 
the fear of fifth column troops, the use 
of civilians as human shields and the 
difficulty air crews encountered in 
distinguishing columns of refugees 
from columns of enemy troops thus 
resulting in horrific incidences of civil-
ians being strafed.
7 DHH, Reid, report 140.
8 DHH, Reid, report 140, 16.
9 DHH, Reid, report 140, 4.
10 See C.R.S. Harris. Allied Military Ad-
ministration of Italy, 1943-1945. London: 
Her Majesty’s Stationary Office. 1957 
for a discussion on the vetting of of-
ficials in Italy and for a discussion on 
the vetting of French officials see Ol-
ivier Wieviorka. Normandy: The Land-
ings to the Liberation of Paris. Harvard 
University Press: Massachusetts. 2008.
11 Wieviorka, 67.
12 TNA, SHAEF Field Handbook of 
Civil Affairs, France, June 1944. WO 
204/12317. Once deployed, Civil Af-
fairs officers were between a rock 
and a hard place. The Allies, until 12 
July 1944, did not officially recognize 
De Gaulle’s provisional government; 
however, almost immediately upon 
liberation De Gaulle had in place 
many of his deputies and civil ad-
ministrators. These administrative 
replacements occurred quite rapidly. 
After only the second day of the Allied 
entrance into Caen, Gaullist officials 
appointed, “a new prefect (M. Daure), 
a new secretary general and an act-
ing mayor. A commissaire de police was 
also appointed.” LAC, Civil Affairs in 
Caen – First Phase, July 1944. RG 24 Vol 
16632. Thus Civil Affairs officers found 
themselves working closely with 
many Gaullists in an administrative 
capacity even while Allied authorities 
avoided official endorsement of De 
Gaulle’s provisional government. 
13 DHH. Major A.K. Reid Canadian Partic-
ipation in Civil Affairs/Military Govern-
ment. Part 111: France, General Historical 
Survey, July-October 1944. CMHQ Re-
ports. Report 149. Jan, 1946. p 16.
14 Library and Archives Canada (LAC). 
Civil Affairs in Caen: Appendix A to Part 
111 Detailed Report 4. CA First Canadian 
Army. July 1944. RG 24, National De-
196
canadian civil affairs in northern france
fence, Series C-3, Volume 16632, Serial: 
1159/CA/25, 2.
15 LAC. Civil Affairs in Caen. p 2.
16 TNA, I’ve switched them all to TNA. 
I cannot find any archive going by 
LNA. Sloppy.] Reconnaissance Report 
on Caen, 12 July 1944. WO 219/3727, 3.
17 TNA, Reconnaissance Report on Caen, 
12 July 1944. WO 219/3727, 2. 
18 LAC. Civil Affairs in Caen. 2.
19 TNA, Reconnaissance Report on Caen, 
12 July 1944. WO 219/3727, 1.
20 TNA, Caen, 1.
21 Ibid.
22 LAC, First Canadian Army Fortnight-
ly Report No 3, Aug 1944. RG 24 Vol 
16632, 3.
23 LAC. Civil Affairs in Caen. 4.
24 Ibid., 3.
25 LAC. Civil Affairs in Caen. p 4.
26 LAC, First Canadian Army Fortnight-
ly Report No 3, Aug 1944. RG 24 Vol 
16632, p 6.
27 Ibid., 5.
28 Ibid., 5.
29 Ibid., 6.
30 Ibid., 3.
31 Ibid.
32 DHH, Reid, report No. 149, 18.
33 The plans for the evacuation of 
Boulogne were drawn up by Lt-Col. 
Walker of II Canadian Corps in discus-
sion with Major Driver, CO of 225 CA 
Detachment, his 2 IC, Captain de Mun, 
and Lt-Col. Cote of 3 CID. LAC. War 
Diary (WD), Civil Affairs II Canadian 
Corps. Sep 8 1944. RG24, National De-
fence, Series C-3, Volume 16633, Serial: 
1701/CA/4.
34 Ibid.
35 Terry Copp, Cinderella Army: The Ca-
nadians in Northwest Europe, 1944-1945 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
2006), 63.
36 LAC. Appendix 4: Scheme for Evacuation 
of Boulogne – Security Belt. Sep 1944. 
RG24, National Defence, Series C-3,, 
Volume 16633, Serial: 1701/CA/4, 1.
37 LAC. Appendix 5: Report on Scheme for 
Evacuation of Boulogne – Security Belt. 
Sep 1944. RG24, National Defence, 
Series C-3,, Volume 16633, Serial: 1701/
CA/4, 1.
38 Ibid. p 2
39 LAC. Appendix 5: Report on Scheme for 
Evacuation of Boulogne – Security Belt, 2.
40 TNA, Civil Affairs Weekly Summary 
No. 16, 6.
41 Ibid., 4.
42 TNA, First Canadian Army Fortnight-
ly Report No. 3
43 TNA, Report on Supply System, 
France. 20 Sep, 1944. WO 171/722.
44 LAC. War Diary. 7th Canadian Infantry 
Brigade. 29 September, 1944. RG-24 C-3.
45 TNA, Proposed Evacuation of the Ci-
vilian Population – Dunkirk, 21 Sep, 
1944. WO 219/3728.
46 Ibid.
47 TNA, Evacuation of Civs – Dunkirk, 5 
Oct 1944. WO 219/3728, 3.
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid., 2.
50 TNA, Evacuation of Civs – Dunkirk, 3.
51 Ibid.
52 TNA, First Canadian Army Fortnight-
ly Report No 4, 7. 
53 Ibid., 10.
54 One of the most delicate tasks of 
Civil Affairs in these cities was deal-
ing with the local French resistance 
groups. Although often labelled as 
the French Forces of the Interior, the 
FFI was in fact a semi-homogenous 
group comprising various resistance 
movements including the right wing 
197
david borys
Ceux de la Liberation, the communist 
Front National, the left wing groups of 
Liberation-Nord and Liberation-Sud, 
the Christian Democrat movement 
‘Combat’ and many more. Alongside 
the FFI were the Maquis, operating 
primarily in rural areas in southern 
France, who carried out a variety of 
guerrilla-style raids as well as provid-
ing safe haven for those fleeing work 
conscription in Germany. Like the FFI, 
the Maquis’ membership came from 
diverse backgrounds. However, most 
‘Maquisards’ belonged to close knit 
groups loyal to individual “charismat-
ic leaders who were a law unto them-
selves, and inspired fierce personal 
loyalty.” Jackson, Julian. France: The 
Dark Years. Oxford University Press: 
London. 2001, 484. By May of 1944 the 
FFI and Maquis came under the Allied 
chain of command, meaning orders to 
the French resistance now descended 
from General Eisenhower at SHAEF to 
French General Marie-Pierre Koenig, 
nominal commander of the French 
resistance.
55 LAC. WD, Civil Affairs II Canadian 
Corps. Sep 15, 1944.
56 TNA, First Canadian Army CA Fort-
nightly Report No 4, 29 September 
1944. FO 371/42020, 1.
57 TNA, Civil Affairs Weekly Summary 
No. 16, 3.
58 TNA, First Canadian Army Fort-
nightly Report No. 3, Sep 1944. WO 
371/42018.
59 TNA, First Canadian Army Fortnight-
ly Report No 4, 5.
60 TNA, First Canadian Army Fortnight-
ly Report No. 3. 
61 TNA, Civil Affairs Weekly Summary 
No. 16, 7. 
